Suchergebnisse

Introduction : the status of the Tractatus -- 1. An essence to logical representation -- 2. Dissolving the subject : solipsism and the self -- 3. Psychology, philosophy and the mechanistic approach of metaphysics -- 4. Causation and the principles of the natural sciences -- 5. On the relative position of logic, science, and natural languages -- 6. The ethical purpose of the Tractatus -- Conclusion : Wittgenstein's method and the continuity in his philosophy.

Interpreters are divided on the question of whether the phrase 'form of life' is used univocally in Wittgenstein's later writings. Some univocal interpreters suggest that, for Wittgenstein, 'form of life' captures a uniquely biological notion: the biologically human form of life. Others suggest that it captures a cultural notion: the notion of differently enculturated forms of human life. Non-univocal interpreters, in contrast, argue that Wittgenstein does not use 'form of life' univocally, but that he uses it sometimes to highlight a cluster of biological notions and sometimes a cluster of cultural ones. The debate between univocal and non-univocal readers has generated a raft of intricate, illuminating literature on both sides. If it remains to an extent open, it is partly as a result of the fact that the textual evidence available on this matter, in Wittgenstein's later published and unpublished writings, is so limited. In this paper, I argue that considering Wittgenstein's earlier treatment of 'form' can help to shed light on his later treatment of 'form of life'. More specifically I argue that revisiting the Tractatus' treatment of 'form' gives us – perhaps surprisingly – reasons to support a non-univocal later reading of 'forms of life'.

Abstract
In this paper, we defend the view that, although Wittgenstein does not present an epistemology of religion in the sense of the term most commonly found in traditional philosophical texts, he does explore a different understanding of religious epistemology – one that aligns the religious attitude with a particular form of know-how.

This volume addresses, from a Wittgensteinian perspective, the philosophical question of how to understand other cultures. In so doing, it brings into discussion Wittgensteinian and other cultural and philosophical traditions, stemming notably from the West African Yoruba community, Japan, China, and India. The book is therefore not just about intercultural understanding, but also brings together, under the umbrella of Wittgensteinian philosophy, a plurality of cultural voices and philosophical cultures, and sets out to develop an approach to the question of intercultural understanding that emphasises the connection between its epistemological, ethical and political aspects. We propose that the Wittgensteinian tradition - spanning not only Wittgenstein's own corpus but also the work of other prominent and up-and-coming philosophers directly influenced by Wittgenstein - is ideally suited to this task, insofar as it is already fully versant with the two central notions at play: the notion of culture and that of understanding. The contributions to this volume build on a wealth of Wittgensteinian strategies and methodologies to develop an imaginative, fresh portfolio of philosophical responses to the intercultural question, as well as strategies for addressing the special challenges it poses.