Competition, Collusion, and Game Theory
Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Foreword -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- I . APPLICATIONS OF CORE THEORY TO MARKET EXCHANGE -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Consumer Surplus and Transferable Utility -- 3. Some Simple Trading Situations -- 4. m Owners and n Nonowners -- 5. The Basic Core Constraints -- 6. Market Efficiency and Honest Brokers -- 7. Multiunit Trade -- 8. Increasing Returns and Public Goods from the Viewpoint of the Core -- 9. A Brief Historical Note -- Appendix: Consumer Surplus -- II. FURTHER APPLICATIONS OF CORE THEORY TO MARKET EXCHANGE -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Balanced Collections of Coalitions -- 3. Empty Cores -- 4. The Feasibility of Trade -- 5. Group Rationality with Multiunit Trade -- 6. Competition and Numbers -- 7. The Number of Traders and the Emptiness of the Core -- 8. Conclusions -- III. APPLICATIONS OF THE CORE TO OLIGOPOLY -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Properties of the Core under Constant Returns -- 3. The Cournot-Nash Theory of Duopoly for Finite Horizons -- 4. The Cournot-Nash Theory of Duopoly for Infinite Horizons -- IV. THEORIES OF EXPECTATIONS FOR N COMPETING FIRMS -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Expectation Models with Quantity as the Policy Variable -- 3. Expectation Models for Price as the Policy Variable -- 4. Summary -- V. COMPETITION OR COLLUSION? -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Nature of Competition and Collusion -- 3. Equilibrium with Product Variety Illustrated for Spatial Competition -- 4. The Costs of Maintaining Collusion -- 5. Sharing the Collusive Return -- VI. THE MONOPOLY AND COURNOT-NASH EQUILIBRIA UNDER DYNAMIC CONDITIONS -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Dynamic Demand Relations -- 3. Some Fundamentals on Optimal Policies -- 4. The Solvability of Certain Linear Equations -- 5. Properties of the Cooperative and Noncooperative Dynamic Equilibria -- 6. Conclusions