Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Principles, Principals, and Ambition: The Politics of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship -- 2 Glorious Heroes, Tragic Heroes, Antiheroes: How Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship Happens -- 3 A Theory of Bureaucratic Ambition: Why Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship Happens -- 4 The Market for Bureaucratic Entrepreneurs: Career Path and Professional Innovation -- 5 The Psychology of Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship: Human Motivation and Political Advocacy -- 6 Ramps and Ladders: How Career Systems Foster or Inhibit Bureaucratic Entrepreneurship -- 7 What Bureaucratic Ambition Means for Democracy -- Appendix A: Survey Methodology -- Appendix B: Supplementary Regression Analysis Results -- Notes -- References -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y.

AbstractThis study uses an embedded survey experiment to evaluate the effects of issue framing on willingness to pay water and sewer rate increases. Government‐owned utilities require public support for financial resources, and so managers must communicate the value of their services to their customers. Water and wastewater utilities provide several benefits; little systematic evidence exists on which resonate with the public. In this study, respondents in a U.S. national survey were randomly assigned to one of four framing treatments in a question about support for a hypothetical rate increase: reduced pollution, safer drinking water, better tasting drinking water, and low‐income affordability. Compared with the other treatments, the safer drinking water framing yielded 11.2% greater average willingness to pay a rate increase. Multivariate analysis shows that Republican partisans and women responded especially positively to safe drinking water framing. Results have important implications for utilities' outreach and public communications efforts.

The ability of low‐income families to pay for basic water and sewer services is a subject of increasing concern. Large‐scale assessments of affordability across large numbers of American utilities are rare, however, and are limited by poor measurement and biased samples. The present study uses improved metrics and data from an original, representative sample of water and sewer utilities in the United States to calculate the affordability of basic single‐family residential water and sewer service for low‐income households. Results indicate that low‐income households must spend an average of 9.7% of their disposable income and/or work 9.5 h at minimum wage to pay for basic monthly water and sewer service but also that these values vary considerably across the country. Community‐level demographic and economic data are used to identify some correlates of affordability. Region, utility size, and local income inequality emerge as strong correlates of affordability.

AbstractPublic agency executive jobs are temporary matches of individual bureaucrats with government employers. Together, the buyers and sellers of executive labour form jobs in ways that define critical links in the policy process: the relationships between agency administrators and their elected officials. This article argues that when the executive is hired from outside, the job typically carries a mandate for significantly greater engagement with elected officials than when the executive is promoted from within an agency. Analysis of three very different types of agencies demonstrates that individuals who were hired from outside interact with their elected officials more frequently than do those who were promoted from within. These results shed new light on bureaucratic executives' roles in the policy process, their relationships with the governments that they serve, and the theoretical significance of bureaucratic jobs as units of analysis in public policy studies.

Professional networks are widely recognized as important sources of environmental protection policy innovation. I argue that innovations are most likely to diffuse from professions to governments under conditions of bureaucratic job mobility. When an agency head arrives from outside the government he serves, she carries both a reputation and mandate for innovation. The incentives for innovation are less potent when an agency head is promoted from within. The result is mobility-contingent professionalism, for the priorities of an administrator's profession are more likely to become manifest in policy when she arrives from outside than when she is promoted from within an agency. Analysis of data from an original survey of water utility executives tests the effect of career path and professional involvement on utilities' adoption of conservation-oriented water rate structures. I find that executive career path is a strong predictor of an agency's adoption of conservation rates, even after accounting for climatic and institutional conditions. Further, the effect of professional involvement is contingent on career path: Professionalism is strongly associated with adoption of conservation rates for diagonally mobile executives but not for executives promoted from within. Adapted from the source document.

In studies of innovation, policy entrepreneurs recognize latent demand for new policies and then expend resources to promote them. But studies of policy entrepreneurs have generally focused on the demand for innovation, while neglecting the supply side of policy entrepreneurship. This article argues that bureaucratic labor markets affect the emergence of policy entrepreneurs, and so affect the diffusion of policy innovations across local governments in the United States. Analysis of a survey of municipal police chiefs and water utility managers relates governments' hiring and promotion policies to their adoption of professionally fashionable innovations. Agency heads who advanced to their current positions diagonally (arriving from another organization) are more likely to initiate these innovations than are agency heads who were promoted from within. Bureaucratic policy entrepreneurs emerge where government demand for innovation meets a supply of mobile administrators, who carry the priorities of their professions into the agencies that they serve.

Extensive research on "environmental federalism" investigates the effects of shared state‐federal implementation on policy outcomes under the landmark American environmental laws of the 1970s. But these laws originally made no mention of American Indian tribal lands, and subsequent research on environmental federalism has given them little attention. Since 1987, tribes have been eligible to assume implementation primacy under federal environmental law, similar to states. We analyze Clean Water Act (CWA) enforcement under American Indian tribal primacy compared with tribal facilities regulated directly by the U.S. government. To date, 62 tribal governments have been approved for implementation primacy under the CWA. The number and diversity of tribes operating regulated facilities provides uncommon leverage on key questions about environmental federalism. Do tribes that secure primacy enforce environmental rules more rigorously? Or does primacy allow tribes to shirk regulations in a race‐to‐the‐bottom? Analysis of CWA enforcement across 474 tribal wastewater facilities finds that, on average, enforcement increases significantly under tribal primacy. Our findings offer insights about environmental federalism, with important implications for environmental justice.