Suchergebnisse

"Every year thousands of college students apply for and receive federally guaranteed loans to fund their educations in the United States. The loans are managed by nongovernmental entities - Sallie Mae, College Ave Student Loans - that indirectly implement the public goal of affordable higher education. Put another way, the US Department of Education relies on these nongovernmental entities for implementation of public policy via third parties. Where this kind of indirect implementation occurs, and how it differs from direct implementation, is the focus of this book, introducing readers to the theory and practice of third-party governance. It helps students understand market-oriented tools such as contracting, networks, public-private partnerships and other collaborative governance mechanisms that make up the repertoire of third-party governance. This background is, in turn, key to understanding modern governance arrangements all over the world. Author Jessica Terman explores the 'whys' behind government and the market, alongside the theories behind when one or both should be used. The book is filled with case studies exploring the issues at play in third-party governance, including transaction costs and the practices that mitigate transaction costs, as well as the advent of networks and how they have changed the governance structure of public policy implementation. Taking a jargon-free approach, the book is written as a primer on third-party governance, introducing readers to the ways that government is structured and the factors that influence contemporary policy implementation. Third-Party Governance will be required reading on courses related to public administration, public policy, and governance and collaboration"--

Bureaucrats have considerable formal policymaking authority. Yet policymaking discussions often overlook the role that bureaucrats play in the policy process. Current theories suggest that bureaucratic policymaking outputs are shaped largely by political signals sent by elected officials. While these external influences are crucial, current theories understate the role of internal organizational dynamics. This study builds on the bureaucratic response and organizational attention literatures to differentiate internally organized attention from externally organized attention in public agencies. It then conceptualizes two ways that public managers can internally organize agency attention to influence formal bureaucratic policymaking in the context of contracting and procurement. This study adds to the public management literature by showing how internal managerial strategies and activities can influence bureaucratic outputs.

The bureaucratic response literature has focused on the quantity and timing of agency outputs in response to political signals. This focus on quantity rather than more qualitative measures such as the content and character of response has made it difficult to fully understand the causes and conditions under which response occurs in relation to a given signal. In the context of minority preference purchasing policy in the State of Florida, this study examines the relationship between political signals and the content and character of bureaucratic response—what is referred to here as the nature of bureaucratic response. A theory is developed and supported through interview and archival data to suggest that bureaucratic actors evaluate signals and policymaker intentions in determining if and how to respond. The article also provides one of the first in-depth examinations of the inner workings of minority preference purchasing.

The last two decades have seen significant growth in the use of stimulus granting (Cogan and Taylor, 2011; citation omitted). A key motivator is to combat economic decline and distress. But, more recently, these efforts have been to both mitigate economic downturn in addition to curtailing the more significant issue of COVID-19 sickness and death. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) passed truly out of an emergency in terms of both human and economic life. The question becomes whether current research on stimulus-oriented granting holds or does prompt grant spending amid the COVID-19 crisis play by different rules? Does partisan congruence between a state governor and president matter? Does having experience with intergovernmental grants and other measures of capacity make a difference? This study tests the factors that influence stimulus-oriented granting, what I also refer to as prompt spending, in the context of the CARES Act.

Like many other national governments, the United States federal government has a history of using local level implementation structures to stimulate the economy. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) is one case in point. The federal government funneled upwards of $800 billion dollars to states and local governments through what were mostly preexisting programs and institutions in the hopes that shovel-ready projects would be promptly funded and successfully implemented. A key feature of this strategic spending and the research conducted around it is that recipient governments spend down this money as soon as possible. This delay made many question the efficacy of the ARRA. Yet, there is more to program performance than the lack of economic stimulation caused by implementation delay. This study asks the following question: When the media attention and politicization of the spending has died down, what factors influence whether the program meets its performance goals (even though it might have experienced considerable implementation delay)? This question is investigated using the Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP) – as funded by the ARRA.