Suchergebnisse

The last two decades have seen significant growth in the use of stimulus granting (Cogan and Taylor, 2011; citation omitted). A key motivator is to combat economic decline and distress. But, more recently, these efforts have been to both mitigate economic downturn in addition to curtailing the more significant issue of COVID-19 sickness and death. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief and Economic Security Act (CARES Act) passed truly out of an emergency in terms of both human and economic life. The question becomes whether current research on stimulus-oriented granting holds or does prompt grant spending amid the COVID-19 crisis play by different rules? Does partisan congruence between a state governor and president matter? Does having experience with intergovernmental grants and other measures of capacity make a difference? This study tests the factors that influence stimulus-oriented granting, what I also refer to as prompt spending, in the context of the CARES Act.

Like many other national governments, the United States federal government has a history of using local level implementation structures to stimulate the economy. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) is one case in point. The federal government funneled upwards of $800 billion dollars to states and local governments through what were mostly preexisting programs and institutions in the hopes that shovel-ready projects would be promptly funded and successfully implemented. A key feature of this strategic spending and the research conducted around it is that recipient governments spend down this money as soon as possible. This delay made many question the efficacy of the ARRA. Yet, there is more to program performance than the lack of economic stimulation caused by implementation delay. This study asks the following question: When the media attention and politicization of the spending has died down, what factors influence whether the program meets its performance goals (even though it might have experienced considerable implementation delay)? This question is investigated using the Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP) – as funded by the ARRA.

Research suggests that competitive markets and contract design and management influence contractor performance. However, there is less systematic knowledge about how a government's policy-specific capacity and programmatic support to contractors influences performance. This study asks the question of what states can do to maximize the performance of contractors in the context of fiscal federalism. This question is tested in the context of the Weatherization Assistance Program, a federal program where states are specifically instructed to use third-party implementers (i.e. contractors). Specifically, I examine (1) whether state policy-specific capacity enhances program implementation support to help contractors meet their performance goals and (2) how state-provided technical assistance to government contractors can help these contractors achieve performance goals.

With tight budgets and hyper‐partisan interactions within and between the states and federal government, attention is being paid to the implementation of federal programs. This is particularly important because, as the recently implemented American Recovery and Reinvestment Act suggests, state administrators are often the implementers of federal policy. This study integrates the fiscal federalism literature with that on implementation and bureaucratic response to examine the effect that within‐state factors have on the degree of performance goal achievement in federally funded, state implemented programs. The findings suggest that, when implementing federal programs, state administrators face conflicting political incentive structures and policy‐specific capacity and capability deficits that influence their motivation and ability to achieve performance goals.

Scholars and practitioners have come to understand the important role of local governments in the causes and effects of climate change. The literature has examined both the substantive and symbolic determinants of urban sustainability policies in addition to the implementation issues associated with those policies. At the heart of these policies is the idea that local governments have the desire and ability to engage in socially and environmentally responsible practices to mitigate climate change. While important, these studies are missing a key component in the investigation of local government involvement in sustainability policies: government purchasing power. This study examines the effect of administrative professionalism and interest group presence on the determinants of green procurement in the understudied context of counties in the United States.