Suchergebnisse

While the number and proportion of people aged 60 and over will continue to grow in developing countries such as Iran in the coming decades, increasing demand and spending on health and particularly long-term care will pose the same problems that developed countries are facing today. Faced with an aging population marked by the demographic transition, facing increasing longevity and number of people experiencing dependency, frailty and disability reduced number of family caregivers, communities and nations to commit more often an increase in economic berdun . acceleration of demographic transition over a short period for developing countries like Iran should be alarming to their political leaders because none of these strategic planning for aging socio-economic impacts has been elaborated. As baby boomers reach Iran in 1991-1996 at the age of 60 + years to 2050. The Iranian authorities and the social have 40 years (= Windows oppurtunity demographic window "of opportunity") to cover the needs of the elderly population. The prevalence of disability will increase rapidly with age. In our study, we conclude that in 2009, 136 people aged over 60 in 10,000 people are moderately or highly dependent (1,005,400 people in 2009). This means they can not do their activities of daily living and they need help from others. They need another person to help them in their grooming, feeding, transfer, shopping, house cleaning, and so on. For older people with severe dependency, they need help for 24/24 hours. This means they are incontinent, bed ridden and sometimes require artificial feeding (Feeding by naso-gastric or gastrostomy). In the future, in 2050, the number of elderly dependents can be estimated at 544 people / 10000. (5,449,465 people in Iran in 2050) This means that the number of elderly who need care for their life will be multiplied by 4. At the same time, because of declining fertility of this period (2009-2049), the number of children will decline. Thus, parents will not have enough children for their support and care. Another result of our work is estimated that 45% of the Iranian population in 2050 will be aged between 50-80 years, so the average age of family caregivers will increase. ; Alors que le nombre et la proportion de personnes âgées de 60 ans et plus vont continuer de s'accroître dans les pays en voie de développent comme l'Iran au cours des prochaines décennies, l'augmentation de la demande et des dépenses de santé et particulièrement les soins de longue durée poseront les mêmes problèmes de santé publique auxquels les pays développées sont confrontés aujourd'hui.Face au vieillissement de la population marquée par la transition démographique, face à l'augmentation de la longévité et du nombre de personnes en situation de dépendance, de fragilité et de handicap, face à la réduction des possibilités d'aides familiales, les communautés et les nations s'engagent le plus souvent vers une augmentation des structures d'hébergement et de soins, puis reconsidèrent pour des questions économiques la prise en charge à domicile.L'accélération de la transition démographique sur une courte période pour les pays en développement comme l'Iran doit être alarmante pour leurs responsables politiques car aucune planification stratégique de ces impacts socio-économiques n'a été élaborée. Les baby-boomers de 1991-1996 en Iran arriveront à l âge de + de 60 ans vers 2050. Les iraniens et les autorités sociales ont 40 ans (Windows oppurtunity =fenêtre démographique «d'opportunité ») pour couvrir les besoins de cette population âgée. Bien que le vieillissement des personnes soit important le besoin de soins pour une partie d'entre eux le sera encore plus en raison d'une limitation dans leur autonomie quotidienne. La prévalence de l'incapacité va croître rapidement avec l'âge.Dans notre étude, nous concluons qu'en 2009, 136 personnes âgées de plus de 60 ans sur 10.000 habitants sont modérément ou très dépendantes (1.005.400 personnes en 2009). Cela signifie qu'ils ne peuvent pas faire leurs activités de la vie quotidienne et qu'ils ont besoin d'aide des autres. Ils ont besoin d'une autre personne pour les aider dans leur toilette, l'alimentation, de transfert, faire des courses, ménage de la maison, et ainsi de suite. Pour les personnes âgées avec la dépendance est sévère, ont besoin d'aide 24/24 heures. Cela signifie qu'ils sont incontinents, grabataires et ont parfois besoin d'une alimentation artificielle (Alimentation par sonde naso-gastrique, ou gastrostomie). A l'avenir, en 2050, le nombre de personnes dépendantes âgées peut être estimé à 544 personnes / 10000. (5.449.465 personnes en Iran en 2050) Cela signifie que le nombre de personnes âgées qui ont besoin de soins pour leur vie sera multiplié par 4. En même temps, en raison du déclin de la fécondité de cette période (2009-2049), le nombre d'enfants va baisser. Ainsi, les parents n'auront pas assez d'enfants pour leur soutien et leurs soins. Un autre résultat de notre travail évalue que 45% de la population iranienne en 2050 sera âgée entre 50-80 ans, donc l'âge moyen des aidant familiaux va augmenter.

While the number and proportion of people aged 60 and over will continue to grow in developing countries such as Iran in the coming decades, increasing demand and spending on health and particularly long-term care will pose the same problems that developed countries are facing today. Faced with an aging population marked by the demographic transition, facing increasing longevity and number of people experiencing dependency, frailty and disability reduced number of family caregivers, communities and nations to commit more often an increase in economic berdun . acceleration of demographic transition over a short period for developing countries like Iran should be alarming to their political leaders because none of these strategic planning for aging socio-economic impacts has been elaborated. As baby boomers reach Iran in 1991-1996 at the age of 60 + years to 2050. The Iranian authorities and the social have 40 years (= Windows oppurtunity demographic window "of opportunity") to cover the needs of the elderly population. The prevalence of disability will increase rapidly with age. In our study, we conclude that in 2009, 136 people aged over 60 in 10,000 people are moderately or highly dependent (1,005,400 people in 2009). This means they can not do their activities of daily living and they need help from others. They need another person to help them in their grooming, feeding, transfer, shopping, house cleaning, and so on. For older people with severe dependency, they need help for 24/24 hours. This means they are incontinent, bed ridden and sometimes require artificial feeding (Feeding by naso-gastric or gastrostomy). In the future, in 2050, the number of elderly dependents can be estimated at 544 people / 10000. (5,449,465 people in Iran in 2050) This means that the number of elderly who need care for their life will be multiplied by 4. At the same time, because of declining fertility of this period (2009-2049), the number of children will decline. Thus, parents will not have enough children for their support and care. Another result of our work is estimated that 45% of the Iranian population in 2050 will be aged between 50-80 years, so the average age of family caregivers will increase. ; Alors que le nombre et la proportion de personnes âgées de 60 ans et plus vont continuer de s'accroître dans les pays en voie de développent comme l'Iran au cours des prochaines décennies, l'augmentation de la demande et des dépenses de santé et particulièrement les soins de longue durée poseront les mêmes problèmes de santé publique auxquels les pays développées sont confrontés aujourd'hui.Face au vieillissement de la population marquée par la transition démographique, face à l'augmentation de la longévité et du nombre de personnes en situation de dépendance, de fragilité et de handicap, face à la réduction des possibilités d'aides familiales, les communautés et les nations s'engagent le plus souvent vers une augmentation des structures d'hébergement et de soins, puis reconsidèrent pour des questions économiques la prise en charge à domicile.L'accélération de la transition démographique sur une courte période pour les pays en développement comme l'Iran doit être alarmante pour leurs responsables politiques car aucune planification stratégique de ces impacts socio-économiques n'a été élaborée. Les baby-boomers de 1991-1996 en Iran arriveront à l âge de + de 60 ans vers 2050. Les iraniens et les autorités sociales ont 40 ans (Windows oppurtunity =fenêtre démographique «d'opportunité ») pour couvrir les besoins de cette population âgée. Bien que le vieillissement des personnes soit important le besoin de soins pour une partie d'entre eux le sera encore plus en raison d'une limitation dans leur autonomie quotidienne. La prévalence de l'incapacité va croître rapidement avec l'âge.Dans notre étude, nous concluons qu'en 2009, 136 personnes âgées de plus de 60 ans sur 10.000 habitants sont modérément ou très dépendantes (1.005.400 personnes en 2009). Cela signifie qu'ils ne peuvent pas faire leurs activités de la vie quotidienne et qu'ils ont besoin d'aide des autres. Ils ont besoin d'une autre personne pour les aider dans leur toilette, l'alimentation, de transfert, faire des courses, ménage de la maison, et ainsi de suite. Pour les personnes âgées avec la dépendance est sévère, ont besoin d'aide 24/24 heures. Cela signifie qu'ils sont incontinents, grabataires et ont parfois besoin d'une alimentation artificielle (Alimentation par sonde naso-gastrique, ou gastrostomie). A l'avenir, en 2050, le nombre de personnes dépendantes âgées peut être estimé à 544 personnes / 10000. (5.449.465 personnes en Iran en 2050) Cela signifie que le nombre de personnes âgées qui ont besoin de soins pour leur vie sera multiplié par 4. En même temps, en raison du déclin de la fécondité de cette période (2009-2049), le nombre d'enfants va baisser. Ainsi, les parents n'auront pas assez d'enfants pour leur soutien et leurs soins. Un autre résultat de notre travail évalue que 45% de la population iranienne en 2050 sera âgée entre 50-80 ans, donc l'âge moyen des aidant familiaux va augmenter.

While the number and proportion of people aged 60 and over will continue to grow in developing countries such as Iran in the coming decades, increasing demand and spending on health and particularly long-term care will pose the same problems that developed countries are facing today. Faced with an aging population marked by the demographic transition, facing increasing longevity and number of people experiencing dependency, frailty and disability reduced number of family caregivers, communities and nations to commit more often an increase in economic berdun . acceleration of demographic transition over a short period for developing countries like Iran should be alarming to their political leaders because none of these strategic planning for aging socio-economic impacts has been elaborated. As baby boomers reach Iran in 1991-1996 at the age of 60 + years to 2050. The Iranian authorities and the social have 40 years (= Windows oppurtunity demographic window "of opportunity") to cover the needs of the elderly population. The prevalence of disability will increase rapidly with age. In our study, we conclude that in 2009, 136 people aged over 60 in 10,000 people are moderately or highly dependent (1,005,400 people in 2009). This means they can not do their activities of daily living and they need help from others. They need another person to help them in their grooming, feeding, transfer, shopping, house cleaning, and so on. For older people with severe dependency, they need help for 24/24 hours. This means they are incontinent, bed ridden and sometimes require artificial feeding (Feeding by naso-gastric or gastrostomy). In the future, in 2050, the number of elderly dependents can be estimated at 544 people / 10000. (5,449,465 people in Iran in 2050) This means that the number of elderly who need care for their life will be multiplied by 4. At the same time, because of declining fertility of this period (2009-2049), the number of children will decline. Thus, parents will not have enough children for their support and ...

Anomie, as defined by sociologists, refers to a state of society characterized by deregulation and erosion of moral values. In the present conceptual analysis, we bring the concept of anomie under a social psychological spotlight. We explore the conditions under which anomie arises and develop a model outlining various responses to anomie. We define anomie as a shared perception of the state of society and propose that two conditions must be met for anomie to emerge. First, a society's social fabric must be perceived to be breaking down (i.e., lack of trust and erosion of moral standards). Second, a society's leadership must be perceived to be breaking down (i.e., lack of legitimacy and effectiveness of leadership). We highlight two key responses of individuals to an anomic situation: a contraction of the personal self and a contraction of the social self. We discuss how a psychology of anomie can inform and advance broader theorizing on group processes.

AbstractPrevious research has consistently indicated that theory of mind (ToM) is associated with executive control in the preschool years. However, interpretation of this literature is limited by the fact that most studies have focused exclusively on urbanized Western cultural samples. Consequently, it is not clear whether the association between ToM and executive control reflects the specific features of this particular cohort or instead reflects a universal pattern. The present study provides the first empirical assessment of these two constructs in three diverse groups of Iranian children. Participants were 142 preschoolers (4–5 years old) from high–socioeconomic status (SES) urban (n = 33), low–SES urban (n = 37) and rural villages (n = 77). The results show that there is a robust association between ToM and executive control in all three groups, and that executive control contributes significant unique variance to ToM understanding, even after controlling for a range of variables that have been proposed as potential confounders of this relationship. However, although the three groups were equated in ToM, significant differences in executive control were evident. Moreover, cluster analysis identified three distinct clusters that were relatively homogeneous with respect to executive control and SES. One of these clusters was characterized by both low SES and low executive functioning, and showed little evidence of ToM understanding. Taken together, these findings provide possibly the clearest evidence to date that the association between ToM and executive control is not dependent on children's previous experiences on the tasks, or their family and cultural background.A video abstract of this article can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dxh_-3gCB8o

Sociologists coined the term "anomie" to describe societies that are characterized by disintegration and deregulation. Extending beyond conceptualizations of anomie that conflate the measurements of anomie as 'a state of society' and as a 'state of mind', we disentangle these conceptualizations and develop an analysis and measure of this phenomenon focusing on anomie as a perception of the 'state of society'. We propose that anomie encompasses two dimensions: a perceived breakdown in social fabric (i.e., disintegration as lack of trust and erosion of moral standards) and a perceived breakdown in leadership (i.e., deregulation as lack of legitimacy and effectiveness of leadership). Across six studies we present evidence for the validity of the new measure, the Perception of Anomie Scale (PAS). Studies 1a and 1b provide evidence for the proposed factor structure and internal consistency of PAS. Studies 2a-c provide evidence of convergent and discriminant validity. Finally, assessing PAS in 28 countries, we show that PAS correlates with national indicators of societal functioning and that PAS predicts national identification and well-being (Studies 3a & 3b). The broader implications of the anomie construct for the study of group processes are discussed.

International audience ; There is evidence that democracies are under threat around the world while the quest for strong leaders is increasing. Although the causes of these developments are complex and multifaceted, here we focus on one factor: the extent to which citizens express materialist and post-materialist concerns. We explore whether objective higher levels of democracy are differentially associated with materialist and post-materialist concerns and, in turn, whether this is related to the wish for a strong leader. Testing this hypothesis across 27 countries (N = 5,741) demonstrated a direct negative effect of democracies' development on the wish for a strong leader. Further, multi-level mediation analysis showed that the relation between the Democracy Index and the wish for a strong leader was mediated by materialist concerns. This pattern of results suggests that lower levels of democracy are associated with enhanced concerns about basic needs and this is linked to greater support for strong leaders.

International audience ; There is evidence that democracies are under threat around the world while the quest for strong leaders is increasing. Although the causes of these developments are complex and multifaceted, here we focus on one factor: the extent to which citizens express materialist and post-materialist concerns. We explore whether objective higher levels of democracy are differentially associated with materialist and post-materialist concerns and, in turn, whether this is related to the wish for a strong leader. Testing this hypothesis across 27 countries (N = 5,741) demonstrated a direct negative effect of democracies' development on the wish for a strong leader. Further, multi-level mediation analysis showed that the relation between the Democracy Index and the wish for a strong leader was mediated by materialist concerns. This pattern of results suggests that lower levels of democracy are associated with enhanced concerns about basic needs and this is linked to greater support for strong leaders.

International audience ; There is evidence that democracies are under threat around the world while the quest for strong leaders is increasing. Although the causes of these developments are complex and multifaceted, here we focus on one factor: the extent to which citizens express materialist and post-materialist concerns. We explore whether objective higher levels of democracy are differentially associated with materialist and post-materialist concerns and, in turn, whether this is related to the wish for a strong leader. Testing this hypothesis across 27 countries (N = 5,741) demonstrated a direct negative effect of democracies' development on the wish for a strong leader. Further, multi-level mediation analysis showed that the relation between the Democracy Index and the wish for a strong leader was mediated by materialist concerns. This pattern of results suggests that lower levels of democracy are associated with enhanced concerns about basic needs and this is linked to greater support for strong leaders.

Collective nostalgia for the good old days of the country thrives across the world. However, little is known about the social psychological dynamics of this collective emotion across cultures. We predicted that collective nostalgia is triggered by collective angst as it helps people to restore a sense of in-group continuity via stronger in-group belonging and out-group rejection (in the form of opposition to immigrants). Based on a sample (N = 5956) of individuals across 27 countries, the general pattern of results revealed that collective angst predicts nostalgia, which subsequently relates to stronger feelings of in-group continuity via in-group belonging (but not via out-group rejection). Collective nostalgia generally predicted opposition to immigrants, but this was subsequently not related to in-group continuity.

Collective nostalgia for the good old days of the country thrives across the world. However, little is known about the social psychological dynamics of this collective emotion across cultures. We predicted that collective nostalgia is triggered by collective angst as it helps people to restore a sense of in-group continuity via stronger in-group belonging and out-group rejection (in the form of opposition to immigrants). Based on a sample (N = 5,956) of individuals across 27 countries, the general pattern of results revealed that collective angst predicts collective nostalgia, which subsequently relates to stronger feelings of in-group continuity via in-group belonging (but not via out-group rejection). Collective nostalgia generally predicted opposition to immigrants, but this was subsequently not related to in-group continuity. ; SCOPUS: ar.j ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

There is evidence that democracies are under threat around the world while the quest for strong leaders is increasing. Although the causes of these developments are complex and multifaceted, here we focus on one factor: the extent to which citizens express materialist and post-materialist concerns. We explore whether objective higher levels of democracy are differentially associated with materialist and post-materialist concerns and, in turn, whether this is related to the wish for a strong leader. Testing this hypothesis across 27 countries (N = 5,741) demonstrated a direct negative effect of democracies' development on the wish for a strong leader. Further, multi-level mediation analysis showed that the relation between the Democracy Index and the wish for a strong leader was mediated by materialist concerns. This pattern of results suggests that lower levels of democracy are associated with enhanced concerns about basic needs and this is linked to greater support for strong leaders. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion