Suchergebnisse

The Icelandic economy collapsed dramatically in the fall of 2008, making the country one of the first victims of the sharp economic downturn that hit most of the West. The Icelandic crisis may serve as an especially illuminating case study of the psychology of economic booms and busts. We offer an analysis of the buildup and aftermath of the economic crisis in Iceland using theories and findings from social psychology and related disciplines. During the buildup, at the national level we focus on strong national identity, high levels of trust, and system justification. At the group level, we discuss homogeneity of bank employees, group identity, and organizational culture. At the individual level the focus is on motivated reasoning and cognitive heuristics. During the aftermath at the national level, the primary focus is on collective action and the ascent of women into power. At the individual level we discuss changes in values, and report on a study in which we examined people's perceptions of what caused the crisis and how it relates to political ideology. We conclude by considering several behaviors not accounted for in our analysis and some policy implications that can be gleaned from the analysis.

This book examines to what extent politics in Iceland have been transformed in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. The book focuses on whether the short-term sudden shock caused by the Great Recession has permanently transformed politics, political behaviour and the Icelandic party system or whether its effect was primarily transitory. These questions remain highly relevant to the wider field of political science, as the book examines under what circumstances sudden shocks lead to permanent changes in a political system. As such, the book situates the post-crisis Icelandic case both temporally and comparatively and evaluates to what extent the Iceland experience is reflective of broader patterns found in other Western democracies, particularly those other countries that were also hard hit by the Great Recession (e.g. Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy). This book will be of key interest to scholars and students of Nordic politics, Icelandic politics and society, electoral studies, political parties and party systems, representative democracy, political behaviour and more broadly to European and comparative politics.

People differ in their general tendency to endorse conspiracy theories (that is, conspiracy mentality). Previous research yielded inconsistent findings on the relationship between conspiracy mentality and political orientation, showing a greater conspiracy mentality either among the political right (a linear relation) or amongst both the left and right extremes (a curvilinear relation). We revisited this relationship across two studies spanning 26 countries (combined N = 104,253) and found overall evidence for both linear and quadratic relations, albeit small and heterogeneous across countries. We also observed stronger support for conspiracy mentality among voters of opposition parties (that is, those deprived of political control). Nonetheless, the quadratic effect of political orientation remained significant when adjusting for political control deprivation. We conclude that conspiracy mentality is associated with extreme left- and especially extreme right-wing beliefs, and that this non-linear relation may be strengthened by, but is not reducible to, deprivation of political control. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/inPress

People differ in their general tendency to endorse conspiracy theories (i.e., conspiracy mentality). Previous research yielded inconsistent findings on the relationship between conspiracy mentality and political orientation, showing a greater conspiracy mentality either among the political right (a linear relation), or among both the left and right extremes (a curvilinear relation). We revisited this relationship across two studies spanning 26 countries (combined N=104,253) and found overall evidence for both linear and quadratic relations, even though small and heterogeneous across countries. We also observed stronger support for conspiracy mentality among voters of opposition parties (i.e., those deprived of political control).Nonetheless, the quadratic effect of political orientation remained significant when adjusting for political control deprivation. We conclude that conspiracy mentality is associated with extreme left- and especially extreme right-wing beliefs, and that this non-linear relation may be strengthened by, but is not reducible to, deprivation of political control.

People differ in their general tendency to endorse conspiracy theories (i.e., conspiracy mentality). Previous research yielded inconsistent findings on the relationship between conspiracy mentality and political orientation, showing a greater conspiracy mentality either among the political right (a linear relation), or among both the left and right extremes (a curvilinear relation). We revisited this relationship across two studies spanning 26 countries (combined N=104,253) and found overall evidence for both linear and quadratic relations, even though small and heterogeneous across countries. We also observed stronger support for conspiracy mentality among voters of opposition parties (i.e., those deprived of political control). Nonetheless, the quadratic effect of political orientation remained significant when adjusting for political control deprivation. We conclude that conspiracy mentality is associated with extreme left- and especially extreme right-wing beliefs, and that this non-linear relation may be strengthened by, but is not reducible to, deprivation of political control.

People differ in their general tendency to endorse conspiracy theories (that is, conspiracy mentality). Previous research yielded inconsistent findings on the relationship between conspiracy mentality and political orientation, showing a greater conspiracy mentality either among the political right (a linear relation) or amongst both the left and right extremes (a curvilinear relation). We revisited this relationship across two studies spanning 26 countries (combined N = 104,253) and found overall evidence for both linear and quadratic relations, albeit small and heterogeneous across countries. We also observed stronger support for conspiracy mentality among voters of opposition parties (that is, those deprived of political control). Nonetheless, the quadratic effect of political orientation remained significant when adjusting for political control deprivation. We conclude that conspiracy mentality is associated with extreme left- and especially extreme right-wing beliefs, and that this non-linear relation may be strengthened by, but is not reducible to, deprivation of political control. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion