This work examines how and why internationalisation of markets affect economic institutions. Its arguments relate to major debates in comparative politics, international relations globalisation, political economy and regulation. It is also relevant for business studies and law
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AbstractAlthough cultural and political nationalism have often been treated as separate, recent studies argue that they are linked because the state produces policies such as promotion of cultural heritage to further nation building. The article examines the conditions that favour national political leaders adopting policies to protect historic buildings for aims of political nationalism. It compares France and Italy, focusing on the period after 1870. It finds that in both countries, national political leaders have introduced extensive protection of historic buildings when faced with major challenges such as war, regime change or pressures from localism or supporters of cultural nationalism as part of wider strategies to build and reinforce the nation state. But Italy extended protection earlier and more deeply than France, suggesting in a later nation state with strong inherited cultural nationalism but major political weaknesses and, national political leaders may introduce earlier, more far‐reaching and more layered legal protection than in states created earlier and with fewer weaknesses.
AbstractHistoric buildings are important in nationalism through their roles in building and reinforcing national identity. As part of the expanding 'heritage industry', they are also of growing economic and political importance. Despite their physical existence, historic buildings are 'created' – they must be constructed as 'historic' through processes of choice and the attachment of significance. The state can perform these functions through policies that define and select buildings for protection, by ownership and funding, and by its uses of buildings for nationalistic purposes. Yet state actors can have good reasons – nationalistic and economic – to destroy or fail to preserve historic buildings. The paper examines why, when and how state actors pursue policies to protect historic buildings. It offers arguments about patterns of state action that part of state strategies to promote national identity and cultural nationalism.
The article examines the European Commission's use of its legal powers over mergers. It discusses and tests two views. One is that the 'neoliberal' Commission has ended previous industrial policies of aiding 'national champion' firms to grow through mergers and instead pursues a 'merger-constraining' policy of vigorously using its legal powers to block mergers. The other is that the Commission follows an 'integrationist policy' of seeking the development of larger European firms to deepen economic integration. It examines Commission decisions under the 1989 EC Merger Regulation between 1990 and 2009. It selects three major sectors that are 'likely' for the 'merger-constraining' view - banking, energy and telecommunications - and analyses a dataset of almost 600 Commission decisions and then individual merger cases. It finds that the Commission has approved almost all mergers, including by former 'national champion' firms. There have been only two prohibitions over 20 years in the three sectors and the outcome has been the creation of larger European firms through mergers. It explains how the Commission can pursue an integrationist policy through the application of competition processes and criteria. The wider implication is that the Commission can combine competition policy with achieving the 'industrial policy' aim of aiding the development of larger European firms. Adapted from the source document.
AbstractThe article examines theEuropeanCommission's use of its legal powers over mergers. It discusses and tests two views. One is that the 'neoliberal'Commission has ended previous industrial policies of aiding 'national champion' firms to grow through mergers and instead pursues a 'merger‐constraining' policy of vigorously using its legal powers to block mergers. The other is that theCommission follows an 'integrationist policy' of seeking the development of largerEuropean firms to deepen economic integration. It examinesCommission decisions under the 1989ECMerger Regulation between 1990 and 2009. It selects three major sectors that are 'likely' for the 'merger‐constraining' view – banking, energy and telecommunications – and analyses a dataset of almost 600Commission decisions and then individual merger cases. It finds that theCommission has approved almost all mergers, including by former 'national champion' firms. There have been only two prohibitions over 20 years in the three sectors and the outcome has been the creation of largerEuropean firms through mergers. It explains how theCommission can pursue an integrationist policy through the application of competition processes and criteria. The wider implication is that theCommission can combine competition policy with achieving the 'industrial policy' aim of aiding the development of largerEuropean firms.