Suchergebnisse

Da valgdeltagelsen er uforholdsmæssigt lav blandt dårligt stillede borgere, vil indførelsen af en retslig forpligtigelse til at stemme føre til en større stigning i valgdeltagelsen blandt dårligt stillede borgere end blandt velstillede borgere. Derfor øger stemmepligt dårligt stillede borgeres politiske indflydelse. De to mest prominente argumenter for stemmepligt tager begge afsæt i denne velbegrundede empiriske påstand. Ifølge disse argumenter er stemmepligt retfærdiggjort på grund af de gode konsekvenser af at øge de dårligt stilledes politiske indflydelse. Det er imidlertid ikke muligt at retfærdiggøre at påbyde velstillede borgere at stemme med henvisning til, at det er ønskværdigt at hæve valgdeltagelsen blandt dårligt stillede borgere. Derfor slår begge argumenter fejl.

Since nonvoting is concentrated among badly off electors, the introduction of compulsory voting will raise electoral turnout among badly off electors more than among well off electors. Therefore, compulsory voting increases the political influence of the worst off. This well-founded empirical claim is central to the two most prominent arguments in favor of compulsory voting. According to both arguments, compulsory voting is justified because of the good consequences of increasing the political influence of badly off electors. It is, however, not possible to justify compelling well off electors to vote on the grounds that it is desirable to raise turnout among badly off electors. Therefore, both arguments fail.

Since nonvoting is concentrated among badly off electors, the introduction of compulsory voting will raise electoral turnout among badly off electors more than among well off electors. Therefore, compulsory voting increases the political influence of the worst off. This well-founded empirical claim is central to the two most prominent arguments in favor of compulsory voting. According to both arguments, compulsory voting is justified because of the good consequences of increasing the political influence of badly off electors. It is, however, not possible to justify compelling well off electors to vote on the grounds that it is desirable to raise turnout among badly off electors. Therefore, both arguments fail.

This paper argues that according to the influential version of legal moralism presented by Moore infidelity should all-things-considered be criminalized. This is interesting because criminalizing infidelity is bound to be highly controversial and because Moore's legal moralism is a prime example of a self-consciously liberal legal moralism, which aims to yield legislative implications that are quite similar to liberalism, while maintaining that morality as such should be legally enforced. Moore tries to make his theory yield such implications, first by claiming that the scope of our moral obligations is much more limited than legal moralists have traditionally claimed, and second by allowing for the possibility that the goodness of legally enforcing morality is often outweighed by the badness of limiting citizens' morally valuable autonomy and spending scarce resources on enforcement. If Moore is successful in this, legal moralism is strengthened because it becomes immune to many of the most damaging liberal objections. By showing that despite making those moves Moore's legal moralism is still committed to criminalizing infidelity, a manifestly illiberal implication for legislation, it is established that Moore is unsuccessful in creating a liberal legal moralism, and Moore's failure in this regard raises questions about whether there can be such a thing as a liberal legal moralism.

This paper discusses how legal moralism should be defined. It is argued that legal moralism should be defined as the position that "For any X, it is always a pro tanto reason for justifiably imposing legal regulation on X that X is morally wrong (where "morally wrong" is not conceptually equivalent to "harmful")". Furthermore, a distinction between six types of legal moralism is made. The six types are grouped according to whether they are concerned with the enforcement of positive or critical morality, and whether they are concerned with criminalising, legally restricting, or refraining from legally protecting morally wrong behaviour. This is interesting because not all types of legal moralism are equally vulnerable to the different critiques of legal moralism that have been put forth. Indeed, I show that some interesting types of legal moralism have not been criticised at all.

Under mandated choice policies, people are free to choose whichever option they prefer, but "choosing not to choose" is penalized. In Australia, voting is mandatory, and abstaining is penalized with a fine. In New Zealand and several American states, it is mandatory for those who want to obtain a driver's license that they decide whether to register as organ donors. If they fail to do so, they will not receive a driver's license. Proponents of such policies stress that they may be the least autonomy-infringing ways of achieving some good and provide society with knowledge about people's preferences and are, partly for these reasons, preferable to employing defaults. This article compares mandated choice in voting and donor registration with respect to the ends served, how a mandated choice policy will serve these ends, the distribution of burdens, and the nature of the possible options. It is argued that mandated choice is more attractive in the context of donor registration.

According to luck egalitarianism, it is not unfair when people are disadvantaged by choices they are responsible for. This implies that those who are disadvantaged by choices that prevent disadvantage to others are not eligible for compensation. This is counterintuitive. We argue that the problem such cases pose for luck egalitarianism reveals an important distinction between responsibility for creating disadvantage and responsibility for distributing disadvantage which has hitherto been overlooked. We develop and defend a version of luck egalitarianism which only holds people responsible for creating disadvantage. This revision enables luck egalitarianism to offer compensation to those who are disadvantaged by preventing disadvantage to others, like dependent caretakers, without compromising the responsibility–sensitivity at the heart of luck egalitarianism.

Abstract
In this article, we argue that anyone who accepts that (1) voting should be compulsory, (2) voting should be secret, and (3) voting should be done by paper ballot ends up with a morally problematic position. In electoral systems where compulsory voting is implemented and the secret paper ballot is in place, it is impossible for officials to check if an elector has cast a valid vote. Therefore, only those who fail to show up at the polls are penalized under the law of compulsory voting. Those electors who show up at the polls but do not vote are not penalized. We argue that this practice amounts to officially sanctioned unequal enforcement of a law, and that such a practice is morally problematic. We then argue that this problem should be solved by rejecting compulsory voting in favor of true mandatory attendance, that is, a regime where the law on the books requires only showing up at the polls on election day as opposed to formally requiring that electors actually cast a valid vote. This is so since only mandatory attendance can be enforced without infringing on the secret ballot, and the law on the books ought to reflect what is actually enforced in practice.