ZINGIBER SULPHUREUM Zingiberaceae
In: Curtis's botanical magazine, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 73-77
ISSN: 1467-8748
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In: Curtis's botanical magazine, Band 12, Heft 2, S. 73-77
ISSN: 1467-8748
In: Bori , P J , Argyriou , D & Theilade , I 2020 , ' Geographic citizen science for forest monitoring and conservation ' , Policy Briefs (Copenhagen Centre for Development Research) , vol. 2020 , no. 2 , pp. 1-6 .
The aim of this brief is to highlight the effectiveness and achievements of the Prey Lang Community Network (PLCN), while presenting those factors that inhibit reaching the full potential of applying citizen science in a local conservation context. Ending with a number of policy recommendations, the brief targets donors, government and environmental monitoring bodies, whose actions could contribute to the removal of these barriers.
BASE
In: Land use policy: the international journal covering all aspects of land use, Band 48, S. 317-328
ISSN: 0264-8377
In: Land use policy: the international journal covering all aspects of land use, Band 120, S. 106258
ISSN: 0264-8377
In: Land use policy: the international journal covering all aspects of land use, Band 86, S. 268-279
ISSN: 0264-8377
In: Environmental management: an international journal for decision makers, scientists, and environmental auditors, Band 61, Heft 6, S. 1019-1030
ISSN: 1432-1009
In: Turreira-García , N , Meilby , H , Brofeldt , S , Argyriou , D & Theilade , I 2018 , ' Who wants to save the forest? Characterizing community-led monitoring in Prey Lang, Cambodia ' , Environmental Management , vol. 61 , no. 6 , pp. 1019-1030 . https://doi.org/10.1007/s00267-018-1039-0
Community monitoring is believed to be successful only where there is sustained funding, legislation for communities to enforce rules, clear tenure rights, and an enabling environment created by the state. Against this backdrop, we present the case of an autonomous grassroots-monitoring network that took the initiative to protect their forest, in a context, where no external incentives and rule enforcement power were provided. The aim was to analyze the socio-demographic and economic backgrounds, motivations and achievements of forest monitors, compared to non-monitors in the same communities. A total of 137 interviews were conducted in four villages bordering Prey Lang forest in Cambodia. We used binary logit models to identify the factors that influenced the likelihood of being a monitor. Results show that there were few (22%, n = 30) active monitors. Active monitors were intrinsically motivated forest-users, and not specifically associated with a particular gender, ethnicity, or residence-time in that area. The most common interventions were with illegal loggers, and the monitors had a general feeling of success in stopping the illegal activities. Most (73%, n = 22) of them had been threatened by higher authorities and loggers. Our results show that despite the lack of power to enforce rules, absence of external funding and land-ownership rights, and enduring threats of violence and conflicts, autonomous community monitoring may take place when community members are sufficiently motivated by the risk of losing their resources. ; Community monitoring is believed to be successful only where there is sustained funding, legislation for communities to enforce rules, clear tenure rights, and an enabling environment created by the state. Against this backdrop, we present the case of an autonomous grassroots-monitoring network that took the initiative to protect their forest, in a context, where no external incentives and rule enforcement power were provided. The aim was to analyze the socio-demographic and economic backgrounds, motivations and achievements of forest monitors, compared to non-monitors in the same communities. A total of 137 interviews were conducted in four villages bordering Prey Lang forest in Cambodia. We used binary logit models to identify the factors that influenced the likelihood of being a monitor. Results show that there were few (22%, n = 30) active monitors. Active monitors were intrinsically motivated forest-users, and not specifically associated with a particular gender, ethnicity, or residence-time in that area. The most common interventions were with illegal loggers, and the monitors had a general feeling of success in stopping the illegal activities. Most (73%, n = 22) of them had been threatened by higher authorities and loggers. Our results show that despite the lack of power to enforce rules, absence of external funding and land-ownership rights, and enduring threats of violence and conflicts, autonomous community monitoring may take place when community members are sufficiently motivated by the risk of losing their resources.
BASE
In: Land use policy: the international journal covering all aspects of land use, Band 79, S. 822-833
ISSN: 0264-8377
Expansion of Hevea brasiliensis rubber plantations is a resurgent driver of deforestation, carbon emissions and biodiversity loss in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian rubber extent is massive, equivalent to 67% of oil palm, with rapid further expansion predicted. Results-based carbon finance could dis-incentivise forest conversion to rubber, but efficacy will be limited unless payments match, or at least approach, the costs of avoided deforestation. These include opportunity costs (timber and rubber profits), plus carbon finance scheme setup (transaction) and implementation costs. Using comprehensive Cambodian forest data, and exploring scenarios of selective logging and conversion, we find that carbon prices of $30-$51 tCO2-1 are needed to break even against costs; higher than those currently paid on carbon markets or through carbon funds. To defend forests from rubber, either carbon prices must be increased, or other strategies are needed, such as corporate zero-deforestation pledges, and governmental regulation and enforcement of forest protection.
BASE
In: Warren-Thomas , E M , Edwards , D P , Bebber , D P , Chhang , P , Diment , A N , Evans , T D , Lambrick , F H , Maxwell , J F , Nut , M , O'Kelly , H J , Theilade , I & Dolman , P M 2018 , ' Protecting tropical forests from the rapid expansion of rubber using carbon payments ' , Nature Communications , vol. 9 , no. 1 , 911 , pp. 1-12 . https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-018-03287-9
Expansion of Hevea brasiliensis rubber plantations is a resurgent driver of deforestation, carbon emissions, and biodiversity loss in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian rubber extent is massive, equivalent to 67% of oil palm, with rapid further expansion predicted. Results-based carbon finance could dis-incentivise forest conversion to rubber, but efficacy will be limited unless payments match, or at least approach, the costs of avoided deforestation. These include opportunity costs (timber and rubber profits), plus carbon finance scheme setup (transaction) and implementation costs. Using comprehensive Cambodian forest data, exploring scenarios of selective logging and conversion, and assuming land-use choice is based on net present value, we find that carbon prices of $30-$51 per tCO2 are needed to break even against costs, higher than those currently paid on carbon markets or through carbon funds. To defend forests from rubber, either carbon prices must be increased, or other strategies are needed, such as corporate zero-deforestation pledges, and governmental regulation and enforcement of forest protection. ; Expansion of Hevea brasiliensis rubber plantations is a resurgent driver of deforestation, carbon emissions, and biodiversity loss in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian rubber extent is massive, equivalent to 67% of oil palm, with rapid further expansion predicted. Results-based carbon finance could dis-incentivise forest conversion to rubber, but efficacy will be limited unless payments match, or at least approach, the costs of avoided deforestation. These include opportunity costs (timber and rubber profits), plus carbon finance scheme setup (transaction) and implementation costs. Using comprehensive Cambodian forest data, exploring scenarios of selective logging and conversion, and assuming land-use choice is based on net present value, we find that carbon prices of $30-$51 per tCO 2 are needed to break even against costs, higher than those currently paid on carbon markets or through carbon funds. To defend forests from rubber, either carbon prices must be increased, or other strategies are needed, such as corporate zero-deforestation pledges, and governmental regulation and enforcement of forest protection.
BASE
Expansion of Hevea brasiliensis rubber plantations is a resurgent driver of deforestation, carbon emissions, and biodiversity loss in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian rubber extent is massive, equivalent to 67% of oil palm, with rapid further expansion predicted. Results-based carbon finance could dis-incentivise forest conversion to rubber, but efficacy will be limited unless payments match, or at least approach, the costs of avoided deforestation. These include opportunity costs (timber and rubber profits), plus carbon finance scheme setup (transaction) and implementation costs. Using comprehensive Cambodian forest data, exploring scenarios of selective logging and conversion, and assuming land-use choice is based on net present value, we find that carbon prices of $30–$51 per tCO2 are needed to break even against costs, higher than those currently paid on carbon markets or through carbon funds. To defend forests from rubber, either carbon prices must be increased, or other strategies are needed, such as corporate zero-deforestation pledges, and governmental regulation and enforcement of forest protection.
BASE
In: Ecology and society: E&S ; a journal of integrative science for resilience and sustainability, Band 18, Heft 3
ISSN: 1708-3087