Suchergebnisse

Since the end of the period between 2003 and 2005, European and French foreign policy towards Iran have followed the US lead under both Republican and Democratic administrations. The myth of European-led nuclear negotiations with Iran, conducted without interruption from 2003 to 2015, is to a significant extent the product of a rewriting of history by diplomatic actors from the Quai d'Orsay. In constructing this myth, their objective is to downplay the hardline stance taken by France on the Iranian nuclear issue before the conclusion of the Iran deal in 2015.1 It is true that the European "E3" – France, Germany, and the UK – played a major diplomatic role between 2003 and 2005 at the initial stage of the internationalization of the Iranian nuclear issue. Nevertheless, the Western strategic line has always been defined by Washington, despite a nominally independent European diplomatic initiative and a European-led administrative framework. Indeed, for reasons related to the lack of European economic sovereignty and the refusal of Europeans to really implement a policy of independence from Washington on this issue, the 2005-2007 period is marked by the end of a European alternative for a resolution of the Iranian nuclear dossier throughout a Brussels-led diplomatic process.

Since the end of the period between 2003 and 2005, European and French foreign policy towards Iran have followed the US lead under both Republican and Democratic administrations. The myth of European-led nuclear negotiations with Iran, conducted without interruption from 2003 to 2015, is to a significant extent the product of a rewriting of history by diplomatic actors from the Quai d'Orsay. In constructing this myth, their objective is to downplay the hardline stance taken by France on the Iranian nuclear issue before the conclusion of the Iran deal in 2015.1 It is true that the European "E3" – France, Germany, and the UK – played a major diplomatic role between 2003 and 2005 at the initial stage of the internationalization of the Iranian nuclear issue. Nevertheless, the Western strategic line has always been defined by Washington, despite a nominally independent European diplomatic initiative and a European-led administrative framework. Indeed, for reasons related to the lack of European economic sovereignty and the refusal of Europeans to really implement a policy of independence from Washington on this issue, the 2005-2007 period is marked by the end of a European alternative for a resolution of the Iranian nuclear dossier throughout a Brussels-led diplomatic process.

La question nucléaire iranienne est au centre du discours officiel français pour illustrer l'hypothèse d'une course aux armements nucléaires au Moyen-Orient. Ce nouveau discours officiel émerge entre 2005 et 2007 et s'explique notamment par la prise de pouvoir des stratégistes contre les régionalistes réalistes au Quai d'Orsay. Plus largement, il reflète le discours dominant au sein des États occidentaux sur un autre nucléaire qui par essence serait différent. Cet article vise donc à décrypter le décalage croissant entre l'idéologie nucléaire officielle de la France et la réalité des évolutions internes et diplomatiques relatives au programme nucléaire iranien. Pour ce faire, il s'agit de déconstruire le discours officiel produit en France sur le nucléaire iranien pour montrer la complexité des facteurs déterminants les choix de l'Iran qui ont conduit à la conclusion de l'Accord sur le nucléaire de 2015.

L'Iran est engagé dans différents conflits régionaux. L'influence de Téhéran est de plus en plus contestée par des mouvements nationalistes, comme l'illustrent les manifestations anti-iraniennes en Irak. La population iranienne est elle aussi de plus en plus critique à l'égard de la stratégie régionale de ses dirigeants. Ces derniers sont d'ailleurs divisés : le président Rohani fait figure de pragmatique, tandis que le Guide suprême cherche avant tout à préserver l'héritage de la révolution islamique.

Crisis management has always been a central toolin the survival strategy of Iranian political elites since theirrise to power after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Fromthe First Gulf War (1980–1988) to structural hostility withWashington and Tel Aviv through the recurrent repressionof social movements such as the student revolt of 1999 orthe Green Movement of 2009, the authoritarian regimeof the Islamic Republic seems to be fueled by crises. Themanagement of crisis is designed to justify the restrictionof the scope of civil rights of Iranian citizens in the nameof Khomeinist ideals. Can the COVID-19 crisis lead tothe strengthening of the institutions of the Islamic Republicor, on the contrary, after a short-term anti-protest effectlinked to the fear of the spread of the virus within the Iranian population, can we expect a weakening of the regime of the Islamic Republic on the internal and regionalfronts? In addition, one should wonder about a possiblespecificity of the political response of the authoritarianstates towards COVID-19 starting from the Iranian example. In other words, are there any ideological convergences between Iran, Russia, and China and to whatextent does the health challenge reveal similar questionsbetween authoritarian states and democratic societies?

Crisis management has always been a central toolin the survival strategy of Iranian political elites since theirrise to power after the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Fromthe First Gulf War (1980–1988) to structural hostility withWashington and Tel Aviv through the recurrent repressionof social movements such as the student revolt of 1999 orthe Green Movement of 2009, the authoritarian regimeof the Islamic Republic seems to be fueled by crises. Themanagement of crisis is designed to justify the restrictionof the scope of civil rights of Iranian citizens in the nameof Khomeinist ideals. Can the COVID-19 crisis lead tothe strengthening of the institutions of the Islamic Republicor, on the contrary, after a short-term anti-protest effectlinked to the fear of the spread of the virus within the Iranian population, can we expect a weakening of the regime of the Islamic Republic on the internal and regionalfronts? In addition, one should wonder about a possiblespecificity of the political response of the authoritarianstates towards COVID-19 starting from the Iranian example. In other words, are there any ideological convergences between Iran, Russia, and China and to whatextent does the health challenge reveal similar questionsbetween authoritarian states and democratic societies?