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This paper evidences the strategic positioning of positive and negative words within a CEO letter as a subtle form of impression management. We find that managers tend to present information in such an order that the reader of the CEO letter has a more positive perception of the underlying message. We uncover a smile in the frequency of positive words within the letter, and a half smile in the intratextual distribution of negative words, with a prevalence of negative words at the beginning of the letter. We also find a significant positive association between this qualitative impression management and the use of abnormal accruals in earnings management. We propose sentiment analytics that can compensate for the strategic management of narrative structure and find that the proposed position weighted sentiment has more predictive power for the firm performance over the next year.

Introduction: Financial Implications of Regulations in the Energy Industry -- Environmental Regulatory Arbitrage by Business Groups in the Context of the European Union's Emission Trading System (EU-ETS) -- Measuring the Effects of Energy Efficiency Policies: Evidence from Turkish Manufacturing Industry. The Convergence of Electricity Prices for European Untion Countries -- Blockchain as a Technology Backbone for an Open Energy Market -- Geopolitics and Gas-Transit Security through Pipelines -- Tapping the Potential: Turkey and Renewable Energy Sources -- The Financing Decision of Oil and Gas Companies: The Role of Country Level Shareholder Protection -- Attitudes of SMEs towards the Elements of Eco-Efficiency: The Turkish Case -- Volatility Spillovers between Oil and Stock Market Returns in G7 Countries: A VAR-DCC-GARCH Model -- Corporate Cash Holding in the Oil and Gas Industry: The Role of Energy Directives -- The Determinants of Systematic Risk of Renewable Energy Firms -- Optimizing Resource Usage in an Unobstrusive Way Through Smart Aggregation: The Case of Electric Vehicle Charging in Amsterdam. .

This paper examines whether CEO risk aversion – proxied by their political affiliation – explains the method used to manage earnings. We argue that, even though real earnings management can have severe long-term consequences for firm performance, Republican managers are likely to prefer real over accruals-based earnings management because the former incurs significantly lower litigation risk costs than the latter and is relatively more difficult to detect. Based on a sample of more than 20,000 firm-year observations, we find that firms led by Republican (i.e. more risk averse) CEOs tend to manage their earnings through real activities manipulation, while those led by Democratic (i.e. more risk taking) CEOs tend to favor accruals-based earnings management. We also show that the positive (negative) relation between Republican-leaning managers and real (accruals-based) is more positive (less negative) for CEOs whose compensation is more oriented towards risk-taking.

This paper examines whether CEO risk aversion – proxied by their political affiliation – explains the method used to manage earnings. We argue that, even though real earnings management can have severe long-term consequences for firm performance, Republican managers are likely to prefer real over accruals-based earnings management because the former incurs significantly lower litigation risk costs than the latter and is relatively more difficult to detect. Based on a sample of more than 20,000 firm-year observations, we find that firms led by Republican (i.e. more risk averse) CEOs tend to manage their earnings through real activities manipulation, while those led by Democratic (i.e. more risk taking) CEOs tend to favor accruals-based earnings management. We also show that the positive (negative) relation between Republican-leaning managers and real (accruals-based) is more positive (less negative) for CEOs whose compensation is more oriented towards risk-taking.

This paper examines whether CEO risk aversion – proxied by their political affiliation – explains the method used to manage earnings. We argue that, even though real earnings management can have severe long-term consequences for firm performance, Republican managers are likely to prefer real over accruals-based earnings management because the former incurs significantly lower litigation risk costs than the latter and is relatively more difficult to detect. Based on a sample of more than 20,000 firm-year observations, we find that firms led by Republican (i.e. more risk averse) CEOs tend to manage their earnings through real activities manipulation, while those led by Democratic (i.e. more risk taking) CEOs tend to favor accruals-based earnings management. We also show that the positive (negative) relation between Republican-leaning managers and real (accruals-based) is more positive (less negative) for CEOs whose compensation is more oriented towards risk-taking.

This paper examines whether CEO risk aversion – proxied by their political affiliation – explains the method used to manage earnings. We argue that, even though real earnings management can have severe long-term consequences for firm performance, Republican managers are likely to prefer real over accruals-based earnings management because the former incurs significantly lower litigation risk costs than the latter and is relatively more difficult to detect. Based on a sample of more than 20,000 firm-year observations, we find that firms led by Republican (i.e. more risk averse) CEOs tend to manage their earnings through real activities manipulation, while those led by Democratic (i.e. more risk taking) CEOs tend to favor accruals-based earnings management. We also show that the positive (negative) relation between Republican-leaning managers and real (accruals-based) is more positive (less negative) for CEOs whose compensation is more oriented towards risk-taking.