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ABSTRACTHow do politicians with influence over public works programs balance their incentives to gain electoral support with their proclivities for rent seeking? This article argues that government elites in parliamentary systems manage this trade-off by concentrating rent-seeking opportunities in their own hands while facilitating efficient public goods provision in the constituencies of their more junior partisan colleagues. Analyses using fine-grained data on road construction in India based on a variety of causal inference strategies support the argument. While ruling party legislators showed higher levels of road provision in their constituencies regardless of ministerial status, road projects in ministers' constituencies showed higher levels of rent seeking than those in the constituencies of other ruling party legislators. Moreover, consistent with the mechanism, ruling party legislators' diminished access to rent-seeking opportunities appears to be largely driven by the influence of co-partisan ministers. The findings illuminate how politicized distribution can sometimes mitigate inefficiencies in infrastructure provision.

AbstractA key finding in the political economy literature is that political elites display partisan biases when allocating public resources. While previous studies posit that such biases are driven by politicians' motivations to target benefits directly to certain groups of ordinary voters, this article develops the argument that national politicians also target pork along partisan lines to win over politicians at lower levels of government whose cooperation they need to ensure the successful implementation of development projects. Using a quasi‐experimental design, the argument is tested with data on thousands of public works projects sanctioned by MPs in North India. The results show that, even controlling for unobserved differences in voter characteristics, MPs systematically favored the constituencies of co‐partisan state legislators when allocating pork specifically under conditions implied by the argument and not otherwise. These results shed new light on the reasons for partisan biases in resource allocation in multilevel systems.

Why do public works programs in developing democracies often experience implementation failures at the local level? Building on the literature on political business cycles, our study sheds light on a key explanation. We argue that electoral cycles undermine the completion of public works projects because of incumbents' difficulties in reaping electoral rewards for following through on projects proposed just prior to an election. Analyses based on project-level data from a nation-wide public program in India supports the argument. We find that projects proposed close to an upcoming election are less likely to be eventually completed than projects proposed at other times. We further find that incumbent turnover exacerbates the effect of electoral cycles and that this modifying effect is plausibly causal. The results suggest that new incumbents have reduced incentives to follow through on projects proposed by their predecessors due to the difficulties involved with claiming credit for such projects.

Most studies of Hindu–Muslim riots in India have tended to emphasize the effects of social, cultural, or political factors on the occurrence of ethnic violence. In this article, the authors focus on the relationship between economic conditions and riots. Specifically, this article examines the effect of economic growth on the outbreak of Hindu–Muslim riots in 15 Indian states between 1982 and 1995. Controlling for other factors, the authors find that just a 1% increase in the growth rate decreases the expected number of riots by over 5%. While short-term changes in growth influence the occurrence of riots, this study finds no evidence of a relationship between the levels of wealth in a state and the incidence of ethnic riots. Moreover, by including state fixed effects, the authors determine that the negative relationship found between economic growth and riots is driven primarily by the relationship between growth and riots within a state over time rather than across states. These results are robust to controlling for a number of other factors such as economic inequality, demographic variables, political competition, temporal lags, spillover effects from adjacent states, and year effects. Finally, to address potential concerns that economic growth could be a consequence rather than a cause of violence or that other unobserved factors could confound the relationship between economic growth and the occurrence of Hindu–Muslim riots, the authors also employ instrumental variables (IV) estimation, using percentage change in rainfall as an instrument for growth. The results with IV estimation are similar to the results with non-IV estimation in terms of sign and significance, indicating that the negative effect of economic growth on riots is not due to reverse causality or omitted variables bias.

AbstractHow do parties in multiethnic societies shape voter attitudes toward female candidates? We address this question, focusing on parties with ideologies that contain ethnonationalist gender norms—patriarchal norms applied to women from an ethnonationalist party's core ethnic constituency. We argue that, while these norms appeal to an ethnonationalist party's base, they also provide informational cues to the party's "non‐core" voters that undermine their support for the party's "core" female candidates. Evidence from an original conjoint survey experiment in the Indian state of Bihar supports our argument; upper‐caste female candidates suffer a support penalty when they are affiliated with the national ruling party, whose ideology prescribes ethnonationalist gender norms targeting its core Hindu upper‐caste constituency. This penalty, we show, is driven by the party's non‐core voters. Our results, which we further bolster using real‐world electoral data, illuminate when and how ethnonationalist gender norms disadvantage elite female candidates.

What factors influence women's political success in ethnically divided societies? Using an original survey experiment in the Indian state of Bihar, supplemented with qualitative interviews, we explore the impact of two factors—intersecting gender and caste identity, and the interaction of campaign appeal with voter experiences of caste discrimination—on women candidates' success in state-level elections. We find, first, that women voters prefer women candidates, and that Scheduled Caste and Muslim voters also prefer candidates from their in-groups. At the same time, we identify evidence of intersectional effects, namely, that Muslim women candidates suffer from a disadvantage vis-a-vis women candidates from other backgrounds. We also show that women voters prefer candidates who offer security, especially when the candidates are women. Finally, we demonstrate that personal experience with caste discrimination increases support for women candidates. These results indicate that voters see women leaders as well-placed to ameliorate their security vulnerabilities.