What Should We Do About Multi-Jurisdictional Litigation in M&A Deals?
In: Vanderbilt Law Review, Band 66, S. 1925
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In: Vanderbilt Law Review, Band 66, S. 1925
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In: 3 Delaware Law Review, 1 (2000)
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In: Arizona Law Review, Band 38, Heft 1, S. 311
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In: Vanderbilt Law Review, Band 46, Heft 3, S. 503
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In: New Zealand Business Law Quarterly, Band 19, Heft 3
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In: Research handbooks in corporate law and governance
In: Columbia Business Law Review, 2021
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There are many lessons to be drawn from the sweep of history. In law, the compelling story repeatedly told is the observable co-movement of law on the one hand, and economic, social, and political changes on the other hand. Aberrations, however, do arise but generally do not persist in the long term. Contemporary corporate law seems to be on the cusp of such an abnormality as legal developments and proposed reforms for corporate law are currently conflicting with the direction in which the host environment is moving. This article identifies a series of contemporary judicial and regulatory corporate governance developments that are at odds with multiple forces unleashed by today's ownership of public companies being highly concentrated in the hands of various types of financial institutions. In particular, we focus on the appropriateness of recent regulatory impediments that have been placed in the path of the continuing evolution of the monitoring board of directors but with an eye to the past, as well as how developments over the last several decades complete the central feature of modern corporate governance, the monitoring model. To address this question, we begin by travelling back in time to post-World War II America during the dominance of managerialism, when shareholders were analogous to children-seen but not heard. That model was replaced by today's monitoring model, which empowers oversight of management in the hands of outside directors, whose obeisance, at least on paper, is anchored in the firm's residual claimants, the stockholders who elect the directors. But, as we discuss, the monitoring board has something of a checkered history in serving this function. We argue that from its inception the monitoring board was incomplete and board-centric because it was formed in an era where the received model was dispersed, not concentrated, ownership. That, of course, is no longer what characterizes American public companies. Today we believe that the growth of institutional investors' voting power and the ...
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In: Texas Law Review (2021) Vol. 99, No. 7
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In: Duke Law School Public Law & Legal Theory Series No. 2020-81
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In: Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Forthcoming
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In: Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, Band 40, Heft 2
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In: Arizona Law Review, Band 58, S. 901
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In: European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Research Paper No. 329/2016
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In: North Carolina Law Review, Band 95, Heft 19
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