Suchergebnisse

1. Introduction -- 2. Business, Monetary and Credit Cycles in Theory -- 3. Statistical and Econometric Analysis of the Cycle -- 4. GDP data for Analysing Business Cycles -- 5. Metrics and Turning Points of Cycles 1660-2018 -- 6. A Narrative History of UK Business Cycles -- 7. Conclusions

AbstractThis article brings together some of the improvements to GDP estimates from the income side since the publication of Charles Feinstein's 1972 volume National income, expenditure and output of the United Kingdom, 1855–1965. Many of the improvements and refinements were made by Feinstein himself and this paper makes a start in bringing the different elements together, focusing chiefly on reconstructing the income‐based estimates for the period 1841–1920. The new data are then used to comment on several features of the late nineteenth‐century UK economy, considering both the trend and cyclical path of the economy. The new data, coupled with modern de‐trending methods, suggest that there was a long‐term slowing of the UK economy from the late nineteenth century, starting from the 1870s. To undertake the trend–cycle decomposition, we employ a wavelets methodology to describe the time–varying features of trends and cycles over this period.

This paper investigates the role of credit supply shocks in driving the weakness in UK banks' lending and economic activity during the various UK financial crises since 1966. It uses a structural VAR analysis to identify credit supply shocks separately from standard macroeconomic shocks. It finds that credit supply shocks can account for most of the weakness in bank lending since the onset of the recent financial crisis and 1/3 – 1/2 of the fall in GDP relative to its historic trend. It also finds that credit supply shocks behave more like aggregate supply shocks than aggregate demand shocks.

This paper constructs a consistent series for the market value of UK government debt over almost 300 years, analysing how monetary and fiscal policy affect the path of the UK price level. Specifically, it examines the interactions between debts, deficits, the monetary base and the price level. Overall, the price level has been closely related to the evolution of the base money supply. Across different sample periods, there is little econometric evidence that fiscal policy has affected the course of the price level (or of the exchange rate under the Gold Standard). Government debt has not significantly affected the base money stock, either.

Abstract
We exploit a fixed rule constraining central bank credit provision in a regression discontinuity framework to analyse counterparties' behavioural responses to the (non-)receipt of liquidity during a crisis. In spring 1847, the Bank of England suddenly started rationing credit to avoid violating its gold reserve requirement. We show that counterparties that suffered rejection from the Bank were more likely to fail. Conditional on survival, rationed counterparties learned from their experience and changed their behaviour during a subsequent panic in fall 1847: they came to the discount window more often, but submitted smaller requests and relied less on central bank liquidity overall.

This paper describes a sectoral empirical model of money and credit in the UK that can be used for analysing unconventional monetary policies that affect banks' balance sheets. The paper uses the model to assess the impact of QE on the UK economy focussing on the endogenous portfolio response of banks, financial companies and non‐financial companies. The baseline results support the quantitative estimates found by other studies, but suggest the impact of QE is sensitive to the assumption about whether and to what extent QE affects bank lending.

AbstractThis paper constructs a new chronology of the business cycle in the United Kingdom from 1700 on an annual basis and from 1920 on a quarterly basis to 2010. The new chronology points to several observations about the business cycle. First, the cycle has significantly increased in duration and amplitude over time. Second, contractions have become less frequent but are as persistent and costly as at other times in history. Third, the typical recession has been tick‐shaped with a short contraction and longer recovery. Finally, the major causes of downturns have been sectoral shocks, financial crises, and wars.