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This paper presents an economic theory of property, tort, and contract law based on the goal of efficiently governing economic exchange relationships. In the theory, legal boundaries emerge endogenously in response to exogenous differences in the nature of the underlying transaction concerning the possible existence of unforeseen or non-contractible contingencies, and/or the desire of one of the parties to make non-salvageable investments prior to trade. The analysis asks whether, in this context, the transaction is best governed by property, tort, or contract principles. The conclusions are illustrated by a discussion of several cases that occupy the "boundaries" between the various areas.

Master teacher Thomas J. Miceli provides an introduction to law and economics that reveals how economic principles can explain the structure of the law and make it more efficient. The third edition of this seminal textbook is thoroughly updated to include recent cases and the latest scholarship, with particular attention paid to torts, contracts, property rights, and the economics of crime. A new chapter organization, ideal for quarter- or semester-long courses, strengthens the book's focus on unifying themes in the field. As Miceli tells a cohesive, analytical "story" about law from a distinctly economic perspective, exercises and problems encourage students to deepen their knowledge. A companion website is available at http://www.sup.org/economiclaw. It offers a full suite of resources for both students and professors. Key pedagogical features include cases; discussion points that provide additional analysis of topics in the book; graduate notes, which enrich the text for more advanced readers; and relevant links. Professors have access to sample syllabi for undergraduate and graduate courses and an instructor's manual, which provides answers to all of the end-of-chapter questions and problems in the book

1. Prologue: The Paradox of Punishment -- 2. The Social Cost of Crime: Deterrence -- 3. Crime as Exchange: Retribution -- 4. Sentencing Guidelines and Judicial Discretion: Balancing Deterrence and Retribution -- 5. Plea Bargaining: Negotiated Justice -- 6. Repeat Offenders: Marginal Deterrence and Redemption -- 7. Individual versus Collective Responsibility: It Takes a Village -- 8. The Limits of Punishment: Of Angels and Bad Men -- 9: Epilogue: What Have We Learned?

Over the past two decades, the field of law and economics has matured to the point where scholars have employed the latest economic methods in an effort to understand the nature of legal rules and to guide legal reform. This book is the first to provide a broad survey of this scholarship as it has been applied to problems in torts, contracts, property, and litigation. It will therefore serve as a convenient reference guide to this exciting field

AbstractThis paper examines markets, firms, and the law as alternative institutional arrangements for organizing transactions that involve transaction-specific investments and uncertain performance. The analysis is the logical extension of Coase's seminal analysis of the market-firm boundary on one hand, and the market-law boundary on the other. It thus combines insights from the literature on industrial organization and law and economics. The result is a unified framework that reveals the relative advantages and disadvantages, within a fairly simple economic setting, of market exchange, court ordering (contracts), and internal governance (agency).

Abstract:Law and economics scholars argue that the common law evolves toward efficiency. Invisible-hand theories suggest that the law is primarily driven by a selection process whereby inefficient laws are litigated more frequently than efficient laws, and hence are more likely to be overturned. However, the preferences of judges also necessarily affect legal change. This paper models the interaction of these two forces to evaluate the efficiency claim, and then applies the conclusions to the evolution of accident law in the United States beginning in the 19th century. Specifically, it attributes the persistence of negligence to its efficiency properties, despite its having been initially selected by judges for a different reason. The paper relates legal evolution to biological evolution by employing the concepts of natural and artificial selection, and the more recent concept of exaptation.