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In putting extraterritoriality into practice in the treaty ports, the British state did not simply withdraw rights from the Chinese state; it inhabited the space made by extraterritoriality by building institutions and engaging in practices which had consequences for the development of the treaty ports, and which need to be at the forefront of any attempt to understand colonialism in China. Through a focus both on the creation of law and institutions, and also on the management of British problem populations - violent Europeans and martial Indians - this book provides a revision of the history of empire and colonialism in China, explaining important features which have to date been glossed over in studies of other aspects of treaty port colonialism. Colonialism in China casts a long shadow, but key aspects of the British states central role in this history have before now been little understood

Abstract
This article examines contestation and change in the global climate change regime, considered as a suborder of the broader Liberal International Order (LIO). The extensive literature on the LIO has overlooked the important case of climate institutions. The article begins by establishing that the climate regime is indeed part of the LIO, considering both its institutional and ideational features. I then outline the most important episodes of contestation against the regime, led at different times by the United States and emerging powers in the developing world, and note that the sources of contestation were partly endogenous to the regime itself. Despite persistent political challenges and the slow progress of global climate cooperation, the climate regime has remained largely intact and resilient. I explain this outcome by pointing to institutional design features and strategies that allowed the suborder to absorb and accommodate contestation before it escalated, including the nonbinding approach to commitments reflected in the Paris Agreement. The article concludes with a discussion of broader lessons for the LIO and for the design and effectiveness of climate institutions.

AbstractThe Paris Agreement on climate change brought states from the North and South together under a common framework to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. This was a remarkable institutional adjustment for a regime that had always maintained a strict distinction between developed and developing countries and imposed meaningful obligations only on the former. To better understand this change, I look at the negotiations surrounding the issue of 'differentiation'. The rising emissions of the emerging economies created a demand for institutional change on the part of key industrialized countries; however, they faced resistance from the increasingly assertive BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India and China). The challengers ultimately adopted strategic cooptation as their main negotiation strategy, offering compromises in the areas of climate finance and the legal form of new commitments. The climate case sheds light on the impact of power shifts in the domain of global environmental governance and illustrates that calls for change sometime comes from established rather than rising powers.

Recent International Relations scholarship offers valuable rational choice explanations for the design of international institutions. However, the rational design literature has relied heavily on institutional outcomes as evidence for testing models. Such studies must be complemented by research designs that analyze the decisions and bargaining that drive design choices in order to expose causal mechanisms and test a wider range of observable implications. I assess an important rational design hypothesis, that uncertainty leads to flexible institutions, by analyzing the negotiations behind the climate change regime and by considering two distinct institutional outcomes across time. While the hypothesis receives considerable support, significant behavior and outcomes do not conform to its logic. I propose refinements for rational design theory in general and work on uncertainty and flexibility in particular. Rational choice theory speaks to the process of institutional design and should not content itself with predicting -- and testing itself against -- equilibrium outcomes. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd. & ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research.]

Recent International Relations scholarship offers valuable rational choice explanations for the design of international institutions. However, the rational design literature has relied heavily on institutional outcomes as evidence for testing models. Such studies must be complemented by research designs that analyze the decisions and bargaining that drive design choices in order to expose causal mechanisms and test a wider range of observable implications. I assess an important rational design hypothesis, that uncertainty leads to flexible institutions, by analyzing the negotiations behind the climate change regime and by considering two distinct institutional outcomes across time. While the hypothesis receives considerable support, significant behavior and outcomes do not conform to its logic. I propose refinements for rational design theory in general and work on uncertainty and flexibility in particular. Rational choice theory speaks to the process of institutional design and should not content itself with predicting — and testing itself against — equilibrium outcomes.