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More members of Congress have been investigated and sanctioned for ethical misconduct in the past decade and a half than in the entire previous history of the institution. But individual members are probably less corrupt than they once were. Stricter ethics codes and closer scrutiny by the press and public have imposed standards no previous representatives have had to face. Dennis Thompson shows how the institution itself is posing new ethical challenges, how the complexity of the environment in which members work creates new occasions for corruption and invites more calls for accountability. Instead of the individual corruption that has long been the center of attention, Thompson focuses on institutional corruption which refers to conduct that under certain conditions is an acceptable part of the job of a representative. Members are required to solicit campaign contributions, and they are expected to help constituents with their problems with government, but some ways of doing these jobs give rise to institutional corruption. The author moves the discussion beyond bribery, extortion, and simple personal gain to delve into implicit understandings, ambiguous favors, and political advantage. Thompson examines many major ethics cases of recent years. Among them: the case of David Durenberger, accused of supplementing his income through book promotions; the case of the Keating Five, accused of using undue influence with the Federal Home Loan Bank Board on behalf of Lincoln Savings and Loan owner Charles Keating; and the case of House Speaker James Wright, accused of several offenses. Thompson shows why neither the electoral process nor the judicial process is sufficient and argues for stronger ethics committees and the creation of a new quasi-independent body to take over some of the enforcement process. He offers more than a dozen recommendations

Normative theorists of corruption have developed an institutional conception that is distinct from both the individualist approaches focused on quid pro quo exchanges and other institutional approaches found in the literature on developing societies. These theorists emphasize the close connection between patterns of corruption and the legitimate functions of institutions. The corruption benefits the institution while undermining it. Reforms therefore should be directed toward finding alternatives for the functions the corruption serves. Also, institutional corruption does not require that its perpetrators have corrupt motives, and it is not limited to political institutions. This review examines four leading theories and discusses criticisms of their approach. A tripartite framework for analyzing the elements of institutional corruption is proposed. Although the theories are useful for distinguishing institutional corruption from the more familiar forms of individual corruption, they could be enriched by giving greater attention to the work on individual corruption in its structural forms in developing societies.

The problem of many hands—the difficulty of assigning responsibility in organizations in which many different individuals contribute to decisions and policies—stands in the way of investigating and correcting the failures of government. The problem can be mitigated by giving greater attention to the design of processes of organizational responsibility. An independent investigation can identify both the individual actions and the structural defects that contributed to an organizational failure. Then, specific individuals can be designated as overseers, who are held responsible for monitoring the structure and making changes as necessary. Three cases—the official responses to terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill in 2010, and the financial crisis that began in 2007—illustrate how this prospective approach of designing responsibility could work in practice.

Obama's "ethics agenda" is the most ambitious ever set out by a new administration. It promises a tougher approach not only to the usual problems such as conflict of interest and the revolving door, but also to broader challenges such as political influence on career officials and lack of transparency in government. The goals of the agenda are a step forward insofar as they focus more on improving the democratic process than disciplining political miscreants. But the means relied on to carry out the goals are less impressive. They perpetuate a major deficiency of the current ethics regime—its disjointedness, which undermines the transparency and accountability necessary for a robust democracy. What is needed is a coordinated approach, led from the White House itself, that takes a more comprehensive view of ethics regulation throughout the government.

Obama's "ethics agenda" is the most ambitious ever set out by a new administration. It promises a tougher approach not only to the usual problems such as conflict of interest and the revolving door, but also to broader challenges such as political influence on career officials and lack of transparency in government. The goals of the agenda are a step forward insofar as they focus more on improving the democratic process than disciplining political miscreants. But the means relied on to carry out the goals are less impressive. They perpetuate a major deficiency of the current ethics regime-its disjointedness, which undermines the transparency and accountability necessary for a robust democracy. What is needed is a coordinated approach, led from the White House itself, that takes a more comprehensive view of ethics regulation throughout the government. Adapted from the source document.