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1. Introduction -- 2. Discovering Authoritarian Modernism: Secrets of the State -- 3. Becoming Authoritarian Modern: Escaping the Modernization Trap -- 4. Learning Authoritarian Modernism: China's "Singapore Model" -- 5. Legitimizing Authoritarian Modernism: Reactionary Culturalism -- 6. Conclusion

The puzzles of Philippine "people power" -- Female leadership of democratic revolutions in Asia -- The East German "Wende" as a democratic revolution -- To shoot or not to shoot: China and Eastern Europe -- Stolen elections and Serbia's "October revolution" (with Philipp Kuntz) -- Democratic revolutions and the "clash of Samuel Huntingtons

This book examines the neglected concept of democratic revolutions, spontaneous popular uprisings which topple unyielding dictators and begin a transition process that eventually results in the consolidation of democracy.

Like much of the rest of the world, East Asia (Northeast and Southeast Asia) has recently experienced a democratic "fall" in which several electoral democracies have undergone autocratization. This synchronized with China's rise through what can be called illiberal realignment as autocratizing regimes in the region have sought increasing material and ideological support from Beijing in the face of Western human rights criticism and occasional (although usually only the threat of ) sanctions. China has viewed this regress as a rejection of "Western-style democracy." Yet a democratic "spring" which preceded the fall left a legacy of democratic normativity in the region as backsliding regimes continued to seek legitimacy through (however unfair and unfree) elections and (partial) liberalization. Residual democratic normativity combined with geopolitical insecurities have limited the region's illiberal realignment toward China during this democratic fall.

The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed enormous governance deficits globally. Several populist strongmen practiced "medical populism" – ignoring scientific advice, proffering denials, and blaming others. More technocratic leaders recognised its severity, implementing strict lockdowns. But some failed to adopt more flexible restrictions once testing improved due to local enforcement difficulties, termed "blunt force regulation." Although neither a pandemic denialist nor an obtuse technocrat, Philippine president Rodrigo R. Duterte's response combined aspects of both approaches with blame shifting and one-size-fits-all lockdowns while also securitising the crisis. Utilising methods developed during his bloody "war on drugs," Duterte imposed a heavily militarised approach, scapegoated supposedly disobedient Filipinos (pasaway) and bullied local politicians. While the Philippines has been among the worst pandemic performers globally, Duterte's approval ratings remained robust. It is argued "brute force governance" undermined the dynamics of accountability, enabling him to win public approval despite policy failure. (JCSA/GIGA)

Abstract
Two influential explanations of Duterte's surprising rise and rule are his "penal populist" leadership style and a structural crisis of oligarchic democracy. The populist leadership perspective explains "too little" about the extreme violence of Duterte's illiberal rule and the vulnerability of the prevailing political order to it. The oligarchic-democracy-in-crisis view, on the other hand, explains "too much" because it is overly generalized and determinist, thus unable to account for what in particular triggered Duterte's rise despite political stability and economic growth. The article offers a third explanation that integrates a leadership perspective into an oligarchic framework using a "structuration" approach. It focuses on how Duterte's leadership style enabled him to take advantage of a disjunctive moment in the country's "liberal reformist" political structure, a distinct subset of oligarchic democracy.