Suchergebnisse

Dentro del área de estudios de Política Comparada, se ha conceptualizado a la etnicidad como una categoría fija en la cual nacen las personas, pero también como solo una de las múltiples identidades que pueden ser políticamente activadas por diversos actores. Esta última perspectiva corresponde al paradigma instrumental o constructivista, que busca responder la siguiente pregunta: ¿Bajo qué circunstancias se activará la identidad étnica de ciudadanos, de modo tal que afecte su comportamiento político? Desde los '90s que los movimientos sociales en Latinoamérica comenzaron a presentarse como movimientos de origen étnico, lo cual culminó con la elección del primer presidente indígena de la region, en 2005. Diseñar investigaciones, utilizando nociones instrumentales y constructivistas de etnicidad, puede permitir el avance del estudio de los movimientos sociales en la región.

Within the realm of comparative politics, ethnicity has been conceptualized as both a fixed category in which individuals are born, as well as one of multiple identities that can be made politically salient by different actors. The latter perspective corresponds to instrumental and constructivist conceptualizations of ethnicity that seeks first and foremost to answer the question: 'Under which circumstances will ethnicity activate and affect citizens' political behavior?' Since the 1990s, Latin American social movements began to 'play the ethnic card', which culminated with the first indigenous candidate ever, to win a presidential election in the region in 2005. Applying research designs based on instrumental and constructivist conceptualizations of ethnicity could significantly advance the study of Latin American social movements. ; Dentro del área de estudios de Política Comparada, se ha conceptualizado a la etnicidad como una categoría fija en la cual nacen las personas, pero también como solo una de las múltiples identidades que pueden ser políticamente activadas por diversos actores. Esta última perspectiva corresponde al paradigma instrumental o constructivista, que busca responder la siguiente pregunta: ¿Bajo qué circunstancias se activará la identidad étnica de ciudadanos, de modo tal que afecte su comportamiento político? Desde los '90s que los movimientos sociales en Latinoamérica comenzaron a presentarse como movimientos de origen étnico, lo cual culminó con la elección del primer presidente indígena de la region, en 2005. Diseñar investigaciones, utilizando nociones instrumentales y constructivistas de etnicidad, puede permitir el avance del estudio de los movimientos sociales en la región.

This article expands the concept of 'audience costs' from the military realm to the realm of economic coercion. 'Audience costs' occur when an executive publicly commits to a coercive foreign policy action and subsequently reneges as public approval will decline. An experiment specifies when the public will support economic or military coercion, and how this preference affects the evaluation of executives who renege on threats. The findings suggest that audience costs do occur when the executive threatens economic sanctions and subsequently reneges, similar to military coercion. However, I find that inconsistency is not punished when a leader reneges after threatening military intervention in a crisis that does not threaten national security. I specify the role public support for economic and military coercion and reactions to executive inconsistencies play in generating and/or weakening approval for executives. In times of international crises, these factors may compete against each other when it comes to determining public approval. To examine this claim, I conducted a survey experiment on a representative sample of adults to determine when audiences will support economic or military coercion, and how this willingness to support specific coercive action affects their evaluation of the executive's handling of international crises. I find that public policy preferences can have a stronger effect than a preference for having a leader behave consistently. Specifically, I find that (1) executive inconsistency is not punished when a leader backs down from a military commitment in a non-threatening crisis, (2) executive inconsistencies are not only punished in military disputes but also in cases of economic coercion (punishment is in fact more prominent in sanctions cases), and (3) executive inconsistency can be punished both in major and lesser conflicts.

The negative impact of populist anti-aid rhetoric on public opinion has been based on anecdotal reports to date. Here, we take a systematic and empirical look at this inquiry. We hypothesize that even though populist rhetoric decreases support for foreign development aid in donor publics, this effect is conditioned by individuals' preexisting beliefs about populist leaders. Using data from original survey experiments conducted with representative samples of American and British adults, we find that exposure to different variants of populist frames decreases individuals' willingness to support their government providing development aid through an international organization. However, this effect is moderated by whether people think populist leaders stand up for the little guy or scapegoat out-groups. Connecting foreign aid and populism literatures, our results suggest that the future of global development might not be as bleak as previously feared in the age of populism.

AbstractOnly two European countries – France and the UK, both NATO members – have nuclear weapons, and leading politicians have called for the UK and EU to maintain close military and security links post-Brexit. In the context of the Trident renewal debate and the UK government's recently published integrated defence and security review, this article uses data from the new UK Security Survey to analyse attitudes towards the possession of nuclear weapons among the British public. It assesses three key theorical strands in the wider scholarly literature on public opinion and states' use of military force: domestic political attitudes, foreign policy predispositions, and the 'gender gap'. We find that all three theoretical perspectives contribute to the underpinnings of contemporary public opinion towards nuclear weapons. Support for the retention of Britain's nuclear deterrent is associated with being a Conservative Party supporter, favouring Brexit, endorsing superior military power worldwide as an important foreign policy goal, wanting to protect the transatlantic relationship, and with being male. The article makes a distinctive contribution to the growing subfield of research on public opinion and foreign policy, while the findings advance wider empirical understanding of contemporary citizen engagement in a key dimension of security policy.

AbstractThe negative impact of populist anti-aid rhetoric on public opinion has been based on anecdotal reports to date. Here, we take a systematic and empirical look at this inquiry. We hypothesize that even though populist rhetoric decreases support for foreign development aid in donor publics, this effect is conditioned by individuals' preexisting beliefs about populist leaders. Using data from original survey experiments conducted with representative samples of American and British adults, we find that exposure to different variants of populist frames decreases individuals' willingness to support their government providing development aid through an international organization. However, this effect is moderated by whether people think populist leaders stand up for the little guy or scapegoat out-groups. Connecting foreign aid and populism literatures, our results suggest that the future of global development might not be as bleak as previously feared in the age of populism.

What are the roles of government institutions in the design and implementation of effective national security policy? Using the case of post-2010 reform to Britain's central government security policy machinery, we find that formal institutions can help the informal strategy-making institutions on their periphery to function better. Through interviews with 25 senior officials, we find that Britain's National Security Council and quinquennial Strategic Defence and Security Reviews – both instituted in 2010 with the intention of improving UK security policymaking – remain limited as formal makers of national strategy. But the networks of individuals and ideas they support, by absolving some decision-makers of audience costs while immersing others in creative yet coherent strategy-development communities, have improved the overall quality of UK security policymaking compared to its pre-2010 condition. This finding also carries implications for other contexts and thus represents a promising avenue for future research. (Final version accepted 20 June 2018.)

Existing compliance research has focused on states' adherence to international rules. This article reports on state and also non-state actors' adherence to international norms. The analysis of warring parties' behaviour in granting the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to detention centres between 1991 and 2006 shows that both governments and rebel groups adhere to the norm of accepting the ICRC in order to advance their pursuit of legitimacy. National governments are more likely to grant access when they are democracies and rely on foreign aid. Insurgent groups are more likely to grant access when they exhibit legitimacy-seeking characteristics, such as having a legal political wing, relying on domestic support, controlling territory and receiving transnational support. Adapted from the source document.

Existing compliance research has focused on states' adherence to international rules. This article reports on state and also non-state actors' adherence to international norms. The analysis of warring parties' behaviour in granting the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) access to detention centres between 1991 and 2006 shows that both governments and rebel groups adhere to the norm of accepting the ICRC in order to advance their pursuit of legitimacy. National governments are more likely to grant access when they are democracies and rely on foreign aid. Insurgent groups are more likely to grant access when they exhibit legitimacy-seeking characteristics, such as having a legal political wing, relying on domestic support, controlling territory and receiving transnational support.

Securitization theory has developed into a fruitful research program on the construction of security threats. The theory has experienced growing sophistication, and empirical studies have produced stimulating insights on issues as varied as the politics of immigration, health, climate change, or cybersecurity. Understanding how social issues become perceived as threats seems timelier than ever given the rise in securitizing narratives in recent political elections across the globe. We propose that this research agenda would benefit from broadening its methodological diversity. In particular, the use of experiments could complement existing methods in securitization theory, mitigate some of the program's methodological weaknesses, and help explain when securitizing moves are likely to succeed or fail.

When member states of the European Union face serious international threats, does this serve as a catalyst or obstacle for European integration in the security and defence domain? To gain purchase on this question, this paper examines public opinion from a common instrument fielded in 24 EU member states (and the United Kingdom) with a total sample size of more than 40,000 respondents. We argue that theoretical accounts of perceived threat produce rival hypotheses. Threats might have either uniform or differential effects on different groups of citizens and could lead to either convergence or divergence of public opinion. We show that perceptions of foreign threats are associated with more favourable views on integration in the security and defence domain. Importantly, this association is as strong among Eurosceptics as among Europhiles. The findings presented here are consistent with the view that functional pressures may temporarily convince Eurosceptics to accept integration in the foreign and security domain.

Abstract
Should the U.S. respond with military means to a limited Russian incursion in the Baltics? This paper explores Western attitudes towards such a hypothetical grey zone crisis. Using survey experiments and crisis simulations we find considerable reluctance to use military tools in order to support a Baltic ally, and surprisingly little variation across the audiences. The underlying reluctance to get the U.S. involved in an armed conflict with Russia in the hopes that such acquiescence may help preserve global stability indicates that the conflict in Ukraine only had a fundamentally limited impact on Western strategic thought on deterring Russia.