Suchergebnisse

Introduction -- The development of an institutional costs framework for security and intelligence -- Counterterrorism and cooperative success and failure in the intelligence and security spheres -- Counterterrorism, collaboration, and direction and oversight -- The paradoxical case of cooperative success and failure in military and defence intelligence -- The relative management and cooperation of the upper levels of defence intelligence in the United Kingdom and United States -- Conclusion.

"This book provides an institutional costs framework for intelligence and security communities to examine the factors that can encourage or obstruct cooperation. The governmental functions of security and intelligence require various organisations to interact in a symbiotic way. These organisations must constantly negotiate with each other to establish who should address which issue, and with what resources. By coupling adapted versions of transaction costs theories with socio-political perspectives, this book provides a model to explain why some co-operative endeavours are successful, whilst others fail. This framework is applied to counterterrorism and defence intelligence in the UK and the US, to demonstrate that the view of good cooperation in the former and poor cooperation in the latter is overly simplistic. Neither is necessarily more disposed to behave cooperatively than the other; rather, the institutional costs created by their respective organisational architectures incentivises different cooperative behaviour in different circumstances. This book will be of much interest to students of intelligence studies, organisational studies, politics, and security studies"--

The American political climate has become increasingly polarized since the 1970s. Analysis by Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal shows that voting patterns within Congress have become increasingly divided along party lines, with fewer and fewer moderates. A major cause of polarization appears to be the geographic sorting of voters: Communities and regions of the country have become more politically and ideologically homogeneous, resulting in constituencies in congressional districts and in states that are more strongly conservative or liberal. Whatever its causes, the effects of increased polarization on political discourse and policymaking are clear: There is less room for deliberation between the two parties, and public policy decisionmaking is increasingly driven more by ideology than by objective analysis of which policies, programs, practices, and processes will produce the desired outcomes at the lowest cost. The mission of the RAND Corporation is to provide just this sort of objective analysis, and today's heated political environment presents a serious challenge to this mission. To help make sure that RAND's objective, nonpartisan research influences the policy debate, RAND must work to identify potentially controversial findings and take steps to ensure that they are not misinterpreted or distorted

Kurzfassung:
In einer Zeit, in der sich die internationalen Beziehungen in eine Richtung entwickeln, die stärker von strategischer Konfrontation gekennzeichnet ist, nimmt Abschreckung wieder einen zentralen Stellenwert ein. Der Artikel gibt einen Überblick über die Kernfragen westlicher Abschreckungspolitik während des Kalten Krieges und in der heutigen Zeit. Während sich die Umstände erheblich geändert haben, bleibt auch heute das zentrale Anliegen von Abschreckung dasselbe wie im Kalten Krieg: Wie hält man angesichts von Gegnern, die ihrerseits mit verheerenden Atomangriffen Vergeltungsschläge gegen die Vereinigten Staaten ausführen können, die Glaubwürdigkeit der US-amerikanischen Drohung aufrecht, auch zur Verteidigung von Alliierten Atomwaffen einzusetzen? Es besteht kaum ein Zweifel an der Glaubwürdigkeit der Drohung der Vereinigten Staaten oder anderer Atommächte, im Fall eines Atomangriffs auf ihre eigenen Staatsgebiete Vergeltung zu üben, sofern die Vergeltungskapazitäten den Erstangriff überstehen. Das Problem liegt in der Glaubwürdigkeit der erweiterten US-amerikanischen Abschreckung.

Abstract:
Against the backdrop of an international system becoming more confrontational in nature, the subject of deterrence is back again. This article provides an overview of the nature of the deterrence problem during the Cold War period and today. While the broader circumstances have changed markedly, today, the central issue of deterrence remains the same as in the Cold War: how to maintain the credibility of the American threat to employ nuclear weapons in the defense of allies in the face of adversaries that can retaliate with devastating nuclear attacks against the US itself. There is little doubt about the threat of the US or other nuclear powers to retaliate in the event of a nuclear attack against their own homelands, so long as those retaliatory forces can survive the initial attack. The problem is the credibility of US extended deterrence.