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This is the 2nd edition of Technological Innovation. Profiting from technological innovation requires scientific and engineering expertise, and an understanding of how business and legal factors facilitate commercialization. This volume presents a multidisciplinary view of issues in technology commercialization and entrepreneurship

This is the 2nd edition of Technological Innovation. Profiting from technological innovation requires scientific and engineering expertise, and an understanding of how business and legal factors facilitate commercialization. This volume presents a multidisciplinary view of issues in technology commercialization and entrepreneurship.

Proponents of the Bayh-Dole Act argue that industrial use of federally funded research would be reduced without university patent licensing. Our survey of U.S. universities supports this view, emphasizing the embryonic state of most technologies licensed and the need for inventor cooperation in commercialization. Thus, for most university inventions, there is a moral-hazard problem with inventor effort. For such inventions, development does not occur unless the inventor's income is tied to the licensee's output by payments such as royalties or equity. Sponsored research from the licensee cannot by itself solve this problem. (JEL O31, O34, O38)

This paper analyzes GATT and its dispute settlement procedure (DSP) in the context of a supergame model of international trade featuring both explicit and implicit agreements. An explicit agreement, such as GATT, may be violated at some positive cost in addition to retaliatory actions that might be induced by the violation. We interpret this cost as arising from "international obligation", a phenomenon frequently mentioned in the legal literature on GATT. We focus on how international obligation affects two aspects of GATT‐DSP: unilateral retaliation and the effect of inordinate delays in the operation of DSP.