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ABSTRACTWe argue that in seeking to insure against model uncertainty, monetary policy makers are often ready to trade ex post performance for greater certainty in the outcome. They thus look for rules that although not optimal ex post, have certain properties that qualify them as robust. We apply first, Gul's approach of 'disappointment' aversion to describe policy makers' aversion to uncertainty and then define the properties the notion of 'robustness' entails. With these two tools we then link the desirability of such robust rules to the degree of policy makers' aversion to uncertainty. We thus show that provided such robust rules exist, a larger degree of disappointment aversion leads to a greater emphasis on robustness in policy implementation.

In this paper it is argued that the slowness of the legislativesystem implies pre-commitment of legislation for at least the periodit takes to change a law. A simple model illustrates the benefit ofthis pre-commitment.

We present an equilibrium-search model with heterogenous workers whosearch for a job in one of two sectors and who lose part of theirskills during unemployment. We show that an import tariff increasethe wage and the employment prospects in the protected sector. Thisresults in a labor market distortion because it changes thecomparative advantage of the least specialised workers. Trade reformresults in sectoral reallocation of workers which affects employmentin both sectors through quantity and quality effects and increasesunemployment persistently. Replacing the tariff by a wage-costsubsidy financed by means of lump-sum taxation prevents unemploymentfrom rising after trade has been reformed. However, giving a wage-cost subsidy to both sectors is cheapersince then comparative advantage of workers will no longer bedistorted, although unemployment will temporarily rise.