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Reveals how the United States has struggled to adapt to the new era of guerrilla conflict, causing military losses and political disasters, and outlines a strategy of military engagement and diplomacy to help the nation withdraw from unsuccessful campaigns

Abstract
The United States has declared an era of strategic competition with China but how might this rivalry end—assuming a positive outcome for US interests? US policy-makers have chosen not to pick a favoured end state for strategic competition, hoping to maintain flexibility. However, the decision not to choose a termination point could make the rivalry more difficult to resolve. The 'negativity bias' in psychology means that threats tend to loom large, limiting the odds of ending strategic competition. This article applies the negativity bias to potential end-state scenarios—China's accommodation of US interests, China's democratization and China's collapse—and shows that none of these scenarios will likely end strategic competition. A study of the resolution of US great power rivalries over the last two centuries suggests there is a high bar to end strategic competition. Washington should choose a favoured end-game for strategic competition and the best option is sustained Chinese reform or 'accommodation plus'. The negativity bias may powerfully influence the course and resolution of the Sino-US rivalry, and it can also help to explain many wider behaviours in international relations.

Why did states fail to balance against the United States after the end of the Cold War? Scholars have neglected an important dynamic: the accidental nature of America's rise to primacy. The United States became the sole superpower not by deliberately increasing its capabilities but due to the unexpected collapse of its rival, the USSR. The case illustrates that a state's responsibility for its gains in power can vary significantly, with important consequences for subsequent balancing. Active or deliberate power increases tend to produce more balancing than passive power increases because they signal aggressive intentions, alter the dyadic power balance between the rising state and potential balancers, and trigger loss aversion.