Suchergebnisse

The gradual enlargement of the EEC has necessitated an adaptation of European supranational structures established in the 1950-1970s to the needs of the time. Under these circumstances one of the key priorities of France's participation in the EU is he struggle for preserving her influence on the EU decision-making process. The article is devoted to the interaction of France with its partners in the EU institutions. This implies not only the implementation of its own interests, but also the search for compromise more or less satisfactory to all participants.

The article analyzes the results of the first Emmanuel Macron's presidential five-year term. The authors highlight that the period 2017–2022 proved to be a time of ambitious undertakings and difficult trials for France. The young president sensitively caught the French desire for change and set about solving urgent problems. The improvement of public finances and reboot of the economy, modernization of the administration of the Republic with expansion of "social lifts", the return of France's leadership in the European Union and strengthening of the EU's position in the world – these were the main goals of Macron. Nevertheless, these plans ran into serious objections: inside the country – via the mass protests of working classes defending social guarantees and the opposition of parliamentarians facing the strengthening of presidential power, in the international arena – due to the EU problems and the rivalry of France with a number of other powers. The COVID‑19 pandemic has become a real "black swan" for the president, forcing him to adjust the initial settings. However, E. Macron had some achievements on his way – such as the Labor Code reform, political confidence laws, transformation of the ENA, development of the European Union initiatives, especially the Franco-German plan to save the EU economy during the 2020 pandemic. The authors conclude that despite Macron's re-election, his second term will become very difficult: the loss of an absolute majority in the National Assembly in the June 2022 elections showed that a tripolar system has been formed in France, so the centrist Macron will have to take the positions of the extreme right and left forces into account when building his economic and domestic policy. As for his foreign policy, the main troubles lie in the serious aggravation of the international situation in Europe.

The study is focused on the COVID 19 pandemic as a challenge for Franco-German leadership in the European Union. The authors investigate whether joint actions by Berlin and Paris can strengthen the EU's resilience to crises. As it is shown, the first isolationist reaction of the EU states to pandemic was followed by their attempts to find a common decision. The negotiations on an anti-crisis plan were complicated by the division of the European Union states into opposing camps. Two projects proposed by them – the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the "coronabonds" – reflected the narrow interests of rich, frugal "Northern" and economically modest "Southern" groups, and failed. In contrast, the Franco-German cooperation became a breakthrough. In March-April 2020, Germany and France opposed each other, supporting ESM and coronabonds, respectfully. In May-June 2020, A. Merkel and E. Macron agreed to a compromise and came up with a unified position. While Germany left "frugal" group by agreeing to allocate money to support the "South" without insisting on mandatory reforms, and endorsed the idea of joint debt obligations, France refused to support the "Southern" coronabond project and agreed to the mediation of the EU Commission. That gave new breath to negotiations where a new regrouping of countries took place: the "South" states failing to defend coronabonds supported the Franco-German plan based on subsidies, while the "frugals" put forward an alternative based on loans. The EU Commission's project which included both proposals was discussed in July 2020: at that moment, the Franco-German tandem backed by the "South" states had to persuade both the "frugal" and the East- European states. Finally, the EU Commission's plan promoted by Merkel and Macron was adopted, though with serious adjustments. The authors conclude that the Franco-German alliance has confirmed its capability to strengthen the European Union resilience, but its leadership is no longer unconditional, and in the future, they should take into account the interests of the EU regional groups. Acknowledgments. The article was prepared within the project "Post-Crisis World Order: Challenges and Technologies, Competition and Cooperation" supported by the grant from Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation program for research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (Agreement № 075-15-2020-783).

The Eastern Mediterranean has become an arena of fierce competition for an access to sea spaces and their resources, including hydrocarbons. Coastal states and a number of non-regional players are deeply involved in this rivalry. Currently the region is witnessing a confrontation between Turkey and a "balancing coalition", which consists of Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt. The article deals with the problem of maritime spaces delimitation in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. It also studies the policies of the main actors. The primary goal is to make an assessment of the risks and to analyze possible ways to reduce tension by balancing the interests of major players. The analysis shows that Turkey intends to consistently defend its claims on the continental shelf based on the so-called "principle of justice", thus challenging the Greek claims. Ankara managed to prevent the construction of the EastMed gas pipeline, thus hurting the interests of other countries of the region. In turn, Greece appeals to the norms of international maritime law. Itis actively looking now for allies that could help it contain Turkey. There is a potential "anti-Turkey" coalition comprising France, Israel and Egypt. The authors conclude that, despite the extreme complexity of the situation, especially from the legal point of view, tension in the Eastern Mediterranean can be reduced because the countries of the region are reluctant to engage in a military confrontation with Turkey and alternative routes for energy transportation exist. In addition, there are signs that Greece might be open to a reasonable compromise with Turkey.