Le origini : Platone e Aristotele, il giusnaturalismo cristiano -- La Riforma e la crisi del giusnaturalismo classico -- Ugo Grozio -- I contrattualisti : Thomas Hobbes -- I contrattualisti : John Locke -- I contrattualisti : Jean-Jacques Rousseau -- La fine del giusnaturalismo : David Hume --Immanuel Kant -- Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel -- Jeremy Bentham -- John Stuart Mill -- L'imperativismo di John Austin -- Hans Kelsen -- Il realismo giuridico : Alf Ross -- Herbert L.A. Hart -- John Rawls e la giustizia come equità -- Robert Nozick e il titolo valido
In questo articolo presento la teoria liberale del diritto fondata sul principio del danno di John Stuart Mill, come lo strumento per garantire il massimo della libertà in condizioni di uguaglianza. Concepito in origine come una regola morale indirizzata al legislatore con la funzione di limitare le proibizioni a quelle moralmente ammissibili nel rispetto dell'autonomia individuale, non esistono ragioni per non applicare il principio del danno anche alla legislazione in materia civile, con il risultato di creare la possibilità giuridica dell'uguaglianza di opportunità. ; In this paper I present the liberal theory of law based on John Stuart Mill's harm principle, as the tool of guaranteeing maximum freedom under conditions of equality. Originally conceived as a moral rule addressed to the legislator with the function of limiting prohibitions to those that are morally permissible while respecting individual autonomy, there is no reason to not apply the harm principle to civil lawmaker as well, with the result of creating the legal possibility of equality of opportunity.
In this paper, the author deals with the problem of misfortune from the point of view of a normative theory of justice. In particular, it is claimed that an unlucky event engenders an entitlement to assistance for its victims. The author first takes into account the view that the demand for security addressed to institutions is linked to the idea of causality; this, in terms of political justice, entails the necessity of identifying a liability. On this view, a boundary should be traced between injustice & misfortune; while events caused by human behavior can be judged as either just or unjust, merely fortuitous ones cannot. This implies that victims are entitled to compensation for damages due to unjust events, not for damages due to unlucky events. The author argues that, despite the distinction between unjust & unlucky events, the entitlement to compensation arises in both cases. In the case of merely unlucky events, rather than following the logic of liability, the administration of justice follows a different principle: the author proposes calling this the "principle of assistance." According to this principle, every unlucky event worsening the living conditions of someone must be followed by a redistributive reallocation of resources. Unlike solidarity, the principle of assistance is a (meta )rule of justice, that can be outlined starting from a rereading of Rawls's second principle. The author argues, then, that the victims of misfortune are entitled to a "right to assistance" that has a normative grounding. Adapted from the source document.
