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When navigating through cross cultural research designs, one can get lost in the jungle of several methodological dichotomies: positivist versus interpretive epistemologies, etic versus emic perspectives, & inductive versus deductive processes. To move towards either end of these dichotomies risks compromising the rigor & validity of one's study. Thus, cross-cultural research is an endeavor devoted to managing the tensions created by these dichotomies; they represent competing interests or paradigms, which are valid concerns, but need to be addressed with perspective. When embarking on a cross-cultural research project, one is always striking a balance between competing interests, & continuously trying to find the middle road. This article discusses this middle road strategy. References. Adapted from the source document.

In this study, we test the impact of national origin on intentions to shame and to seek revenge in response to a normative conflict. As expected, Chinese managers showed a stronger desire to shame and teach a moral lesson compared with American managers. Contrary to expectations, Americans were no more likely than the Chinese to express a desire for revenge. Results also showed that Americans were more likely to choose a direct approach in response to the conflict, compared with the Chinese managers, who were more likely to use an indirect approach. These data are consistent with previous research suggesting that shaming is a more common form of social control in more collectivistic compared with more individualistic societies, but inconsistent with cross cultural theories that suggest that interpersonal harmony is more important in a collectivistic culture.

In recent years, the U.S. commercial airline industry has achieved unprecedented levels of safety, with the statistical risk associated with U.S. commercial aviation falling to 0.003 fatalities per 100 million passengers. But decades of research on organizational learning show that success often breeds complacency and failure inspires improvement. With accidents as rare events, can the airline industry continue safety advancements? This question is complicated by the complex system in which the industry operates where chance combinations of multiple factors contribute to what are largely probabilistic (rather than deterministic) outcomes. Thus, some apparent successes are realized because of good fortune rather than good processes, and this research intends to bring attention to these events, the near‐misses. The processes that create these near‐misses could pose a threat if multiple contributing factors combine in adverse ways without the intervention of good fortune. Yet, near‐misses (if recognized as such) can, theoretically, offer a mechanism for continuing safety improvements, above and beyond learning gleaned from observable failure. We test whether or not this learning is apparent in the airline industry. Using data from 1990 to 2007, fixed effects Poisson regressions show that airlines learn from accidents (their own and others), and from one category of near‐misses—those where the possible dangers are salient. Unfortunately, airlines do not improve following near‐miss incidents when the focal event has no clear warnings of significant danger. Therefore, while airlines need to and can learn from certain near‐misses, we conclude with recommendations for improving airline learning from all near‐misses.

Prior research shows that when people perceive the risk of some hazardous event to be low, they are unlikely to engage in mitigation activities for the potential hazard. We believe one factor that can lower inappropriately (from a normative perspective) people's perception of the risk of a hazard is information about prior near‐miss events. A near‐miss occurs when an event (such as a hurricane), which had some nontrivial probability of ending in disaster (loss of life, property damage), does not because good fortune intervenes. People appear to mistake such good fortune as an indicator of resiliency. In our first study, people with near‐miss information were less likely to purchase flood insurance, and this was shown for both participants from the general population and individuals with specific interests in risk and natural disasters. In our second study, we consider a different mitigation decision, that is, to evacuate from a hurricane, and vary the level of statistical probability of hurricane damage. We still found a strong effect for near‐miss information. Our research thus shows how people who have experienced a similar situation but escape damage because of chance will make decisions consistent with a perception that the situation is less risky than those without the past experience. We end by discussing the implications for risk communication.

Disasters garner attention when they occur, and organizations commonly extract valuable lessons from visible failures, adopting new behaviors in response. For example, the United States saw numerous security policy changes following the September 11 terrorist attacks and emergency management and shelter policy changes following Hurricane Katrina. But what about those events that occur that fall short of disaster? Research that examines prior hazard experience shows that this experience can be a mixed blessing. Prior experience can stimulate protective measures, but sometimes prior experience can deceive people into feeling an unwarranted sense of safety. This research focuses on how people interpret near‐miss experiences. We demonstrate that when near‐misses are interpreted as disasters that did not occur and thus provide the perception that the system is resilient to the hazard, people illegitimately underestimate the danger of subsequent hazardous situations and make riskier decisions. On the other hand, if near‐misses can be recognized and interpreted as disasters that almost happened and thus provide the perception that the system is vulnerable to the hazard, this will counter the basic "near‐miss" effect and encourage mitigation. In this article, we use these distinctions between resilient and vulnerable near‐misses to examine how people come to define an event as either a resilient or vulnerable near‐miss, as well as how this interpretation influences their perceptions of risk and their future preparedness behavior. Our contribution is in highlighting the critical role that people's interpretation of the prior experience has on their subsequent behavior and in measuring what shapes this interpretation.

After disasters such as the attacks of September 11, 2001, the public experiences a heightened response that naturally returns to some lower level of concern. We demonstrate that this pattern of heightened response followed by a decline as time passes also occurs for terrorist events that are near misses. Data from a field study and two experimental lab studies show that people's perceptions of the risk of similar category events and their perception that the near-miss attempt was close to being a successful terrorist attack decline over time. Moreover, the decline in the perception of how close the near miss was to being a successful terrorist attack partially explains the decline in the perception of the risk of future similar category events. We also show that the perceived risk for terrorism in general decays more slowly than for a specific category event, and is reactivated by additional terrorist attempts. Finally, we show that people rely on reference points to provide the context for near-miss terrorism events, and without reference points assessing perceptions of risk and perceptions of how close an event was to having a truly bad outcome are difficult. The reliance on reference points for context can result in different people evaluating the same event differently depending on that person's information about prior terrorist attempts. Our contributions provide guidance to organizations such as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security for encouraging stakeholders to make rational decisions on the basis of the nature, scale, and scope of the attack that balance recovery with continued vigilance. We also provide information to other intelligence agencies who need to consider their own individuals' personal biases that may arise when repeatedly examining terrorist near misses.