Suchergebnisse

This article discusses how two similar far right movements in different political systems – Golden Dawn (GD) in democratic Greece and the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) in authoritarian Russia – adapted their strategies and claims to better fit existing political contexts and how this affected the institutionalization of these movements. GD, a neo-Nazi movement formed in the 1980s, entered mainstream politics during the deep financial crisis of 2010, and since 2012 has consolidated its position as the third major opposition party. DPNI was founded in 2002; it had close connections with governing politicians and mobilized large xenophobic protests until it was banned in 2011. It then entered into a coalition with other far right groups under the banner of Russkie, cooperated with the liberals in the massive anti-fraud protests during 2011–2013, and tried to register as the Party of Nationalists, but failed and has now disbanded. While GD de-radicalized its anti-immigration claims to fit with the dominant discourse and exploited the financial crisis for its grass-root mobilization, DPNI changed its strategies and collaborated with its ideological opponents only after it had become very popular and faced with severe state repression. Our comparative analysis shows that far right movements adapt to their diverse environments in a manner similar to that of other anti-establishment movements regardless of context – whether within a democratic or non-democratic regime. ×

Mi tesis doctoral trata los factores que influyen la aparición de organizaciones de extrema derecha contemporáneos en Rusia y subraya el papel clave de liderazgo en dichas organizaciones. Las preguntas de investigación son: ¿Hasta que punto ha cambiado el movimiento de derecha radical ruso a lo largo del tiempo? ¿Qué factores son responsables de la transformación interna (la aparición y la evolución) del movimiento de derecha radical en Rusia? Las variables dependientes centrales de mi estudio son el surgimiento y el cambio de los modelos organizativos de la derecha radical rusa y tienen que ver con el por qué, el cuándo y el cómo emergen nuevas estructuras movilizadoras y como cambian su forma, sus estrategias, discursos, y modelos. El objeto de mi estudio es el movimiento nacionalpatriota ruso, lo cual llamaré "oposición nacionalista-patriota" y definiré como: el amplio espectro de organizaciones nacionalistas extra-parlamentarias (partidos, movimientos y milieus), así como sus aliados dentro de la Duma. Utilicé una serie de métodos de recolección de datos que incluyen la observación participante, entrevistas semiestructuradas (entrevistas a informantes claves), el uso de documentos generados por los movimientos bajo investigación, artículos de prensa e investigación de archivos. Mi estudio utiliza un enfoque interdisciplinario que combina diferentes disciplinas (ciencia política, sociología, economía) y diferentes métodos, y su objetivo es forjar un puente entre la documentación existente de ciencia política y de sociología sobre el fenómeno de la derecha radical. Queriendo entender el surgimiento y evolución de los movimientos, mi tesis aborda el desafío analítico de identificar las circunstancias que incluyen procesos estructurales y culturales y los combina con un enfoque basado en la actividad humana. Se basa en el esfuerzo continuo de fusionar las teorías de nacionalismo y de los movimientos sociales con el fin de contribuir a la construcción de una teoría más sólida sobre la protesta de los movimientos ...

This article discusses how two similar far right movements in different political systems – Golden Dawn (GD) in democratic Greece and the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) in authoritarian Russia – adapted their strategies and claims to better fit existing political contexts and how this affected the institutionalization of these movements. GD, a neo-Nazi movement formed in the 1980s, entered mainstream politics during the deep financial crisis of 2010, and since 2012 has consolidated its position as the third major opposition party. DPNI was founded in 2002; it had close connections with governing politicians and mobilized large xenophobic protests until it was banned in 2011. It then entered into a coalition with other far right groups under the banner of Russkie, cooperated with the liberals in the massive anti-fraud protests during 2011–2013, and tried to register as the Party of Nationalists, but failed and has now disbanded. While GD de-radicalized its anti-immigration claims to fit with the dominant discourse and exploited the financial crisis for its grass-root mobilization, DPNI changed its strategies and collaborated with its ideological opponents only after it had become very popular and faced with severe state repression. Our comparative analysis shows that far right movements adapt to their diverse environments in a manner similar to that of other anti-establishment movements regardless of context – whether within a democratic or non-democratic regime.

This article focuses on the on-going war in a borderland between the European Union and Russia, the conflict in Eastern Ukraine (Donbass) that started with the events on the Euromaidan and the swift annexation of Crimea by Russia. Our analysis of key speeches by Vladimir Putin regarding the annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbass demonstrates that in this case, populism extends beyond the dichotomy of the people against the establishment, since it relies on complex notions of enmity and alliance. We argue that, in the context of Crimea's annexation and the war in Donbass, the Russian political leadership deployed a discourse of Russian identity, which is based on an overstretched definition of the Russian nation, a new discursive division of the political space, and the introduction of new and the reaffirmation of old symbols of unity. We also conclude that populism and nationalism were used interchangeably according to the audience: Russian leadership has used discursive strategies associated with populism to articulate this new vision of identity in relation to Crimean residents, and nationalist ones when addressing the domestic audiences. ×