La 4e de couverture indique : "Avec ce premier livre en français destiné à un large public, le prix Nobel d'économie 2014 nous invite à partager sa passion pour cette discipline. Il défend une certaine vision de l'économie, science qui croise la théorie et les faits au service du bien commun, et de l'économiste, chercheur et homme de terrain. C'est dire que le lecteur pénètre dans l'atelier d'un économiste et voyage à travers les sujets affectant notre quotidien : économie numérique, innovation, chômage, changement climatique, Europe, État, finance, marché... En dressant un panorama des grandes problématiques de l'économie d'aujourd'hui, Jean Tirole nous fait entrer au coeur des théories dont il est le père
The past twenty years have seen great theoretical and empirical advances in the field of corporate finance. Whereas once the subject addressed mainly the financing of corporations--equity, debt, and valuation--today it also embraces crucial issues of governance, liquidity, risk management, relationships between banks and corporations, and the macroeconomic impact of corporations. However, this progress has left in its wake a jumbled array of concepts and models that students are often hard put to make sense of. Here, one of the world's leading economists offers a lucid, unified, and comprehensive introduction to modern corporate finance theory. Jean Tirole builds his landmark book around a single model, using an incentive or contract theory approach. Filling a major gap in the field, The Theory of Corporate Finance is an indispensable resource for graduate and advanced undergraduate students as well as researchers of corporate finance, industrial organization, political economy, development, and macroeconomics. Tirole conveys the organizing principles that structure the analysis of today's key management and public policy issues, such as the reform of corporate governance and auditing; the role of private equity, financial markets, and takeovers; the efficient determination of leverage, dividends, liquidity, and risk management; and the design of managerial incentive packages. He weaves empirical studies into the book's theoretical analysis. And he places the corporation in its broader environment, both microeconomic and macroeconomic, and examines the two-way interaction between the corporate environment and institutions. Setting a new milestone in the field, The Theory of Corporate Finance will be the authoritative text for years to come
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Autocratic regimes, democratic majorities, private platforms, and religious or professional organizations can achieve social control by managing the flow of information about individuals' behavior. Bundling the agents' political, organizational, or religious attitudes with information about their prosocial conduct makes them care about behaviors that they otherwise would not. The incorporation of the individuals' social graph in their social score further promotes soft control but destroys the social fabric. Both bundling and guilt by association are most effective in a society that has weak ties and is politically docile. (JEL D64, D72, D83, D91, K38, Z13)
When will solidarity, which emerges spontaneously from the fear of spillovers, be reinforced through contracting? The optimal pact between countries that differ substantially in their probability of distress is a simple debt contract with market financing, a borrowing cap, but no joint liability. While joint liability augments total surplus, the borrowing country cannot compensate the deep-pocket guarantor. By contrast, the optimal pact between two countries symmetrically exposed to shocks with an arbitrary correlation is a simple debt contract with joint liability, provided that shocks are sufficiently independent, spillovers sufficiently large, liquidity needs moderate, and available sanctions sufficiently tough. (JEL D86, F34, H63)
The paper provides a first analysis of market jump starting and its two-way interaction between mechanism design and participation constraints. The government optimally overpays for the legacy assets and cleans up the market of its weakest assets, through a mixture of buybacks and equity injections, and leaves the firms with the strongest legacy assets to the market. The government reduces adverse selection enough to let the market rebound, but not too much, so as to limit the cost of intervention. The existence of a market imposes no welfare cost. (JEL D82, D83, G01, G31, H81)
