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Abstract Does the political ideology of negotiating parties influence the design of international environmental agreements? This article distinguishes between leftist and rightist executives in democracies to develop a twofold argument. First, left-leaning democratic governments tend to be generally more environmental-friendly, which implies that they should favor designs that are more conducive to effective institutions. Second, leftist democratic executives are commonly less concerned about sovereignty costs. Both mechanisms suggest that environmental treaties likely comprise "legalized," i.e., hard-law elements when left-wing democracies negotiate their design. The empirical implication of the theory is tested with quantitative data on international environmental agreements since 1975. The findings report an association between leftist ideology in democracies and agreement legalization, although this is driven by aspects of sovereignty delegation. This article contributes to the literatures on environmental institutions, international cooperation more generally, as well as party politics.

Generally, democratic regime type is positively associated with participating in international environmental agreements. In this context, this study focuses on the legal nature of an agreement, which is linked to audience costs primarily at the domestic level that occur in case of non-compliance and are felt especially by democracies. Eventually, more legalized ("hard-law") treaties make compliance potentially more challenging and as democratic leaders may anticipate the corresponding audience costs, the likelihood that democracies select themselves into such treaties decreases. The empirical implication of our theory is that environmental agreements with a larger share of democratic members are less likely to be characterized by hard law. Results from quantitative analyses strongly support our argument, shed new light on the relationship between participation in international agreements and the form of government, and also have implications for the "words-deeds" debate in international environmental policy-making.

The literature increasingly acknowledges that international institutions do not exist in isolation, but regularly interact with each other. This interplay might induce influence, affecting institutions' development and performance. The following research adds to this debate by systematically analyzing the quantitative evidence on how institutional interaction drives institutional design from a network perspective. Using dyadic cross-sectional data on international environmental agreements in 1952–2000, the authors find support for their theoretical argument that regimes' similarity in design as captured by their degree of legalization strongly depends on institutions' interaction. However, while "soft law" disseminates between regimes that are well connected through direct or indirect links, this does not apply to "hard law." The authors explain this divergence with states' concerns about binding-law commitments and sovereignty costs associated with the latter. This research may have important implications for studies of international institutions and of network analysis in general.

Among other influences, a specific set of factors, which are related to the belligerents, any third parties that intervene, or both of them, determine whether a conflict is likely to see mediation efforts in the first place and ultimately the prospects for successful mediation outcomes. However, although there is an extensive body of literature, previous research has rarely addressed the interaction between these actors in conflict and mediation attempts, i.e., how both belligerents and/or mediating parties are tied to each other and how they coordinate an intervention. In order to address these shortcomings, Tobias Böhmelt examines four interrelated, albeit different issues of actors' interaction in international mediation as a tool for settling conflicts peacefully.

Although the focus of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations (PKOs) remains peace and security, missions may also have an environmental orientation. Such an emphasis is usually based on environmental goals and activities in operation mandates or deployed units on the ground dedicated to environmental matters. A "green" mission orientation can strengthen peacekeepers' commitment to environmental protection and help promote environmental quality in host countries. However, little is known about what leads to an environmental mission orientation in the first place. This research contributes to addressing this question as I analyze the mission orientation of African PKOs since 1991. Consistent with the general rationale that interventions tend to strategically select themselves into the more difficult cases, I report evidence that peacekeepers are more likely to have a green orientation when host countries are more exposed to climate change and environmental stress. The analysis is complemented by a short qualitative study of UN peacekeeping in Somalia.

AbstractDoes the political ideology of negotiating parties influence the design of international environmental agreements? This article distinguishes between leftist and rightist executives in democracies to develop a twofold argument. First, left-leaning democratic governments tend to be generally more environmental-friendly, which implies that they should favor designs that are more conducive to effective institutions. Second, leftist democratic executives are commonly less concerned about sovereignty costs. Both mechanisms suggest that environmental treaties likely comprise "legalized," i.e., hard-law elements when left-wing democracies negotiate their design. The empirical implication of the theory is tested with quantitative data on international environmental agreements since 1975. The findings report an association between leftist ideology in democracies and agreement legalization, although this is driven by aspects of sovereignty delegation. This article contributes to the literatures on environmental institutions, international cooperation more generally, as well as party politics.

Does the political ideology of negotiating parties influence the design of international environmental agreements? This article distinguishes between leftist and rightist executives in democracies to develop a twofold argument. First, left-leaning democratic governments tend to be generally more environmental-friendly, which implies that they should favor designs that are more conducive to effective institutions. Second, leftist democratic executives are commonly less concerned about sovereignty costs. Both mechanisms suggest that environmental treaties likely comprise "legalized," i.e., hard-law elements when left-wing democracies negotiate their design. The empirical implication of the theory is tested with quantitative data on international environmental agreements since 1975. The findings report an association between leftist ideology in democracies and agreement legalization, although this is driven by aspects of sovereignty delegation. This article contributes to the literatures on environmental institutions, international cooperation more generally, as well as party politics.

Abstract
Previous research suggests that client politics shape national migration laws in that they converge toward more liberal regulations. An examination of recently released cross-country data suggests, however, that there is little support for either convergence or generally more open policies. Trying to shed light on this empirical puzzle, I argue that democratic policymakers have incentives to listen to, and pursue policies that are favored by, the 'unorganized' electorate as well, since this maximizes their chances of staying in power. However, due to the influence of client interests that work against the public's view on migration, a positive effect should only materialize under more salient circumstances, that is, when the inflow of foreign-born individuals is high. I analyze these expectations quantitatively using data that combine information on national migration policies with all European Social Survey rounds in 2002–2016. I find robust and significant support for public opinion influencing domestic immigration laws, but this effect only emerges with rather large migrant and refugee populations in the country.

Political leaders are ultimately responsible for their country's foreign policy, but our understanding of how executive turnover affects the likelihood of international treaty ratification remains limited. For contributing to this debate, I define leader change as the replacement of the executive leader by a new one who relies on different social groups for support. Focusing then on those cases where new leaders can assume office only from predecessors who plausibly supported treaty ratification, I expect that—in light of the predecessor's support for an agreement and the change in the domestic support base—leadership turnover makes ratification less likely. The empirical implication is tested with quantitative methods using data on multilateral treaties of the post–Cold War era. The main findings and a series of additional analyses provide strong and robust evidence for the theoretical argument. This research sheds new light on the determinants of multilateral cooperation as well as the role of government leaders in international affairs and foreign-policy decision-making.