Suchergebnisse

In the Plurinational State of Bolivia, the 2009 Constitution articulates a multidimensional conception of democracy, reflecting a legacy of social movement mobilizations that demanded political inclusion and propelled to power a president who self-identifies as Indigenous. Many anticipated that Bolivia could present a propitious environment for an invigorated and post-liberal democracy. This article evaluates the three dimensions of democracy enshrined in the Constitution – representative, participatory, and communitarian – with the aim of understanding the relationship among them. I focus on two important sites of democratic practice: the process of drafting and approving the Constitution, and the construction of "Indigenous autonomies"; that is, institutions of Indigenous self-government based on communitarian democracy. While Bolivian democracy is more stable and inclusive under the current government than under previous ones, this study finds that the expansion of sanctioned participatory and communitarian democratic processes has been limited vis-à-vis the hegemonic system of representation.

The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples recognizes Indigenous peoples' rights to self-determination and to maintain their distinct institutions. This article investigates how those rights are being exercised in Charagua, which became Bolivia's first "Indigenous autonomous government" when the municipality's Guaraní majority approved conversion in 2015. We explore the construction of novel institutions of self-government to assess how local Guaraní leaders are negotiating autonomy, both externally and internally. The result of those negotiations is a hybrid political system in which power is balanced between an executive organ (as required by Bolivian law) and a deliberative assembly (the Ñemboati Guasu, which operates according to Indigenous custom). The prominence of the assembly expresses a significant form of autonomy that promotes intercultural political participation and enacts Indigenous self-government in ways that are important to Guaraní people. Yet, because the new political unit does not control subsoil rights and thus cannot determine the sorts of development that take place in its territory, we cannot yet say the Guaranís are exercising full and robust autonomy as expressed by the UN Declaration's provisions for self-determination. ResumenLa Declaración sobre los Derechos de los Pueblos Indígenas de la ONU reconoce que pueblos indígenas tienen el derecho de auto-determinación y mantención de sus instituciones propias. Este artículo investiga cómo se ejerce estos derechos en Charagua, que fue el primer "gobierno autónomo indígena" en Bolivia, después de que la mayoría de la población aprobó conversión en 2015. Exploramos la construcción de nuevas instituciones de auto-gobierno para evaluar como los líderes guaraníes están negociando autonomía, tanto externamente como internamente. El resultado de estas negociaciones es un sistema político híbrido en donde el poder es equilibrado entre un órgano ejecutivo (mandado por ley boliviana) y una asamblea deliberativa (el Ñemboati Guasu, que opera bajo normas indígenas). La prominencia de la asamblea expresa una forma significante de autonomía la cual promueve participación política intercultural y pone en práctica auto-gobierno indígena de manera importante para el pueblo guaraní. Sin embargo, porque el municipio no tiene control sobre los usos del subsuelo, and por eso no puede control las formas de desarrollo en su territorio, todavía no podemos decir que están ejercitando una autonomía tan plena y robusta como se entendió en la Declaración de la ONU.

Abstract
The government of Bolivia led by President Evo Morales and the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party claims to be constructing a new postliberal or plurinational state. However, this alleged experiment in plurinationalism conflicts with two central elements of government and MAS party strategy: the expansion of the economic development model based on the extraction of non-renewable natural resources, and the MAS's efforts to control political space, including indigenous territories. This article analyzes these contradictions by examining how Bolivia's constitution and legal framework appear to support indigenous autonomy while simultaneously constraining it. Specifically, it explores how political and bureaucratic processes have seriously limited opportunities to exercise indigenous rights to autonomy. The article makes a comparative analysis of the implications of Bolivia's experience for indigenous autonomy and plurinationalism for other resource extraction–dependent states.