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The trilogy Forms of Representation in the Aristotelian Tradition investigates how Aristotle and his ancient and medieval successors understood the relation between the external world and the human mind. It gives an equal footing to the three most influential linguistic traditions – Greek, Latin, and Arabic – and offers insightful interpretations of historical theories of perception, dreaming, and thinking. This first volume focuses on sense perception and discusses philosophical questions concerning the external senses, their classification, and their functioning, from Aristotle to Brentano.

Acknowledgements -- Abbreviations -- Introduction -- 1 Historical Setting -- 2 Authors and Sources -- 3 Methodology -- 4 Contents in Brief -- 5 How to Use This Study? -- 6 A Note about Translations -- 1 Terminology -- 1 Basic Terminology: Political, Conjugal, and Domestic -- 2 Political or Social Animal? -- 3 Later Developments -- 2 Needs, Desires, and Natural Inclinations -- 1 Preservation of Oneself and the Species -- 2 Inclination and the Body That Makes Us Social -- 3 Reflections on Mirrors of Princes -- 4 Instrumental Role of the Community -- 5 Cities and beyond -- 3 Good Life, Virtue, and Human Sociability -- 1 Good Life and Virtue -- 2 Aims of Individuals and the Community -- 3 Social Role, Prudence, and Virtue -- 4 Is Practical Happiness for Everyone? Virtue and Prudence of Citizens -- 5 Prudence of Slaves (and Women) -- 6 Craftsman qua Craftsman qua Human -- 7 Happiness and Morality -- 4 Reason and Language -- 1 Naturalness of Language -- 2 Language and Justice -- 3 Creating Communities -- 4 Purpose of the Linguistic Argument -- 5 The Social and Political Nature of Animals -- 1 The Ant, the Bee, and the Crane -- 2 Forget the Bee: Truncating the Linguistic Argument -- 3 No Animal Is Political -- 6 Beasts, Gods, and Human Beings -- 1 Part/Whole Metaphysics -- 2 Solitary Humans -- 3 What Is It Like to Be a God? -- 4 Ways of Being Wild -- 5 The Normative Scale: Above and below Beasts -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- Bibliography -- Index.

The present article delves into the history of political philosophy by discussing human sociability in Antonio Montecatini's (1537–99) commentary on Aristotle's Politics. The focus is on a philosophical analysis of three interrelated ideas that Montecatini discusses: (1) Aristotle's dictum that human beings are political animals by nature; (2) naturalness of the household; and (3) the nature and origin of political communities. Montecatini's views are briefly related to those of John Case (ca. 1546–1600), and they are also contextualized within the late medieval commentary tradition on the Politics, but the main aim is to clarify Montecatini's philosophical position and examine the ways in which he deviates from Aristotelian naturalism in political philosophy. This paves the way to a deeper understanding of the developments that led to early modern innovations. ; peerReviewed

This chapter discusses the reception of the Aristotelian concept of 'political animal' in thirteenth and fourteenth century Latin philosophy. Aristotle thought that there are other political animals besides human beings, and his idea of what it means to be a political animal was partially based on biological needs and desires that lead animals to live together. By analysing what medieval philosophers thought of other political animals - such as ants, bees, and cranes - and of the biological basis of the political nature of humans, the chapter elaborates on the precise meaning of the concept of political animal. It is argued that biological aspects play a significant role in medieval views, but at the same time medieval authors tend to distance human beings from other political animals by emphasising rationality, choice, and language as central factors for the social and political life. ; peerReviewed

This essay discusses how medieval authorsfrom the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries dealt with aphilosophical problem that social institutions pose for theAristotelian dichotomy between natural and artificial entities.It is argued that marriage, political community, andlanguage provided a particular challenge for the conceptionthat things which are designed by human beings areartefacts. Medieval philosophers based their argumentsfor the naturalness of social institutions on the anthropologicalview that human beings are political animals bynature, but this strategy required rethinking the borderlinebetween nature and art. The limits of nature were extended,as social institutions were considered to be naturaleven though they are in many ways similar to artificialproducts.

The estimative power has been widely discussed in modern scholarly literature. This chapter complements the existing picture by analysing medieval Latin views concerning its role as the explanans of the social behaviour of humans and other animals. Although medieval authors rarely focus on this function, the chapter shows that the estimative power plays an important explanatory role both in philosophical psychology and political philosophy. ; peerReviewed

This essay discusses how medieval authors from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries dealt with a philosophical problem that social institutions pose for the Aristotelian dichotomy between natural and artificial entities. It is argued that marriage, political community, and language provided a particular challenge for the conception that things which are designed by human beings are artefacts. Medieval philosophers based their arguments for the naturalness of social institutions on the anthropological view that human beings are political animals by nature, but this strategy required rethinking the borderline between nature and art. The limits of nature were extended, as social institutions were considered to be natural even though they are in many ways similar to artificial products. ; peerReviewed

This essay discusses how medieval authors from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries dealt with a philosophical problem that social institutions pose for the Aristotelian dichotomy between natural and artificial entities. It is argued that marriage, political community, and language provided a particular challenge for the conception that things which are designed by human beings are artefacts. Medieval philosophers based their arguments for the naturalness of social institutions on the anthropological view that human beings are political animals by nature, but this strategy required rethinking the borderline between nature and art. The limits of nature were extended, as social institutions were considered to be natural even though they are in many ways similar to artificial products.

The trilogy Forms of Representation in the Aristotelian Tradition investigates how Aristotle and his ancient and medieval successors understood the relation between the external world and the human mind. It gives an equal footing to the three most influential linguistic traditions – Greek, Latin, and Arabic – and offers insightful interpretations of historical theories of perception, dreaming, and thinking. This second volume focuses on dreaming and analyses some of the most prominent problems connected to dreams as representations. The contributions in this volume address the core Aristotelian texts and their reception, up to and including contemporary scientific discourse on dreaming.

In this article we argue that freedom of speech should be understood as a social freedom. In the public discussion after the Charlie Hebdo attacks, it has often been understood as an absolute right to say anything – to offend, to make a fool of others and of oneself, and to express any opinion regardless of the consequences. We challenge this view and propose that advocating freedom of speech without understanding its social foundations is misleading and counterproductive. Based on the critical social theories of Erich Fromm, Charles Taylor and Axel Honneth, we show that there is an alternative tradition in which freedom is fundamentally rooted in social relations and therefore requires respect for others. We argue that interpreting freedom of speech as a social freedom avoids some of the problems apparent in current discussions. In addition, our position has significant practical consequences on how humour and insults should be understood.