International organizations, European Union access, and authority
In: Journal of European integration: Revue d'intégration européenne, Volume 44, Issue 5, p. 617-634
ISSN: 1477-2280
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In: Journal of European integration: Revue d'intégration européenne, Volume 44, Issue 5, p. 617-634
ISSN: 1477-2280
World Affairs Online
In: Zeitschrift für internationale Beziehungen: ZIB, Volume 27, Issue 1, p. 121-136
ISSN: 0946-7165
Laut Michael Zürns "A Theory of Global Governance" beugen sich Staaten einer übergeordneten Instanz, weil sie ihre epistemischen und politischen Handlungsgrenzen erkennen. Dies setzt eine Fähigkeit zu kritischer und aufgeklärter Reflexion voraus. Zugegebenermaßen fällt es schwer, in Diktatoren kritische und reflektierte Geister zu sehen, die eine externe Autorität anerkennen. Ist Zürns Theorie der reflexiven Autorität daher nur auf stabile und reife Demokratien anwendbar, die mehr Anlass dazu bieten, diesen Reflexionsprozess als plausibel zu betrachten? Vermeiden Diktatoren nicht eher nationale und internationale Handlungsschranken? Dieser Forumsbeitrag setzt Michael Zürns Theorie internationaler Autorität in Dialog mit jüngeren Forschungsergebnissen der Autokratieforschung. Er erörtert die Bedingungen, unter denen auch autokratische Eliten in einen Reflexionsprozess eintreten können. Aus der theoretischen Diskussion leiten sich zwei empirische Erwartungen ab, die mit neuen Daten überprüft werden. Die Ergebnisse einer quantitativen Ereignisdatenanalyse zeigen, dass Demokratien und Diktaturen in gleichem Maße IOs anerkennen.
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Volume 67, Issue 4
ISSN: 1468-2478
Abstract
One of the most influential arguments suggests that new democracies are more inclined than others to commit to international human rights treaties. This paper examines whether new democracies are more likely to commit not only to the basic, but also to the more demanding and constraining treaties. We argue that despite the strategic utility of costly commitments, new democracies are often unwilling to pay for the increased costs of more demanding and constraining treaties. We test our argument by tackling some of the trickiest inferential challenges. We employ propensity score weighting to address the nonrandom assignment of new democracies and further specify marginal structural models to account for dynamic confounding. Our analyses reveal intriguing findings. While new democracies commit to the broad human rights conventions more quickly, they are more reluctant than established democracies to commit to the more demanding and constraining protocols.
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association
ISSN: 1468-2478
One of the most influential arguments suggests that new democracies are more inclined than others to commit to international human rights treaties. This paper examines whether new democracies are more likely to commit not only to the basic, but also to the more demanding and constraining treaties. We argue that despite the strategic utility of costly commitments, new democracies are often unwilling to pay for the increased costs of more demanding and constraining treaties. We test our argument by tackling some of the trickiest inferential challenges. We employ propensity score weighting to address the nonrandom assignment of new democracies and further specify marginal structural models to account for dynamic confounding. Our analyses reveal intriguing findings. While new democracies commit to the broad human rights conventions more quickly, they are more reluctant than established democracies to commit to the more demanding and constraining protocols.
World Affairs Online
In: Global policy: gp, Volume 12, Issue 4, p. 430-442
ISSN: 1758-5899
AbstractInternational organizations (IOs) are perceived as increasingly important, yet also severely challenged actors in world politics. How authoritative are IOs, how do they exercise authority, and how has their authority evolved over time? The International Authority Database (IAD) offers a novel measure of IO authority built from several aspects of an IO's institutional design. We provide systematic data on how IOs exercise authority across seven policy functions, using a representative sample of 34 IOs, based on coding over 200 IO bodies, and covering the period 1920–2013. Empirical applications illustrate how the IAD advances our understanding of IOs in novel and important ways.
International organizations (IOs) are perceived as increasingly important, yet also severely challenged actors in world politics. How authoritative are IOs, how do they exercise authority, and how has their authority evolved over time? The International Authority Database (IAD) offers a novel measure of IO authority built from several aspects of an IO's institutional design. We provide systematic data on how IOs exercise authority across seven policy functions, using a representative sample of 34 IOs, based on coding over 200 IO bodies, and covering the period 1920–2013. Empirical applications illustrate how the IAD advances our understanding of IOs in novel and important ways.
BASE
International organizations (IOs) are perceived as increasingly important, yet also severely challenged actors in world politics. How authoritative are IOs, how do they exercise authority, and how has their authority evolved over time? The International Authority Database (IAD) offers a novel measure of IO authority built from several aspects of an IO's institutional design. We provide systematic data on how IOs exercise authority across seven policy functions, using a representative sample of 34 IOs, based on coding over 200 IO bodies, and covering the period 1920–2013. Empirical applications illustrate how the IAD advances our understanding of IOs in novel and important ways.
BASE
In: Global policy: gp, Issue Early View Articles, p. 1-13
ISSN: 1758-5899
International organizations (IOs) are perceived as increasingly important, yet also severely challenged actors in world politics. How authoritative are IOs, how do they exercise authority, and how has their authority evolved over time? The International Authority Database (IAD) offers a novel measure of IO authority built from several aspects of an IO's institutional design. We provide systematic data on how IOs exercise authority across seven policy functions, using a representative sample of 34 IOs, based on coding over 200 IO bodies, and covering the period 1920-2013. Empirical applications illustrate how the IAD advances our understanding of IOs in novel and important ways.
In: Global policy: gp, Volume 13, Issue 5, p. 656-668
ISSN: 1758-5899
AbstractDo international organizations (IOs) actually help address global problems? This question is of major concern for global governance scholars and policy makers, yet few existing studies review issues of effectiveness across a range of different issue areas. This paper generates comparative insights on IO performance across seven policy domains, namely climate change, development, finance, investment, migration, security, and trade. Based on a detailed expert survey, we consider how key IOs in these issue areas perform across three different measures of effectiveness: constitutive effectiveness, compliance, and goal achievement. We also investigate causal claims on effectiveness, exploring how IO institutional design – and in particular measures of authority – influence their ability to shape policy outcomes. Taking stock of the distribution of authority across issue areas and policy functions, we ask whether highly formalized, deeply constraining institutional arrangements have a consistently stronger impact on state behaviour or whether less formalized institutions with fewer discretionary powers can also contribute to the effective implementation of internationally coordinated policies. Finally, we identify key cross‐cutting challenges for global governance effectiveness, including political conflict and politicization, concerns related to legitimacy and representation, and growing problem complexity.