Suchergebnisse

I estimate the cost of meeting the EU 2030 targets for greenhouse gas emission reduction, using statistical emulators of ten alternative models. Assuming a first-best policy implementation, I find that total and marginal costs are modest. The statistical emulators allow me to compute the risk premiums, which are small, because the EU is rich and the policy impact is small. The ensemble of ten models allows me to compute the ambiguity premium, which is small for the same reason. I construct a counterfactual estimate of recent emissions without the climate policy and use that to test the predictive skill of the ten models. The models that show the lowest cost of emission reduction also have the lowest skill for Europe in recent times.

The European Commission did not publish a cost-benefit analysis for its 2020 climate package. This paper fills that gap, comparing the marginal costs and benefits of greenhouse gas emission reduction. The uncertainty about the marginal costs of climate change is large and skewed, and estimates partly reflect ethical choices (e.g., the discount rate). The 2010 carbon price in the EU Emissions Trading System can readily be justified by a cost-benefit analysis. Emission reduction is not expensive provided that policy is well-designed, a condition not met by planned EU policy. It is probably twice as expensive as needed, costing one in ten years of economic growth. The EU targets for 2020 are unlikely to meet the benefit-cost test. For a standard discount rate (3% pure rate of time preference), the benefit-cost ratio is rather poor (1/30)-so that benefits need to be very much higher, or costs very much lower than typically assumed to justify the 2020 targets. Only a very low discount rate (0% PRTP) would justify the 20% emission reduction target for 2020. © 2012 Elsevier Ltd.

The nuclear meltdown in Fukushima has given renewed momentum to the anti-nuclear power movement across Europe. However, the degree of momentum varies greatly from country to country, and considering the geographically widespread consequences of a nuclear accident, it hardly appears optimal for one country to ban nuclear power while multiple nuclear power plants are still active in neighbouring countries. Even beyond the nuclear power dilemma, the economic and political externalities associated with energy policy are difficult to overstate. The contributions to this Forum look into the benefi ts expected from a comprehensive common energy policy for Europe and the problems which establishing such a policy would involve. © 2011 Springer-Verlag.

Based on a brief account of 1,000 years of river floods and flood management in the Dutch Rhine delta, it is argued that vulnerability to river floods depends on the complex interaction of economics, institutions, politics and, to a limited extent, climate. Response functions and thresholds for climate change impacts should take this complexity into account rather than assuming society to be constant or evolving in a straightforward manner.

Non-cooperative game theoretical models of self-enforcing international environmental agreements (IEAs) that employ the cartel stability concept of D'Aspremont et al. (Can J Econ 16:17-25, 1983) frequently assume that countries are identical, and they can sign a single agreement only. We modify the assumption by considering two self-enforcing IEAs and also two types of asymmetric countries. Extending a model of Barrett (Oxford Econ Pap 46:878-894, 1994), we demonstrate that there are similarities between one and two self-enforcing IEAs. But in the case of few countries and high environmental damage we show that two self-enforcing IEA work far better than one self-enforcing IEA in terms of both welfare and environmental quality. Our simulation shows that only if all countries that have fewer benefits and higher cost from pollution abatement must build one coalition, there is hope that two myopic stable coalition can be formed. Moreover, if the cost-benefit functions of pollution abatement impose that the first myopic coalition is formed by countries, which have higher benefits and lower cost from pollution abatement, then two IEA's worsen abatement and welfare in comparison to one IEA. But, if the first myopic coalition is formed by countries, which have smaller benefits and higher cost from pollution abatement, then two IEA's improve abatement and welfare in comparison to one IEA. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.

This paper warns against the risk of underestimating the costs-and the uncertainty about the costs-of achieving stringent stabilization targets. We argue that a straightforward review of integrated assessment models results produces biased estimates for the more ambitious climate objectives such as those compatible with the 2°C of the European Union and the G8. The magnitude and range of estimates are significantly reduced because only the most optimistic results are reported for such targets. We suggest a procedure that addresses this partiality. The results show highly variable costs for the most ambitious scenarios. © 2010 The Author(s).

Many regions of the world are facing formidable freshwater scarcity. Although there is substantial scope for economizing on the consumption of water without affecting its service level, the main response to water scarcity has been to increase the supply. To a large extent, this is done by transporting water from places where it is abundant to places where it is scarce. At a smaller scale and without a lot of public and political attention, people have started to tap into the sheer limitless resource of desalinated water. This study looks at the development of desalination and its costs over time. The unit costs of desalinated water for five main processes are evaluated, followed by regressions to analyze the main influencing factors to the costs. The unit costs for all processes have fallen considerably over the years. This study suggests that a cost of $1/m

The holiday destination choice is analysed for tourists from 45 countries, representing all continents and all climates. Tourists are deterred by distance, political instability and poverty, and attracted to coasts. Tourists prefer countries with a sunny yet mild climate, shun climates that are too hot or too cold. A country's tourists' aversion for poverty and distance can be predicted by that country's average per capita income. The preferred holiday climate is the same for all tourists, independent of the home climate. However, tourists from hotter climates have more pronounced preferences. © Springer 2006.

Methane is, after carbon dioxide, the most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas. Governments plan to abate methane emissions. A crude set of estimates of reduction costs is included in FUND, an integrated assessment model of climate change. In a cost-benefit analysis, methane emission reduction is found to be instrumental in controlling the optimal rate of climate change. In a cost-effectiveness analysis, methane emission reduction largely replaces carbon dioxide emission reduction. Methane emission reduction reinforces the case for international cooperation in climate policy, but complicates the efficient allocation of emission reduction efforts. Methane emission reduction at the short run does not help to achieve the ultimate objective of the Framework Convention on Climate Change.

This paper applies the DIVA model to assess the risk of and adaptation to sea-level rise for the European Union in the 21st century under the A2 and B1 scenarios of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. For each scenario, impacts are estimated without and with adaptation in the form of increasing dike heights and nourishing beaches. Before 2050, the level of impacts is primarily determined by socio-economic development. In 2100 and assuming no adaptation, 780×10

Climate change may lead to an increased risk of river floods in the Netherlands. However, the impacts of changes in water management are even larger, whether enhancing or reducing flood risks. Therefore, the abilities of water management authorities to learn that climate and river flows are changing, and to recognise and act upon the implications are of crucial importance. At the same time, water management authorities respond to other trends, such as the democratisation of decision making, which alter their ability to react to climate change. This complex of interactions is illustrated with changes in river flood risk management for the Rhine and the Meuse in the Netherlands over the last 50 years. A scenario study is used to seek insight into the question whether current water management institutions and their likely successors are capable of dealing with plausible future flood risks. Structural solutions to future flood risks are feasible, but require considerable political will and institutional reform.

Climate change may well lead to an increased risk of river floods in the Netherlands. However, the impacts of changes in water management on river floods are larger, either enhancing or reducing flood risks. Therefore, the abilities of water-management authorities to learn that climate and river flows are changing, and to recognize and act upon the implications, are of crucial importance. At the same time, water-management authorities respond to other trends, such as the democratization of decision making, which alter their ability to react to climate change. These complex interactions are illustrated with changes in river flood risk management for the Rhine and the Meuse in the Netherlands over the last 50 years. A scenario study is used to seek insight into the question of whether current water-management institutions and their likely successors are capable of dealing with plausible future flood risks. The scenarios show that new and major infrastructure is needed to keep flood risks at their current level. Such a structural solution to future flood risks is feasible, but requires considerable political will and institutional reform, both for planning and implementation. It is unlikely that reform will be fast enough or the will strong enough.

This paper assesses the potential benefits of climate change mitigation in reducing the impacts of sea-level rise over the 21st century in G-20 countries (excluding the European Union as a whole), using the Dynamic Interactive Vulnerability Assessment model. Impacts of the expected number of people flooded annually and wetland losses were assessed. To assess the benefits of mitigation, it was assumed that defences were not upgraded during the study. Globally, with a sea-level rise of 0.68m by the 2080s (with respect to 1980-1999), representing a potential future with limited climate change mitigation, and with the SRES A1 socio-economic scenario, 123 million additional people could be flooded annually and 39% of present global wetland stock could be lost. For a 0.19m rise in sea-level, associated with a substantial reduction in emissions, the number of people flooded could reduce to 13 million per year, with 21% of global wetland stock loss, unless new wetlands emerge. Collectively, non-Annex 1 G-20 countries experience a disproportionate higher number of people flooded in their nations compared with the proportion of population flooded globally. The greatest wetland losses for G-20 countries are projected for Australia, Indonesia and the USA. Thus, G-20 nations with the highest emissions or gross domestic product, frequently do not experience the greatest impacts, despite some of these nations being potentially more able to pay for adaptation.