Suchergebnisse

The United Kingdom (UK) may opt to leave the European Union (EU) emissions trading system (ETS) for greenhouse gases. This policy brief examines the implications. The UK is a large importer of emission permits. Thus, meeting its climate policy targets would be much more difficult without the EU ETS, costing an additional 0.2 to 0.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). In addition to the increased compliance costs, the UK will face transition costs for leaving the EU ETS because a central plank of UK climate policy (i.e., permit trade) will need to be replaced on short notice. Furthermore, there may be a loss of business as the carbon trade leaves London. Moreover, as UK greenhouse gas regulation diverges from the EU, distortions at the border will also increase. The impact of a UK departure from the EU ETS on the EU would be limited if the EU accepts a weaker emissions cap. Non-EU countries such as Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein participate in the EU ETS, and this would appear to be the best option for the UK if it leaves the EU.

The Ramsey rule for the consumption rate of discount assumes a transfer of money of a (representative) agent at one point in time to the same agent at another point in time. Climate policy (implicitly) transfers money not just over time but also between agents. I propose three alternative modifications of the Ramsey rule to account for this. Taking the Ramsey rule as given, I derive an intuitively clear but ad hoc modification. Using the assumptions underlying the Ramsey rule, I derive a consistent but more elaborate modification. If the discount rate is differentiated by victim, the consistent modified Ramsey rule is simpler and identical to regional equity weights. I apply the modified Ramsey rules to estimates of the marginal damage costs of carbon dioxide emissions. The results confirm that optimal climate policy has differentiated carbon taxes. Results also show that the standard Ramsey rule drastically underestimates the social cost of carbon.

A simulation model of international tourist flows is used to estimate the impact of a carbon tax on aviation fuel. The effect of the tax on travel behaviour is small: a global $1000/tC would change travel behaviour to reduce carbon dioxide emissions from international aviation by 0.8%. This is because the imposed tax is probably small relative to the air fare. A $1000/tC tax would less than double air fares, and have a smaller impact on the total cost of the holiday. In addition, the price elasticity is low. A carbon tax on aviation fuel would particularly affect long-haul flights, because of high emissions, and short-haul flights, because of the emission during take-off and landing. Medium distance flights would be affected least. This implies that tourist destinations that rely heavily on short-haul flights (that is, islands near continents, such as Ireland) or on intercontinental flights (e.g., Africa) will see a decline in international tourism numbers, while other destinations may see international arrivals rise. If the tax is only applied to the European Union, EU tourists would stay closer to home so that EU tourism would grow at the expense of other destinations. Sensitivity analyses reveal that the qualitative insights are robust. A carbon tax on aviation fuel would have little effect on international tourism, and little effect on emissions.

Poorer countries are generally believed to be more vulnerable to climate change than richer countries because poorer countries are more exposed and have less adaptive capacity. This suggests that, in principle, there are two ways of reducing vulnerability to climate change: economic growth and greenhouse gas emission reduction. Using a complex climate change impact model, in which development is an important determinant of vulnerability, the hypothesis is tested whether development aid is more effective in reducing impacts than is emission abatement. The hypothesis is barely rejected for Asia but strongly accepted for Latin America and, particularly, Africa. The explanation for the difference is that development (aid) reduces vulnerabilities in some sectors (infectious diseases, water resources, agriculture) but increases vulnerabilities in others (cardiovascular diseases, energy consumption). However, climate change impacts are much higher in Latin America and Africa than in Asia, so that money spent on emission reduction for the sake of avoiding impacts in developing countries is better spent on vulnerability reduction in those countries. His last big project in a long career, Jan Feenstra managed the Netherlands Climate Change Assistance Programme through which the Dutch Government sponsors climate change research in developing countries. He hated how climate change detracted from what he considered to be the real issues. This paper is dedicated to his memory.