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Liberal regimes shape the ethical outlooks of their citizens, relentlessly influencing their most personal commitments over time. On such issues as abortion, homosexuality, and women's rights, many religious Americans feel pulled between their personal beliefs and their need, as good citizens, to support individual rights. These circumstances, argues John Tomasi, raise new and pressing questions: Is liberalism as successful as it hopes in avoiding the imposition of a single ethical doctrine on all of society? If liberals cannot prevent the spillover of public values into nonpublic domains, how accommodating of diversity can a liberal regime actually be? To what degree can a liberal society be a home even to the people whose viewpoints it was formally designed to include? To meet these questions, Tomasi argues, the boundaries of political liberal theorizing must be redrawn. Political liberalism involves more than an account of justified state coercion and the norms of democratic deliberation. Political liberalism also implies a distinctive account of nonpublic social life, one in which successful human lives must be built across the interface of personal and public values. Tomasi proposes a theory of liberal nonpublic life. To live up to their own deepest commitments to toleration and mutual respect, liberals, he insists, must now rethink their conceptions of social justice, civic education, and citizenship itself. The result is a fresh look at liberal theory and what it means for a liberal society to function well
Can libertarians care about social justice? In Free Market Fairness, John Tomasi argues that they can and should. Drawing simultaneously on moral insights from defenders of economic liberty such as F. A. Hayek and advocates of social justice such as John Rawls, Tomasi presents a new theory of liberal justice. This theory, free market fairness, is committed to both limited government and the material betterment of the poor. Unlike traditional libertarians, Tomasi argues that property rights are best defended not in terms of self-ownership or economic efficiency but as requirements of democrati
Can libertarians care about social justice? In Free Market Fairness, John Tomasi argues that they can and should. Drawing simultaneously on moral insights from defenders of economic liberty such as F.A. Hayek and advocates of social justice such as John Rawls, Tomasi presents a new theory of liberal justice. This theory, free market fairness, is committed to both limited government and the material betterment of the poor. Unlike traditional libertarians, Tomasi argues that property rights are best defended not in terms of self-ownership or economic efficiency but as requirements of democratic legitimacy.
In: Critical review: a journal of politics and society, Band 26, Heft 3-4, S. 439-471
ISSN: 1933-8007
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 75, Heft 2, S. E12
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: Public policy research: PPR, Band 19, Heft 1, S. 26-33
ISSN: 1744-540X
Challenging orthodoxy on both left and right, political theorist John Tomasi develops a new account of liberal justice – free market fairness – to show how limited government and the material betterment of the poor can be reconciled. In doing so, he asks the left to rethink their attitude towards private economic liberty.
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 29, Heft 1, S. 50-80
ISSN: 1471-6437
AbstractLibertarians and classical liberals typically defend private economic liberty as a requirement of self-ownership or on the basis of consequentialist arguments of various sorts. By contrast, this paper defends private economic liberty as a requirement of democratic legitimacy. In recent decades, many philosophers have converged upon a certain view about political justification. If a set of social institutions is to be just and legitimate, those institutions must be acceptable in principle to the citizens who are to lead their lives within them. This deliberative or democratic approach to justification is traditionally associated with thinkers on the left who are skeptical of the importance of private economic liberty. This article shows how the protection of private economic liberty is a requirement of citizens' developing and exercising the moral powers they have as democratic citizens. Democratic legitimacy does not require the affirmation of absolute economic liberty rights as sometimes defended by libertarians. But democratic legitimacy does require that a wide range of private economic liberties be meriting constitutional protection on a par with the civil and political liberties of democratic citizens. This opens the way for a wider defense of classical liberalism based upon the idea of democratic legitimacy.
In: Critical review of international social and political philosophy: CRISPP, Band 14, Heft 4, S. 517-521
ISSN: 1369-8230
In: Critical review of international social and political philosophy: CRISPP, Band 14, Heft 4, S. 517-520
ISSN: 1743-8772
SSRN
In: APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: Toward a Humanist Justice, S. 67-90
In: Social philosophy & policy, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 322-345
ISSN: 1471-6437
It is easy and popular these days to be a political liberal. Compared
to 'ethical liberals', who justify the use of state power by way
of one or another conception of people's true moral nature,
'political liberals' seek a less controversial foundation for
liberal politics. Pioneered within the past twenty years by John Rawls and
Charles Larmore, the 'political liberal' approach seeks to justify
the coercive power of the state by reference to general political
ideas about persons and society. Since it abandons the debates about personal
moral value that have historically dogged liberal theory, political
liberalism offers itself as a more latitudinarian, indeed a more
liberal, form of liberalism. Being a political liberal is not the only
way to be a good liberal, but this approach has become prevalent enough
that I shall focus upon it here.