Suchergebnisse

Un régime de retraite propre à l'Alberta (RRA) fait l'objet depuis peu d'un regain d'attention. Dans cet article, j'évalue la viabilité à long terme de ce régime, en utilisant à la fois un modèle quantitatif détaillé et des approches simples et intuitives. Je constate que la marge de manœuvre pour modifier les niveaux de prestations et les taux de cotisation par rapport au Régime de pensions du Canada (RPC) est modeste. Plus précisément, j'estime que le taux de cotisation minimum au RRA est de 8,2 %, comparativement à 9,5 % pour le taux de base du RPC. En tenant compte d'un coussin de 0,4 point de pourcentage, le même que pour le RPC, le taux de cotisation imposé au RRA par la loi passerait alors à 8,6 %. Ce chiffre contraste fortement avec un rapport récent commandé par le gouvernement (LifeWorks 2023), qui calcule un taux de cotisation de 5,9 %. J'explique cet écart et je montre qu'il dépend en grande partie de la façon dont on interprète la formulation imprécise de la Loi sur le Régime de pensions du Canada. Je considère également plusieurs risques pertinents. Par exemple, les flux migratoires nets positifs de l'Alberta constituent près des deux tiers de son avantage en matière de pensions. Et, selon l'horizon prévisionnel choisi, les risques d'investissement pourraient éliminer entièrement son avantage. Dans l'ensemble, cet article constitue une base actualisée non seulement pour évaluer les forces et les faiblesses du RRA, mais aussi pour comprendre, plus généralement, la viabilité des régimes de retraite.

Federal health care funding has long been a source of policy debate in this country, a situation exacerbated recently by the COVID-19 pandemic and the calls by premiers for a massive expansion of the Canada Health Transfer. In this paper, after briefly reviewing the evolution of federal health care funding in Canada since the 1950s, we formulate three potential policy pathways federal policymakers might consider in order to improve health care funding in the country. The first pathway is the status quo, which simply preserves the Canada Health Transfer (CHT) as is. Explaining what the status quo entails is important to gauge the potential impact of the two other pathways we formulate, which depart from the status quo in a significant manner: first, the implementation of demographic adjustments that add to CHT as populations age; and second, the creation of a joint federal-provincial-territorial taxation regime. While the second pathway would constitute a form incremental change, the third one would be transformative in nature and, therefore, more challenging to implement, which is not a reason to exclude it for consideration, especially if we take a more long-term view of potential policy change in fiscal federalism. These three potential pathways should allow policymakers to consider how to adapt to changing circumstances while addressing the concerns of citizens and the demands of provincial/territorial governments. We do not support one or another of these policy pathways; instead, we explain what they are and what impact they could have, leaving the reader decide what option they prefer.

Since oil prices fell in 2014, Alberta's provincial government has wrestled with large and persistent deficits. The new government elected in April 2019 is committed to balancing the books by 2022. But a longer-run challenge remains.

Alberta's short-term fiscal challenges are well known, but its long-term ones are more significant. An aging population, a high reliance on non-renewable resource revenue, and rising debt levels will increasingly widen the current gap between spending and revenue. This paper estimates how large this gap is and where it is headed in the coming decades. Combining detailed data and projections for macroeconomic and demographic variables with a rich model of Alberta's budget, this report quantifies the scale of the province's fiscal challenge and explores potential ways to address it. Overall, I find the present value of the difference between spending and non-resource revenues is 4.2 per cent of GDP between 2018 and 2100. By 2040, the fiscal gap that year will be roughly 44 per cent of controllable government revenue, 29 per cent of program spending, and the equivalent of over 4 per cent of GDP. In present value terms, the fiscal gap between now and 2040 is equivalent to over $250 billion today. I further find that debt levels are not on a sustainable path, as the long-run debt obligations exceed the government's future ability to service that debt without significant policy changes. Meaningful action on both spending and revenue can address the province's financial challenges. I explore various potential options. Without sustained, disciplined, and transparent action today, Alberta faces a precarious fiscal future.

Politicians across Canada have come to understand that our economy improves when we develop so-called "value added" industries and jobs. They suppose that turning raw materials into finished goods creates more value added than simply extracting and exporting raw materials directly. That understanding is entirely and often dangerously wrong. Indeed, the meaning of the phrase "value added" has been so widely misunderstood and distorted that we would all be better off if it were struck from the political rhetoric and public debate entirely. The reality is that almost everything Canadians are being told about which activities add value, and which ones do not, is utterly backwards. Manufacturing has come to be seen as the ultimate source of value added, as though the physical manipulation of matter was somehow responsible. For example, the leader of the federal Opposition, the NDP's Thomas Mulcair, has insisted that "exporting unrefined heavy oil creates no valueadded jobs" and likens exporting raw logs to "a practice typical of undeveloped nations." It is not just the NDP, similar statements are made across the political spectrum. Fortunately for us, such views can be put to the test. We will see that they are not just inaccurate, they are the very opposite of the reality: Canada's raw resource extraction industries actually provide the highest valueadded, often by a significant margin. Oil and gas extraction, for example, creates $1.36 million in value per job per year, 15 times higher than the national average for all sectors and more than triple the value added per job per year in the petroleum products refining sector. Absent such data, is there a better way to think about value added that would provide a clear and intuitive defense to misleading statements? Thankfully, there is: industries that generate the most income are industries with high value added. To say a sector like oil and gas extraction creates no value-added jobs is to say it creates no income, which is plainly false. If replacing "income" for "value added" leads a claim to not make sense, then it is likely false and the politician or commentator should be dismissed. Disturbingly, this mixed-up thinking matters a lot for the health of Canada's economy. Public policy often favours supposedly high value-added industries at the expense of others through subsidies or other supports. Instead of creating value, when governments favour one sector over another they invariably hurt the economy by distorting the allocation of labour and capital, which lowers Canada's overall GDP. This is true for any subsidy made on the basis of "value added" – subsidizing resource extraction would also be economically damaging. There may be other reasons to provide industry supports – but value added is never one of them. Canada's economy, and everyone in it, would be better off if politicians and public commentators put the phrase "value added" to rest.

Public perception of Canada's energy trade is skewed towards Alberta's oilsands and pipeline projects; a look at the facts reveals a more complex picture. Over the last decade, growth in Canada's energy trade has been nothing short of historic. Energy exports have become so significant that the revenue is now equivalent to nearly $9,000 for every Canadian household. And it is only projected to grow much, much larger. While Western Canada leads the industry, every region — including Ontario, Quebec and Atlantic Canada — plays a key role. Today, nearly every province is a net energy exporter. The energy sector also adds much to Canada's economy, with valueadded and productivity higher than nearly every other sector. When it comes to labour compensation, oil and gas extraction is the highest-paying sector in the country, at more than three times the average hourly earnings in the Canadian economy generally, and nearly 50 per cent higher than manufacturing. It is vital that policy debates rely on accurate information; unfortunately, this is not always the case. The often heated rhetoric neglects important aspects of Canada's energy trade. For example, the type of energy that Canada trades has undergone a dramatic transformation. Ten years ago, natural gas was the largest energy export but today accounts for less than one-tenth of the total. Meanwhile, crude oil exports have more than quadrupled. Even more surprising to many Canadians, and perhaps even policy-makers, is how much energy Canada imports. Even Alberta, with its vast energy reserves, imports a considerable amount of energy. Alberta's energy imports have grown faster than any other province and will soon exceed Ontario's, a province more than three times larger with very little of its own oil production. Trade in energy is also intimately tied with Canada's foreign investment policies. The majority of Canada's energy trade is in the form of related-party transactions. For example, Suncor exports oil from its Canadian operations to its American refineries to supply its American gas stations. This fact has important implications for Canadian policy: foreign multinational firms are an important and growing part of the country's rapidly expanding energy trade. Promoting Canada's energy trade requires lowering investment barriers and creating a predictable and stable investment climate for foreign direct investment. Yet, in practice, Canada has recently shown a tendency for the opposite, with governments blocking the takeover of Potash Corporation by Australia's BHP Billiton, and announcing, after the takeover of Nexen Inc. by a Chinese firm, that future takeovers would face even greater scrutiny. Foreign investment in Canada's energy has already begun to fall, feasibly as a result of these increasingly hostile signals. Canada has a great deal riding on the future of its energy industry — an industry that is as economically beneficial as any other, if not more so. It is absolutely crucial that we ensure our energy-trade policies are based on high-quality and objective information; politicized and emotional rhetoric does not help.

Le taux d'inflation au Canada a atteint des sommets générationnels en 2022. La présente étude examine cette hausse rapide. En utilisant de nouvelles méthodes et des données détaillées sur la consommation des ménages, l'article identifie séparément les hausses de prix induites par la demande et l'offre. Nous constatons que cette dernière explique la majeure partie de la hausse de l'inflation, en particulier en ce qui concerne les produits à forte consommation d'énergie et les produits fortement échangés. En outre, nous constatons que les produits dont les prix varient de manière normalement transitoire, ou qui sont particulièrement sensibles aux taux d'intérêt sont à l'origine de la quasi-totalité de l'augmentation. Cette étude jette un éclairage nouveau et important sur les tendances récentes de l'inflation et illustre de nouvelles méthodes empiriques capables d'apporter une valeur ajoutée aux efforts de surveillance de l'inflation au Canada.