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In Central Asia, energy policy and energy projects as part of the fuel and energy complex and regional economy as a whole are two sides of the same coin. In other words, the key energy projects that determine the development trends and major parameters of the republics' fuel and energy complexes for many years to come are, as a rule, closely connected with the main strategic foreign policy trends of those who rule Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The main strategic actors (Russia, the United States, EU, and China) are exerting their influence on the local developments in the energy sphere. The second echelon (Iran, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, and Poland) recently joined the struggle over influence in the energy sphere. The list of those involved is even longer: Japan, India, Malaysia, and South Korea are ready with their money to pursue their commercial and resource-related interests. The long list of those wishing to have a finger in the Central Asian resource pie explains the local countries' multi-vector energy policy. While bringing certain short-term political and even economic dividends, this policy interferes with long-term strategic decisions and slows down progress in the region's fuel and energy complex. Here are several recent examples: the already commissioned or planned pipelines depend for their continued functioning or even realization on Central Asian involvement. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline will not reach its designated annual capacity of 50 million tons of oil without Kazakhstan's oil. The planned Trans-Caspian pipeline (along the seabed) will never be realized if the Central Asian countries refuse to use it. This explains the heightened attention (bordering on pressure) to the leaders of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The aim is obvious: the two countries should be removed from Russia's gasand oil transport orbit to channel their fuel to Europe bypassing the Russian Federation and its pipeline system.

The events that took place early in September 2006 can be described as the starting point of a new round of the Great Game for control over the Central Asian and Caspian gas resources. The near monopoly domination of Russia and Gazprom in this part of the world is becoming a thing of the past. China, which signed contracts on the delivery of over 100 bcm of gas with Russia and the Central Asian countries, has moved to the fore, thus tipping the balance of forces. The fact that the huge contractual amounts have not yet been confirmed either by available resources or by adequate transportation facilities testifies that the countries involved are working toward new and more acceptable rules on the market that is just taking shape. The rivalry over the energy sources of Central Asia and the Caspian is rooted in the 19th century when Britain and Russia were locked in the so-called Great Game over the region. Early in the 20th century, the Caspian supplied the world with half the oil it consumed; this was where the huge wealth of the Nobels and Rockefellers originated. When the Soviet Union left the stage, Western companies pushed in with the intention to control the natural resources of the newly independent Central Asian and Caspian states. In Asia, too, the giants-China, India, Japan, and the Republic of Korea-stepped up their involvement in the process. Russia, which lost some of its influence in the 1990s, has been building up its presence in the last few years. Analysts and political observers have already tagged the rivalry over energy resources and pipelines as "a new round of the Great Game of the 19th century." Today, America, Russia, China, Japan, and India are interested in the region for several reasons: its favorable geographic location and its potential as a West-East and North-South communication corridor; the world's growing demand for energy fuels, in which the region is rich, as well as the counter-terrorist struggle. In the final analysis, however, the present active involvement of the world's largest countries in Central Asia and the Caspian, which manifests itself in different forms (diplomatic, military, economic, etc.), is explained by nothing more than the key political reality: the exacerbating rivalry over raw materials, particularly energy fuels. The oil crisis taught the oil importers that they need an uninterrupted flow of oil from the oil wells to the consumer; they also learned that oil should come from different sources in sufficient quantities to exclude the possibility of "energy blackmail."

A year after the start of Russia's special military operation in Ukraine, the rapprochement between the Russian Federation and China in the most important areas of world development has intensified. Although Beijing is trying to demonstrate its neutrality on this issue, the statements of Chinese leaders and diplomats and, most importantly, their deeds reflect the growing cooperation between two countries in politics, economy, finance, and even in the military sphere. It seems possible to talk about the nascent union of the two countries, although for the time being they prefer to keep silent about this in Russia, and in China, and, even more so, in the West. In the first part of the article (June 2022), the political, economic and financial aspects of China's reaction to the Ukrainian events were considered, an attempt was made to predict the future configuration of relations between the Russian Federation and China, the impact of these relations on the global economy. In 2023, relations between the two countries clearly exceeded the level of partnership (even strategic) and began to resemble allied relations of states with close interests in foreign policy, acting in concert against common opponents, significantly expanding their combined influence on global political, financial, and economic development.

Russia's special military operaton in Ukraine has become the biggest politcal and military crisis since the end of the Cold War. Under the conditons of the politcal and economic blockade of Russia organized by the «collectve West», China's positon is extremely important for the further oppositon of our country to the pressure of the West. The artcle examines the politcal, economic and fnancial aspects of the Chinese reacton to the Ukrainian events, an atempt is made to predict the future confguraton of relatons between the Russian Federaton and China, the impact of these relatons on the world economy.

Air transport has become the most dynamic segment of the PRC's transport services market. As a necessary conditon for the country's territorial integrity and the unity of its economic space, regular air lines connect all parts of the huge state, ensure the expansion of China's foreign economic relatons and its integraton into the system of world economic relatons. Despite the losses incurred by the industry in 2020 due to the COVID‑19 epidemic, China contnues to explode its air travel market. Moreover, the Chinese airlines were the fastest to restore the previous, «dock‑like» indicators. At this stage, the main problem of Chinese civil aviaton is saturaton of the market with aircraf of its own producton. Actng in cooperaton with Russia and other post‑Soviet countries, the PRC begins producton of its own models of civil aircraf and is thinking about promotng these products to foreign markets.

In recent years, China has stepped up work to develop its pipeline infrastructure as an important part of ensuring the country's energy security. In modern geopolitical conditions, the supply of hydrocarbons mainly by sea entails growing risks, which predetermines the rapid development of energy ties with neighboring states. One of the constraints of this strategy is the lack of development of pipeline infrastructure. New measures of the PRC government, both technological and regulatory, are designed to create an oil and gas transportation infrastructure that is adequate to the tasks of providing the country's economy with imported fuel as quickly as possible.