Leadership, Institutions and Enforcement: Anti-Corruption Agencies in Serbia, Croatia and Macedonia
In: Executive Politics and Governance
In: Springer eBooks
In: Political Science and International Studies
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In: Executive Politics and Governance
In: Springer eBooks
In: Political Science and International Studies
In: Vojnotehnički glasnik: naučni časopis Ministerstva Odbrane Republike Srbije = Military technical courier : scientific periodical of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia = Voenno-techničeskij vestnik : naučnyj žurnal Ministerstva Oborony Respubliki Serbija, Band 38, Heft 6, S. 562-568
ISSN: 2217-4753
In: Nacionalni interes, Band 15, Heft 3, S. 133-156
Cilj ovog članka je višestruk. U prvom delu se diskutuje o konceptu regulatornih agencija, koje spadaju u grupu nemajoritarnih institucija (non-majoritarian institutions; u daljem tekstu NMI): kada i zašto nastaju, koja je njihova uloga, i sa kojim problemima se suočavaju. Potom se analiziraju regulatorna tela u Srbiji. Fokus je na sledećem aspektu - nezavisnosti ovih institucija: pojašnjavamo različite vidove nezavisnosti i ukazujemo na konceptualne nejasnoće. Zatim računamo tzv. formalnu (de jure) nezavisnost regulatornih i kontrolnih tela u Srbiji koristeći se Đilardijevim indeksom (Gillardi 2002, 873-893). Rezultati pokazuju da regulatorna tela u Srbiji poseduju visok nivo formalne nezavisnosti. S obzirom na to da je ona samo preduslov za tzv. faktičku (bihejvioralnu) nezavisnost, neophodan je oprez prilikom donošenja ocene o statusu regulatornih institucija u Srbiji. Da bi se konceptualizovao i izmerio bihejvioralni aspekt nezavisnosti, neophodni su dalji radovi koji će se susresti s većim metodološkim ograničenjima. ; The article discusses the concept of regulatory agencies: when and why they arise, what is their role, and what kind of challenges they face. Analyzing a group of regulatory agencies in Serbia, the article measures their de-jure independence using Gillardi's index. The conclusion is that, viewed through the lenses of formal institutional design, Serbian regulatory agencies exhibit a high degree of independence. However, this might be further mediated by insufficient or hindered enforcement. Therefore, in order to account for a full picture of the agencies' institutional life, in the first place their de-facto independence, one needs to reflect on what some theories of Europeanization drew attention to – to what extent have the regulatory agencies resorted to their formally granted powers and mechanisms in practice. Such an exploration of enforcement would be a step further in accounting for the genuine agencies' level of independence.
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