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This work analyzes the implementation of controversial public policy. A single, overarching model provides the framework for testing competing theories, ranging from Max Weber's bureaucracy theory and Woodrow Wilson's theory of administration to more recent ideas on how the legislature controls the bureaucracy. The model combines ideas about policy implementation drawn from different disciplines: political science, public administration, sociology and economics. The author uses a novel empirical test design to measure agency performance and deviations from political decisions taken in three Dutch local authorities. In contrast to more conventional implementation studies, this work adopts a `few variables, many cases' approach. The model and empirical tests, which are fully clarified in the book, together offer a novel framework for the analysis of complex implementation processes. A previous version of the book (written in Dutch) was awarded the prestigious Van Poelje prize of the Dutch Association for Public Administration and the 1996 annual award of the Dutch Political Science Association

Three perspectives on delegation in the European Union are presented in this article. The transaction-costs perspective focuses on information asymmetries between policy makers and implementers. According to the commitment perspective, policy makers delegate authority as a solution to commitment problems. The consensus-building perspective views the decision to delegate as a trade-off between decisiveness and inclusiveness during the bargaining process. Hypotheses are derived from these perspectives regarding the amount of delegation to both the European Commission and to member states in legislation. From detailed information on eighty-six EU laws, there is some evidence for the transaction-costs perspective as an explanation of delegation to the Commission. With respect to delegation to member states, there is some evidence for both the transaction-costs perspective and the consensus-building perspective.

This article analyses the effect of conflict in the Council of the European Union (EU) on delays in the transposition of EU directives. Based on enforcement and management theories, we predict that conflict in the Council speeds up the transposition process. In addition, we control for the instigation of infringement procedures by the Commission and expect a weaker effect of conflict in cases where the Commission disagrees with a directive and if directives grant more discretion to member states. These hypotheses are tested using two indicators of conflict: heterogeneity and polarization. Cox regression analysis is applied with time-dependent effects and with a shared frailty to control for the multilevel structure of the data. The analyses show that, over time, conflict has an increasing negative effect on delays.