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Equity theorists have frequently attempted to rank order situations of injustice in terms of preference, motivation to redress justice, and/or overt behavioral responses. The present paper deals with some difficulties facing those efforts and proposes a basis for more precise predictions. It is shown, through a structural specification of their various component types (socalled minor types), why a situation which is less preferred than others in one case may be more preferred than those in another, i.e., the preferential order reversed. This is demonstrated empirically in the present study. Two major types of injustice situations (Under/Over and Under/Just) were involved, one more unjust than the other. Each one encompassed, and was represented by three structurally different minor types. According to the predictions, subjects' preferences for either one of the two major types of injustice situations varied with the particular minor type presented in the study as representing the underlying major types. The findings have implications for the design offuture equity studies.

Previous formulations of injustice have left undiscovered the majority of the possible types of justice and injustice and have tended to conceal many of the structural features of the few types that have been recognized. It is here proposed that a specification of the structural properties of injustice types is crucial to making accurate predictions of people's reactions in such situations. By clearly specifying the various comparisons between two particular individuals, and between them and people associated with given reference positions, with respect to their inputs and outcomes, a typology of just and injust situations is constructed. A set of propositions is advanced with regard to the order of the various types of injustice in terms of the magnitudes ofjustice motivation that a person is likely to experience in such situations. These propositions prompt the questioning of two of J. S. Adams' conjectures with regard to magnitudes of injustice. They also lead to the conclusion that any "main type" or "subtype" of injustice may vary in its magnitude of injustice, as determined by the structure of the particular "minor types" involved. This may, in some instances necessitate modifications in the predicted order between the main types and subtypes of injustice. Some methodological refinements are finally proposed with respect to the design and interpretation of research on injustice.