Suchergebnisse

We examine the impact of a policy reform that gave employees in a municipality extended rights to self-declare sickness absence. To identify the effect of bypassing the physician as an absence certifier we contrast the development of absence in the reform municipality with absence in similar municipalities. We use a standard difference-in-difference comparison and the synthetic control method to quantify the effect of the reform. Using these methods we find that the reform reduced sickness absence by more than 20%. It is the incidence of absence spells that declines, not their length. To explain this result, we emphasize that the reform not only removed the physician from the picture, it also put the employer more firmly into it by prescribing a detailed follow up scheme (phone calls, meetings, flowers) for the employer (the first line-leader) and the employee calling in sick. The combination of extended self-certification and employer involvement can be taken as a sign of trust and concern for the employees' well-being or as enhanced monitoring. Both interpretations can explain the drop in absence we observe.

This paper examines the relationship between workers' productivity and preferred bonus scheme. The data are from a company where agents work in teams and receive a bonus that depends on individual and team performance. Standard agency theory predicts that workers with productivity below the team average prefer a team bonus, while high‐productivity agents prefer an individual bonus. Risk aversion may temper the taste for individual pay. This model predicts the observed relationship between productivity and bonus preferences very well. There is, however, one pattern that it cannot explain: many low performers—especially men—prefer individual bonuses.

In this paper we investigate the incentives of unemployed workers to wait for a recall when recall probabilities are endogenously determined by the waiting decisions of others. Because of a positive externality that arises when workers seek new employment, an excessive number of workers choose to wait for a recall, and structural adjustment is slow. We also find that a small reduction in the unemployment benefits, or introducing a small cash bonus for workers that get a new job, may have no e.ect on unemployment in some cases, while eradicating significant levels of unemployment in other cases. Our analysis suggests that the government may face a Samaritan's Dilemma if it can influence the recall probability of workers, and that multiple equilibria may exist in a game involving both workers and an unemployment-averse government. Furthermore, we explore a link to the war of attrition literature, showing that the Bulow and Klemperer (1999) one too many -result may not hold if there is uncertainty concerning when the game ends.

We study a model where two parties, one from the left and one from the right, compete for position. The election is to be held in the near future and the outcome is uncertain. Prior to the election, the members of both parties nominate their prime ministerial candidates. Investors care about the outcome since they may invest in irreversible domestic production capital. We find that there is political convergence in the nomination process. In some circumstances, it is only the median voter of the left-wing party that elects a more moderate candidate. In other instances, the members of both parties nominate more "conservative" candidates, but there is still convergence. We also show that a higher probability of the left winning the election increases the degree of convergence, while a more globalised economy (greater capital mobility) reduces it.