Why do some resource-abundant countries succeed while others do not?
In: Oxford review of economic policy, Band 25, Heft 2, S. 241-256
ISSN: 1460-2121
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In: Oxford review of economic policy, Band 25, Heft 2, S. 241-256
ISSN: 1460-2121
In: Journal of development economics, Band 67, Heft 2, S. 455-470
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: Journal of international trade & economic development: an international and comparative review, Band 6, Heft 3, S. 329-344
ISSN: 1469-9559
In: Structural change and economic dynamics, Band 8, Heft 3, S. 351-370
ISSN: 1873-6017
In: Journal of international trade & economic development: an international and comparative review, Band 3, Heft 1, S. 15-31
ISSN: 1469-9559
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
In: American economic review, Band 99, Heft 2, S. 310-315
ISSN: 1944-7981
SSRN
In: NBER Working Paper No. w12133
SSRN
Working paper
In: Journal of development economics, Band 78, Heft 2, S. 494-515
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: Journal of international trade & economic development: an international and comparative review, Band 13, Heft 3, S. 265-285
ISSN: 1469-9559
In: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Band 108, Heft 4, S. 571-585
SSRN
In: Journal of international trade & economic development: an international and comparative review, Band 29, Heft 6, S. 665-676
ISSN: 1469-9559
We provide a potential explanation, based on the "political agenda effect", for the absence of, and unwillingness to create, centralized power in the hands of a national state. State centralization induces citizens of different backgrounds, interests, regions or ethnicities to coordinate their demands in the direction of more general-interest public goods, and away from parochial transfers. This political agenda effect raises the effectiveness of citizen demands and induces them to increase their investments in conflict capacity. In the absence of state centralization, citizens do not necessarily band together because of another force, the escalation effect, which refers to the fact that elites from different regions will join forces in response to the citizens doing so. Such escalation might hurt the citizen groups that have already solved their collective action problem (though it will benefit others). Anticipating the interplay of the political agenda and escalation effects, under some parameter configurations, political elites strategically opt for a non-centralized state. We show how the model generates non-monotonic comparative statics in response to the increase in the value or effectiveness of public goods (so that centralized states and public good provision may be absent precisely when they are more beneficial for society). We also suggest how the formation of a social democratic party may sometimes induce state centralization (by removing the commitment value of a non-centralized state), and how elites may sometimes prefer partial state centralization. ; publishedVersion ; © 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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