Suchergebnisse

Ongoing reassessments in U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific have coincided with a major growth in Sino-Australian economic relations. The Australian-American alliance could be increasingly tested if U.S. policy planners are unsuccessful in generating more

The policies of Australia's current government have been so close to the United States as to invite comparisons to an Australian 'deputy sheriff' executing the interests and policies of a US global marshal. Advocates of the ANZUS alliance disagree, citing the immense politico-strategic benefits Australia extracts from that relationship and insisting that ANZUS objectives are commensurate with a stable and just world order. Recent developments in international security politics such as the Iraq conflict and the persistence of global terrorism may now challenge that proposition and test the Australian electorate's future support for the American alliance. A greater determination by Australia to cultivate a more balanced approach to alliance politics will underwrite its national security interests more effectively than a sustained and rigid adherence to alliance loyalty under any circumstances.

Orchestrating relations between its American security ally and increasingly crucial Chinese trading partner constitutes perhaps the major foreign policy challenge now confronting Australia. The Howard government insists that it can pursue such diplomacy without having to choose between the US and China in the event of a future great power regional confrontation. Both Washington and Beijing, however, appear intent on pulling Australia into their own orbits of influence. This article contends that neither of them will be content to allow Australia to apply a 'discriminate engagement' policy toward their own regional interests if Sino-American strategic competition intensifies over Taiwan or throughout the Asia-Pacific region. It reviews Chinese and American strategic expectations regarding Australia and their response to that country's relations with the other, and outlines growing policy imperatives that Australia must confront in order to overcome current anomalies in its 'dual strategy' directed toward China and the United States.

Debate over the continued relevance of postwar U.S. alliance systems in Asia is intensifying at a time when American 'global' and 'regional' strategies seem to be converging. The ANZUS alliance is no exception to this trend. Australian and regional security analysts have recently focused on whether Australia faces a 'choice' between sustaining U.S. alliance affinities and commitments in a 'global' context or prioritizing its regional security postures in tandem with its growing economic involvement in Asia. It is argued in this article that the two approaches are complementary rather than divergent and that the current Australian government recognises this geopolitical reality. It concludes that alliances and other 'classic' state-centric mechanisms for pursuing both regional and international security will continue to be applicable to Australia's need for 'getting the balance right' between its future regional and global strategies.

Prospects for a U.S. decline in global power generated by political strife and protracted economic recession at home have affected Washington's regional diplomatic presence and strategic influence in the Asia-Pacific. Ongoing regional power politics and economic imperatives may constrain the ability of the U.S. to quickly recover from the largely self-imposed damage it has inflicted on its future role as a central regional player.

Orchestrating relations between its American security ally and increasingly crucial Chinese trading partner constitutes perhaps the major foreign policy challenge now confronting Australia. The Howard government insists that it can pursue such diplomacy without having to choose between the US and China in the event of a future great power regional confrontation. Both Washington and Beijing, however, appear intent on pulling Australia into their own orbits of influence. This article contends that neither of them will be content to allow Australia to apply a 'discriminate engagement' policy toward their own regional interests if Sino-American strategic competition intensifies over Taiwan or throughout the Asia-Pacific region. It reviews Chinese and American strategic expectations regarding Australia and their response to that country's relations with the other, and outlines growing policy imperatives that Australia must confront in order to overcome current anomalies in its 'dual strategy' directed toward China and the United States.

This chapter is organised into three parts. The first offers a brief survey on how multilateral security has been regarded and approached by the Asia-Pacific region�s large powers, particularly in Southeast Asia, and what part they have played in supporting or constraining its development. The second section evaluates what factors may convince the region�s great powers to become genuine architects for building multilateral security politics. The third section concludes with an offering of some general propositions about what will be needed to transform current great power politics - now largely based on national self-interest - into an effective process for order-building in the region.

Ongoing reassessments in U.S. strategy in the Asia-Pacific have coincided with a major growth in Sino-Australian economic relations. The Australian-American alliance could be increasingly tested if U.S. policy planners are unsuccessful in generating more

The policies of Australia's current government have been so close to the United States as to invite comparisons to an Australian 'deputy sheriff' executing the interests and policies of a US global marshal. Advocates of the ANZUS alliance disagree, citing the immense politico-strategic benefits Australia extracts from that relationship and insisting that ANZUS objectives are commensurate with a stable and just world order. Recent developments in international security politics such as the Iraq conflict and the persistence of global terrorism may now challenge that proposition and test the Australian electorate's future support for the American alliance. A greater determination by Australia to cultivate a more balanced approach to alliance politics will underwrite its national security interests more effectively than a sustained and rigid adherence to alliance loyalty under any circumstances.

Prospects for a U.S. decline in global power generated by political strife and protracted economic recession at home have affected Washington's regional diplomatic presence and strategic influence in the Asia-Pacific. Ongoing regional power politics and economic imperatives may constrain the ability of the U.S. to quickly recover from the largely self-imposed damage it has inflicted on its future role as a central regional player.

Recent changes of government in Australia and Japan, and a pending one in the United States, signifies a historical crossroads in these three allies� security politics in the Asia-Pacific region. In recent years, all three countries have tended to rationalize their strategic collaboration on the need to build innovative and competitive-oriented �strategic geometries� as a means to counter China�s growing power and to meet new types of threats in the region. Yet the Australian Government under John Howard simultaneously pursued a hedging strategy, exploiting its growing economic relationship with China while strengthening its diplomatic and strategic profile with the United States. Despite Tokyo�s own substantial economic relationship with Beijing, recent Japanese leaders were unable to pursue the same type of �dual track� strategy to the same extent as Howard. With Kevin Rudd�s election as the new Australian Prime Minister and Yasuo Fukuda�s ascent to power in Japan, prospects for Australia and Japan to cultivate more independent politico-security ties with Beijing have strengthened. If so, the evolving regional security postures of both these US allies may compel the United States to reassess its own traditional skepticism towards multilateral security groupings in the region.

Debate over the continued relevance of postwar U.S. alliance systems in Asia is intensifying at a time when American 'global' and 'regional' strategies seem to be converging. The ANZUS alliance is no exception to this trend. Australian and regional security analysts have recently focused on whether Australia faces a 'choice' between sustaining U.S. alliance affinities and commitments in a 'global' context or prioritizing its regional security postures in tandem with its growing economic involvement in Asia. It is argued in this article that the two approaches are complementary rather than divergent and that the current Australian government recognises this geopolitical reality. It concludes that alliances and other 'classic' state-centric mechanisms for pursuing both regional and international security will continue to be applicable to Australia's need for 'getting the balance right' between its future regional and global strategies.

Recent changes of government in Australia and Japan, and a pending one in the United States, signifies a historical crossroads in these three allies� security politics in the Asia-Pacific region. In recent years, all three countries have tended to rationalize their strategic collaboration on the need to build innovative and competitive-oriented �strategic geometries� as a means to counter China�s growing power and to meet new types of threats in the region. Yet the Australian Government under John Howard simultaneously pursued a hedging strategy, exploiting its growing economic relationship with China while strengthening its diplomatic and strategic profile with the United States. Despite Tokyo�s own substantial economic relationship with Beijing, recent Japanese leaders were unable to pursue the same type of �dual track� strategy to the same extent as Howard. With Kevin Rudd�s election as the new Australian Prime Minister and Yasuo Fukuda�s ascent to power in Japan, prospects for Australia and Japan to cultivate more independent politico-security ties with Beijing have strengthened. If so, the evolving regional security postures of both these US allies may compel the United States to reassess its own traditional skepticism towards multilateral security groupings in the region.