Suchergebnisse

I akademia skrives det ofte at stater deltar i institusjoner så lenge dette sammenfaller med deres interesser på ethvert tidspunkt. Implikasjonen av dette er at stater som Kina kanskje vil avvise internasjonale institusjoner så fort de føler at institusjonene ikke er nyttige. Jeg vil hevde at Kina lar sine interesser formes av institusjonene ut over hva ytre rammevilkår vil tilsi. For å belyse dette argumentet tar artikkelen for seg en casestudie med utviklingen av Shanghai-samarbeidsorganisasjonen (SCO) og Kinas holdninger i denne prosessen. Spesifikt vil artikkelen trekke linjer fra forhandlingene mellom Kina og Sovjetunionen over grensespørsmål på 1980-tallet frem til grunnleggingen av SCO på 2000-tallet. Ved å sammenligne en rasjonell tilnærming med en historisk vil artikkelen hevde at den historiske er mer relevant for å forstå Kinas holdninger. Artikkelen argumenterer at en historisk tilnærming har potensial som et nyttig verktøy, og at den bør undersøkes mer innen IR-faget.
Abstract in EnglishEfficient tools or historical frameworks? China's attitude to international institutionsIn academia, it is common to assume that states participate in institutions insofar as this serves their interests at any given time. The implication is that states like China may reject international institutions as soon as they no longer consider them useful. The author argues that China lets its interests be shaped by the institutions beyond what structural factors imply. To shed light on this argument, this article conducts a case study of the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and China's attitudes to this process. Specifically, the article will draw connections from negotiations between the China and the Soviet Union over border disputes in the 1980s to the foundation of the SCO in the 2000s. By comparing a rational approach with a historical one, the article argues that the historical approach is more relevant to understand China's attitudes. It further argues that a historical approach has potential as a useful tool and should be examined further in IR.

During the pandemic era, media reports and leaks indicate a growing assertiveness from China towards the EU. Is this a sign of a new normal in China's EU policy of something else entirely? To devise an appropriate response, the EU should contrast this perceived assertiveness with China's long-term interests. In all, assertive behavior undermines Chinese policy goals, which hints that there may be other considerations guiding these Chinese representatives. ; publishedVersion

Abstract
Amid an intensifying rivalry with the United States, China is modernizing and significantly expanding its nuclear forces. These developments fuel concerns that China's traditional nuclear strategy premised on a limited nuclear arsenal for assured retaliation and a no-first-use policy is undergoing a major shift. Using Chinese-language materials, an examination of Chinese debates about China's security environment and the future direction of its nuclear strategy finds that a nuclear-conventional entangled security dilemma is emerging between the United States and China. The shift in the conventional balance of force in the region and the U.S. development of lower-yield nuclear weapons has led to greater fears in China of U.S. limited nuclear use in a conflict. Chinese strategists increasingly believe that U.S. nonnuclear strategic capabilities threaten China's nuclear forces. Although there is limited evidence of a shift in its nuclear strategy, China is changing its strategic posture to ensure its second-strike capability, including by relying on advanced conventional weapons (e.g., counterspace capabilities, cyber weapons, and electronic warfare) that can target U.S. missile defense. The dynamics of an entangled security dilemma may weaken arms race stability, and they underscore why it will be challenging for the United States to engage China in nuclear arms control.