Suchergebnisse

AbstractThe Swiss party system has changed considerably since the 1990s. With the increasing electoral success of the right‐wing populist Swiss People's Party (SVP), the simultaneous defeat of the center‐right and a relatively stable left, it has become more polarized. In what respect have these changes in the electoral arena affected legislative politics in parliament? This article studies the voting behavior of party groups in the Swiss lower house between 1996 and 2013 in six different policy fields. The findings point to a growing level of conflict in the Swiss parliament. Overall agreement among the government parties is reduced, especially at final voting stages of the parliamentary debate. Moreover, electoral politics have become more important for the parties' behavior in parliament: in policy areas that are at the center of their party program, the SP and the SVP are less willing to move away from their original policy stance, with the consequence of increasing isolation in parliamentary votes.

AbstractThis article investigates the benefit of participation in policymaking. Based on data from interviews with various interest groups, private organisations, and representatives of regions that had been involved in recent policymaking processes in Switzerland, this study analyses the relationship between participation and satisfaction with the policy outcome. The study looks at two different aspects of outcome satisfaction: perceived consensus of a decision and preference attainment. The results show that the level of participation is related to both aspects of outcome satisfaction but that the strength of association is dependent on the type of interest group and the level of conflict among the groups participating in the decision‐making process.

AbstractThis Special Issue brings together a large variety of contributions dealing with the influence of issues and issue competition, the structure of attitudes towards immigration and international cooperation and a series of non‐policy factors such as campaign consultants and the rise of female representation in Switzerland. In this introduction we place the contributions in the broader framework of current debates in the international literature and stress the substantial and methodological innovations of the articles. Last, we offer some more general thoughts on almost 30 years of Swiss electoral research taking stock of the historical development.

AbstractThis article investigates prime ministers' communication strategies during the most recent economic crisis in Europe. It argues that when electoral risk is high but governments' policy options are severely limited, prime ministers will use specific communication strategies to mitigate electoral risks. Two such communication strategies are analysed – issue engagement and blame shifting – by applying state‐of‐the‐art quantitative text analysis methods on 5,553 speeches of prime ministers in nine European Union member states. Evidence is found for both strategies. Prime ministers talk about the economy more in response to both high (domestic) unemployment and low (domestic) gross domestic product growth. Furthermore, it is found that the (domestic) unemployment rate is the most consistent predictor of blame shifting: as the domestic unemployment rate goes up, this is followed by an increase in blame shifting towards banks, Greece and the Troika of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Welfare state reform in times of austerity is notoriously difficult because most citizens oppose retrenchment of social benefits. Governments, thus, tend to combine cutbacks with selective benefit expansions, thereby creating trade-offs: to secure new advantages, citizens must accept painful cutbacks. Prior research has been unable to assess the effectiveness of compensating components in restrictive welfare reforms. We provide novel evidence on feasible reform strategies by applying conjoint survey analysis to a highly realistic direct democratic setting of multidimensional welfare state reform. Drawing on an original survey of Swiss citizens' attitudes toward comprehensive pension reform, we empirically demonstrate that built-in trade-offs strongly enhance the prospects of restrictive welfare reforms. Our findings indicate that agency matters: governments and policy makers can and must grant the right compensations to the relevant opposition groups to overcome institutional inertia.

Well-established methods exist for measuring party positions, but reliable means for estimating intra-party preferences remain underdeveloped. While most efforts focus on estimating the ideal points of individual legislators based on inductive scaling of roll call votes, this data suffers from two problems: selection bias due to unrecorded votes and strong party discipline, which tends to make voting a strategic rather than a sincere indication of preferences. By contrast, legislative speeches are relatively unconstrained, as party leaders are less likely to punish MPs for speaking freely as long as they vote with the party line. Yet, the differences between roll call estimations and text scalings remain essentially unexplored, despite the growing application of statistical analysis of textual data to measure policy preferences. Our paper addresses this lacuna by exploiting a rich feature of the Swiss legislature: on most bills, legislators both vote and speak many times. Using this data, we compare text-based scaling of ideal points to vote-based scaling from a crucial piece of energy legislation. Our findings confirm that text scalings reveal larger intra-party differences than roll calls. Using regression models, we further explain the differences between roll call and text scalings by attributing differences to constituency-level preferences for energy policy.

This study investigates the connection between legislative and electoral politics in Switzerland. We postulate that party unity is higher in the election year, and more specifically in votes on issues that are important for the party platform and that are of greater visibility to voters. We analyze the entire voting record of the Swiss parliament (lower house) on legislative acts between 1996 and 2007, which consists of roll call votes as well as unpublished votes. We find a strong effect of elections on voting unity among certain parties, and we also find encouraging support for our hypotheses that this effect is mediated by the importance of the vote.

This study investigates the connection between legislative and electoral politics in Switzerland. The authors postulate that party unity is higher in an election year, and more specifically in votes on issues that are important for the party platform and that are of greater visibility to voters. The authors analyse the entire voting record of the Swiss parliament (lower house) on legislative acts between 1996 and 2007, which consists of roll call votes as well as unpublished votes. The authors find a strong effect of elections on voting unity among certain parties, and also find encouraging support for the hypotheses that this effect is mediated by the visibility of the vote and related issue salience. Adapted from the source document.

This article examines the decision‐making process leading to the new constitutional articles on education in Switzerland. It analyzes how actors from both state levels (Confederation and cantons) could reach consensus in a process that was prone to a "joint‐decision trap". To that end, we hypothesize which factors may be conducive to a "problem‐solving" style of policy‐making in a compulsory negotiation system. Rich empirical material from various sources supports our theoretical arguments: We show that shared beliefs and a common frame of reference, the procedural separation between constitutional and distributional issues, neutral brokers, and informal structures were all beneficial to the success of the reform project.