Suchergebnisse

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Chapter One Strategic Thought in America, 1952-1966 -- Chapter Two The Coming of the First World War: A Reassessment -- Chapter Three A "Wasting Asset": American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954 -- Chapter Four The Nuclearization of NATO and U.S.-West European Relations -- Chapter Five The Berlin Crisis -- Chapter Six The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis -- Chapter Seven Making Sense of the Nuclear Age -- Appendix Key to Abbreviations in Chapter Five -- Index

Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- PREFACE -- ABBREVIATIONS -- CHAPTER ONE. A Spheres of Influence Peace? -- CHAPTER TWO. Toward the Rubicon -- CHAPTER THREE. The Test of Strength -- CHAPTER FOUR. The Making of the NATO System -- CHAPTER FIVE. Eisenhower and Nuclear Sharing -- CHAPTER SIX. An Alliance in Disarray -- CHAPTER SEVEN. The Politics of the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1960 -- CHAPTER EIGHT. Kennedy, NATO, and Berlin -- CHAPTER NINE. A Settlement Takes Shape -- SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY -- INDEX

What makes for war or for a stable international system? Are there general principles that should govern foreign policy? In The Cold War and After, Marc Trachtenberg, a leading historian of international relations, explores how historical work can throw light on these questions. The essays in this book deal with specific problems--with such matters as nuclear strategy and U.S.-European relations. But Trachtenberg's main goal is to show how in practice a certain type of scholarly work can be done. He demonstrates how, in studying international politics, the conceptual and empirical sides of th

What makes for war or for a stable international system? Are there general principles that should govern foreign policy? In The Cold War and After, Marc Trachtenberg, a leading historian of international relations, explores how historical work can throw light on these questions. The essays in this book deal with specific problems--with such matters as nuclear strategy and U.S.-European relations. But Trachtenberg's main goal is to show how in practice a certain type of scholarly work can be done. He demonstrates how, in studying international politics, the conceptual and empirical sides of the analysis can be made to conncect with each other, and how historical, theoretical, and even policy issues can be tied together in an intellectually respectable way.

This is a practical guide to the historical study of international politics. The focus is on the nuts and bolts of historical research--that is, on how to use original sources, analyze and interpret historical works, and actually write a work of history. Two appendixes provide sources sure to be indispensable for anyone doing research in this area. The book does not simply lay down precepts. It presents examples drawn from the author's more than forty years' experience as a working historian. One important chapter, dealing with America's road to war in 1941, shows in unprecedented detail ho

Main description: This is a practical guide to the historical study of international politics. The focus is on the nuts and bolts of historical research--that is, on how to use original sources, analyze and interpret historical works, and actually write a work of history. Two appendixes provide sources sure to be indispensable for anyone doing research in this area. The book does not simply lay down precepts. It presents examples drawn from the author's more than forty years' experience as a working historian. One important chapter, dealing with America's road to war in 1941, shows in unprecedented detail how an interpretation of a major historical issue can be developed. The aim throughout is to throw open the doors of the workshop so that young scholars, both historians and political scientists, can see the sort of thought processes the historian goes through before he or she puts anything on paper. Filled with valuable examples, this is a book anyone serious about conducting historical research will want to have on the bookshelf.

Abstract
The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) played a key role in U.S.-Soviet relations in the early 1970s. This article reassesses some aspects of the SALT process in the light of important evidence that has become available in recent years. The key question is whether U.S. policy in the SALT negotiations was rooted in strategic stability theory—that is, in the idea that both major powers should work out an arrangement that would guarantee the survivability and effectiveness of both sides' strategic nuclear forces, thereby reducing whatever incentive either of them might have to strike first in a crisis. The notion that U.S. policy on SALT was rooted in that theory is essentially a myth—although a myth that had important political consequences. The SALT process of the 1970s, as shaped by decisions made during the administration of Richard M. Nixon, helped pave the way for the hardening of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union in the early 1980s—scarcely the result supporters of nuclear arms control had been hoping for a decade earlier.

The Russian government has claimed that the Western powers promised at the end of the Cold War not to expand NATO, but later reneged on that promise. Most former officials in the West, and many scholars as well, have denied that this was the case; but other scholars, along with a handful of former officials, believe that promises to that effect were, in fact, made in 1990. So who is right? The question still has political importance: how it is answered has bearing on how we should feel about NATO expansion and, indeed, about the United States' post–Cold War policy more generally. So it makes sense to stand back and try to see where the truth lies. An examination of the debate in light of the evidence—especially evidence that the participants themselves have presented—leads to the conclusion that the Russian allegations are by no means baseless, which affects how the U.S.-Russian relationship today is to be understood.

Individual researchers, according to the revised set of guide-lines adopted by the American Political Science Association two years ago, "have an ethical obligation to facilitate the evaluation of their evidence-based knowledge claims" not just by providing access to their data, but also by explaining how they assembled that data and how they drew "analytic conclu-sions" from it.1 The assumption was that research transpar-ency is of fundamental importance for the discipline as a whole, and that by holding the bar higher in this area, the rigor and richness of scholarly work in political science could be sub-stantially improved.