Social norms and conditional cooperative taxpayers
In: European journal of political economy, Band 26, Heft 1, S. 89-103
ISSN: 1873-5703
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In: European journal of political economy, Band 26, Heft 1, S. 89-103
ISSN: 1873-5703
A benchmark result in the political economy of taxation is that majority voting over a linear income tax schedule will result in an inefficiently high tax rate whenever the median voter has a below average income. The present paper examines the role of tax avoidance for this welfare assessment. We find that the inefficiency in the voting equilibrium is the lower, the higher the average level of tax avoidance in the economy, or equivalently, the lower the median voter's amount of avoidance. The result holds for endogenous avoidance and labor choice and, under certain conditions, for an endogenous enforcement policy.
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In: Public choice, Band 140, Heft 1-2, S. 43-58
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Public choice, Band 140, Heft 1, S. 43-58
ISSN: 0048-5829
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In: Choice Architecture in Democracies, S. 321-328
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 28, Heft 3, S. 390-398
In: Journal of economics, Band 102, Heft 3, S. 237-262
ISSN: 1617-7134
We study the optimal observability of the tax base within the standard linear income tax problem, where observability is determined by the government's investment into the accurate measurement of the tax base. We characterize the optimal level of observability and derive a new expression for the optimal progressivity, which in addition to the standard equity efficiency trade-off accounts for the limited accuracy of an income tax system.
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3091
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2549
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