Agenda Crossover in the HouseAgenda Crossover in the Senate; Agenda Crossover and Senate Electoral Success; Agenda Crossover in At-Large States; Conclusion; 6 Rethinking State Delegations in Congress; The Origins of and Changes in State Delegations ; Broadening our Conception of State Delegations; Normative Consequences of Agenda Crossover; Agenda Crossover, Representation, and Bicameralism; Appendix A Interviews; Conducting the Interviews; Interview Structure; Appendix B Wisconsin's Unwritten Rule; Bibliography; Index.
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This article examines the role progressive ambition plays in the U.S. Senate. I analyze the effect ambition has on party loyalty in the upper chamber. The theoretical argument is that senators with ambition for higher office are more loyal to the party than their colleagues who never make a bid for higher office because of their need to appeal to the party base to secure the party's nomination. I posit the following hypothesis to test this theory: A senator who seeks higher office will be more likely to vote with the party on party votes than those senators who never run for the presidency. My findings indicate that ambitious senators are more loyal to the party than their colleagues who never make a bid for higher office. That is, senators who run for higher office recognize the importance of the party when it comes to successfully navigating the primary season. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2009.]
This article examines the role progressive ambition plays in the U.S. Senate. I analyze the effect ambition has on party loyalty in the upper chamber. The theoretical argument is that senators with ambition for higher office are more loyal to the party than their colleagues who never make a bid for higher office because of their need to appeal to the party base to secure the party's nomination. I posit the following hypothesis to test this theory: A senator who seeks higher office will be more likely to vote with the party on party votes than those senators who never run for the presidency. My findings indicate that ambitious senators are more loyal to the party than their colleagues who never make a bid for higher office. That is, senators who run for higher office recognize the importance of the party when it comes to successfully navigating the primary season.
AbstractFrom the 1980s to the mid‐2010s, nearly three‐quarters of members newly elected to the US House of Representatives had previous elected experience; however, only half of the freshmen elected from 2016 to 2020 held prior office. In this article, we investigate emergence‐ and success‐driven explanations for the declining proportion of experienced officeholders entering Congress. In our analyses, we find that the advantages traditionally afforded to experienced candidates are waning. First, we show that inexperienced candidates' emergence patterns have changed; amateurs are increasingly apt to emerge in the same kinds of contests as their experienced counterparts. We then show that experienced candidates have lost their fundraising edge and that—for certain kinds of candidates—the value of elected experience itself has declined. Lastly, we identify other candidate characteristics as strong predictors for success in modern elections. We demonstrate that these electorally advantageous identities overwhelmingly belong to candidates who lack elected experience.
In legislatures such as the U.S. House of Representatives, where the majority party controls the agenda, the frequency of observed partisan disagreement is partially a function of strategic agenda‐setting choices made by that party. Do majority party leaders use their agenda control to privilege bills that accentuate disagreements with the minority party? In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework focused on the costs and benefits associated with floor consideration of partisan legislation. We test hypotheses derived from our theory on a dataset of 15,611 bills considered in House committees during the 104th–114th Congresses (1995–2016). We find that minority party opposition in committee is associated with a decreased likelihood of floor consideration, suggesting that the majority party does not use agenda setting to indiscriminately favor partisan legislation. Our findings focus attention on the costs of partisan agenda setting, and contextualize the partisan disagreement we ultimately observe on the House floor.
In: Political research quarterly: PRQ ; official journal of the Western Political Science Association and other associations, Band 76, Heft 3, S. 1516-1528
How do working class candidates perform in primary elections? Working class candidates rarely emerge, but existing evidence suggests workers perform as well as white-collar candidates once on the ballot. However, this evidence comes from studies of general elections. It is unknown whether these findings extend to other types of elections like primaries, where candidates compete without the political and financial backing of a party. We collect and analyze novel data describing the occupational background of all candidates who competed in U.S. House primaries between 2008 and 2016. The results show that working class candidates received an average vote share 24 percentage points lower than nonworkers and are 31 percentage points less likely to win their primaries. Controlling for other candidate, contest, and district characteristics helps to attenuate the performance gap. We find mixed evidence that fundraising and prior officeholding experience moderates workers' performance, but weak or no evidence that voter bias, party affiliation, or primary type do so. The study suggests that workers struggle to compete in primaries and calls for further research explaining what prevents workers from winning public office.
Do US voters prefer inexperienced candidates? Candidates who have never held elected office before have had greater success in recent presidential and congressional elections. However, it could be that voters prefer the type of anti-establishment rhetoric that such candidates use more than the lack of experience itself. We conduct a 2x2 factorial experiment that manipulates a fictitious congressional candidate's experience and rhetoric toward the political system. Results from a nationally representative Qualtrics sample and two follow-up studies from Mechanical Turk show that respondents evaluate the candidate more positively when he uses anti-establishment rhetoric instead of pro-establishment rhetoric. Though the findings are mixed, we find weak and inconsistent evidence that respondent prefer inexperienced candidates to experienced ones. The results suggest that outsider candidates receive an electoral boost by using anti-establishment messaging, but that candidates' political résumés matter less to potential voters.