Suchergebnisse

The shift from centrally planned economies to market-oriented economic models presented trade unions in Eastern European countries with crucial choices in relation to their roles as industrial relations actors. This paper investigates whether (and why) unions have chosen adversarial and/or co-operative relationships with the employers, based on a strategic choice conceptual framework. It focuses on trade union relations with employers at national, sectoral and company levels in Romania. It is argued that adversarial and co-operative relations between unions and employers developed simultaneously after 1989, but co-operation was the prevalent approach. Evidence suggests that ideological legacies, former institutions and the initial decision to participate in the macroeconomic transformation played a key role in shaping unions' choices towards co-operation with employers. Although this paper confirms the widespread view that labour is rather weak in Eastern Europe, it indicates that unions can be proactive and shape their own future if they have the capacity to mobilise their members and union leaders have the skills and willingness to use both conflict and co-operation in their relationships with employers. The comparison of evidence from Romania with other Eastern European countries reflects on the stage of Romanian transformation and also illustrates a wider possible applicability of the theoretical framework employed for the study.

There are several studies on recent developments in collective bargaining in Eastern Europe, but there is still a debate about the extent to which collective bargaining practices resemble those in continental Western Europe. This paper aims to contribute to this debate, by examining primary data on collective bargaining practices in Romania using an actor-centred institutionalist approach. It focuses on collective bargaining in four large chemical companies. Comparisons are made to other countries in order to highlight the developments in Romanian cases. Unexpectedly, the study's findings point to an increase in state intervention in establishing the terms and conditions of employment after 1989, due to the state's new roles during the transformation process that affected job security. The study suggests a considerable increase in the influence of top managers in determining pay and working conditions, while trade unions retained the considerable influence over social benefits in large companies. The findings show continuance of certain pre-1989 practices, such as a persistence of high state intervention and a limited independence of the trade unions from the management. This paper contributes to a deeper understanding of institutional changes in the context of a shift from a centrally planned economy to a market-based economy.

In their seminal book on the models of eastern European capitalism, Bohle and Greskovits (2012) argue that Romania has a special type of neoliberal society with weak state institutions, a high degree of centralisation and collective bargaining coverage and relatively high mobilisation power on the part of the trade unions. Before the 2008 crisis, Romania had a comprehensive system of industrial relations with widespread collective bargaining at national, sectoral and establishment levels. The legal system supported the development of bipartite and tripartite consultation and negotiation between trade unions, employers and the government (Trif 2010). However, this system was radically altered by the government after the crisis, despite opposition from trade unions and the largest employers' associations (Ciutacu 2012). The legal changes led to the implosion of trade unions' fundamental rights to bargain collectively, to form trade unions and to take industrial action. As a result, cross-sectoral collective agreements ceased to exist and very few multi-employer collective agreements were concluded after the new labour code was adopted in 2011. The crisis was used as a pretext by the centre-right government to reform the industrial relations system, with the support of the 'Troika', comprising the European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB).

In their seminal book on the models of eastern European capitalism, Bohle and Greskovits (2012) argue that Romania has a special type of neo-liberal society with weak state institutions, high centralisation and coverage of collective bargaining and relatively high mobilisation power of trade unions. Before the 2008 crisis, Romania had a comprehensive system of industrial relations with widespread collective bargaining at national, sectoral and establishment levels; the legal system supported the development of bi-partite and tripartite consultation and negotiation between trade unions, employers and the Government (Trif, 2010). However, this system was radically altered by the Government after the crisis, despite opposition from trade unions and the largest employers' associations (Ciutacu, 2012). The legal changes led to the implosion of trade unions' fundamental rights to bargain collectively, to form trade unions and to take industrial action. As a result, cross-sectoral collective agreements ceased to exist and very few multi-employer collective agreements were concluded after the new labour law was adopted in 2011. The crisis was used as a pretext by the centre-right government to reform the industrial relations system, with the support of the Troika of the European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB)

This article examines the impact of the recession on collective bargaining in Romania, focusing on legislative changes and developments in the public health care and the construction sectors. Prior to the recession, Romania had a legal system that supported dialogue between trade unions, employers and the government, resulting in widespread collective bargaining at all levels. In 2011, the government scrapped all collective agreements and changed, without parliamentary debate, the main labour laws, making it impossible to have cross-sectoral collective agreements and far more difficult to negotiate collective agreements at the sectoral, multi-employer and company levels. The recession was thus used by the centre-right government as a pretext to reform the industrial relations system.

This article examines the impact of the recession on collective bargaining in Romania, focusing on legislative changes and developments in the public health care and the construction sectors. Prior to the recession, Romania had a legal system that supported dialogue between trade unions, employers and the government, resulting in widespread collective bargaining at all levels. In 2011, the government scrapped all collective agreements and changed, without parliamentary debate, the main labour laws, making it impossible to have cross-sectoral collective agreements and far more difficult to negotiate collective agreements at the sectoral, multi-employer and company levels. The recession was thus used by the centre-right government as a pretext to reform the industrial relations system.

This article compares collective bargaining practices in Romania after 1989 with those in continental Western Europe. It focuses on the structures, processes and outcomes of collective bargaining in four large chemical companies; comparisons are also made with other Eastern European countries. Unexpectedly, the findings point to an increase in state intervention in establishing terms and conditions of employment after 1989. The development of collective bargaining in Romania appears to follow a nation-specific path, with the continuance of certain pre-1989 features, such as unclear boundaries between trade unions and management.

Whilst most studies on the transformation of industrial relations (IR) in Eastern Europe focus on the common trends, this paper examines variations in IR practices at company level. It uses a revised version of the exchange model to analyse the evidence from nineteen case studies in Romania. As the exchange model argues that capital and labour are involved in a rational exchange, it would be expected that if a negative sum game occurs, the rational choice of the actors would be to move towards a zero or positive sum game. However, evidence indicates that nine companies investigated seem to have a long-term equilibrium with a negative sum game for capital and labour. It is argued that this is able to occur because, in addition to capital and labour, the government and, sometimes, the top management are key actors involved in complex games that sum to zero. The paper suggests that differences in the power relations between these four actors lead to variations in the IR types employed at company level within a country. The main contribution of the paper is twofold: firstly, it cites original evidence for the diversity of IR practices at company level; secondly, it operationalises a revised version of the exchange model that could be used in further research to explain the variations in IR at the company level in Eastern Europe. Overall, it aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of variations in IR at the company level. ; Im Gegensatz zur Mehrzahl der Studien über die Transformation der Arbeitsbeziehungen in Osteuropa, die sich mit allgemeinen Trends beschäftigen, werden in diesem Discussion Paper die Unterschiede in der Praxis der Arbeitsbeziehungen auf Unternehmensebene betrachtet. Als Raster für die Klassifikation von neunzehn rumänischen Unternehmen wird eine überarbeitete Version des Exchange Model entwickelt. Dieses Modell argumentiert, dass die Kapital- und die Arbeitnehmerseite rationale Tauschpartner in einem Aushandlungsspiel sind. Bei einem sich abzeichnenden Negativsummenspiel wäre somit davon auszugehen, dass die rationalen Entscheidungen der Akteure bewirken, dass sich die Konstellation in Richtung auf ein Nullsummenspiel oder ein Positivsummenspiel auflösen wird. In der Praxis jedoch ist bei neun der untersuchten Firmen ein langfristiges Gleichgewicht mit einem Negativsummenspiel für Kapital und Arbeit festzustellen. Dies wird damit begründet, dass als weitere Schlüsselakteure die Regierung und zuweilen auch die Leitung der Unternehmen in komplexe Nullsummenspiele eingebunden sind. Die Autorin geht davon aus, dass es die Unterschiede in den Machtbeziehungen dieser vier Akteure sind, die zu unterschiedlichen ?Typen? von Arbeitsbeziehungen in Unternehmen innerhalb eines Landes führen. Das Discussion Paper trägt auf zweifache Weise zur Diskussion bei: Zum einen weist es eine Vielfalt von unterschiedlichen Formen der Arbeitsbeziehungen auf Unternehmensebene nach; zum anderen bietet die entwickelte überarbeitete Version des Exchange Model einen Ansatzpunkt für die zukünftige Erforschung der Arbeitsbeziehungen in den Unternehmen Osteuropas.

Industrial relations (IR) have been rather extensively investigated in many eastern European countries in the last 15 years, but there is still very limited information about Romania. This article presents an overview of the main IR institutions, concerning both the legal framework as well as their operation in practice, in Romania. It examines the role of the state, employers associations, trade unions and collective bargaining from a historical perspective. In the final part, the changes that have occurred after 1989 in these selected parameters are discussed in the broader eastern European context. The study is based on primary data collected in 2000 and 2001 which aimed to identify what has changed since 1989 regarding the IR actors (i.e. state, employers associations and trade unions) and the relations between them. Seven officials from national institutions were interviewed: a government representative involved in the establishing of the Labour Code; two officials from employers associations; two trade union officials; the secretary of the Economic and Social Council; and the representative in Romania of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). An ILO official responsible for the activities of employers associations throughout central and eastern European countries was also interviewed. In addition, 25 (one-to-one) interviews were conducted in a total of fifteen companies which were studied during the research. Thirteen interviewees were managers or employers (three employers, three top managers, three human resource managers and four line managers), while twelve were employees (four shop stewards, seven employees and an unemployed person). Hence, data triangulation is used to ensure the reliability of the empirical evidence

Subsequent to the collapse of the communist regime in 1989, Romania has undergone political and economic changes which have determined radical changes in industrial relations (IR). Nevertheless, ten years after the fall of the communist regime, the old and new elements still exist side by side, although labour legislation and an institutional framework similar to those in developed countries has been adopted. It appears that communist legacies, such as the specific economic and political context which exists in Romania, the lack of experience of all the actors involved in IR and also the current international context have all had an important impact on the emerging IR system in Romania. Nevertheless, there has been very little empirical research into how the IR system works in practice and how terms and conditions of employment are established and implemented at company level. The aim of this paper is, firstly, to present a new perspective on Crouch's exchange theory of IR (1993) and, secondly, to use this approach to analyse empirical findings regarding the changes which have occurred in IR at the company level in Romania since 1989. The empirical findings will be presented for each of the six categories investigated, analysing the development of IR since 1989. After that, a synthesis of the findings will be presented in an attempt to answer the research questions indicated in the next section.

Globalization, which refers to the process of increased integration between countries, has had significant effects on employee relations (Lansbury, 2018). Economic liberalism, a key feature of globalization, has fostered individualism and competition since the 1980s, hindering collective mechanisms aimed at limiting 'a race to the bottom' in labour standards in many countries (Doellgast et al., 2018). Despite being one of the causes of the 2008 financial crisis, the neo-liberal political discourse has become, over the past decade, a one-size fits-all recipe for structural reforms with the blessing of international bodies, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the European Union (EU). In the EU, most governments have sought to reduce unemployment and/or contain labour costs primarily by weakening the role of statutory and/or collective bargaining regulations in setting labour standards (Koukiadaki et al., 2016; Marginson, 2015). Thus, economic liberalism during the crisis has reduced the role of institutional mechanisms (e.g. collective bargaining and labour laws) and increased the role of market forces in the regulation of employee relations.

Purpose
– The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate concerning the compatibility of variable pay schemes (VPS) and trade unions, by investigating the effects of the managerial function (to increase management control over employees) and market function (to attract and retain suitably qualified employees) of VPS for trade unions.


Design/methodology/approach
– A critical case study approach was used to verify how the two varying functions of VPS affect the trade union of a large multi-establishment Irish financial institution. Data are based on a total of 60 in-depth interviews with key informants (trade unions, managers and non-managerial employees) at various levels in the organisational hierarchy and a representative survey of employees.


Findings
– While the findings confirmed the a priori expectation that the managerial function of VPS is more likely to damage unions than the market function, this study revealed that the interplay between the two functions varied over time and across outlets, and was primarily contingent on the disposition of line management towards the use of VPS and the market context.


Research limitations/implications
– The consequences of the shift to a managerial function of VPS following the 2008 economic crisis could only be assessed in a preliminary manner due to the time frame of the study.


Practical implications
– Trade unions, managers and employees need to consider the potential gaps between the intended purposes of VPS and their actual implementation to assess whether they are of potential benefit.


Originality/value
– This paper contributes to the existing literature in two main ways. First, it adds that the market function of VPS serves managers' aims not only in aiding them attract, retain and motivate suitably qualified employees as indicated by Flanders (1970), but also in helping them gain great control over labour costs, which in turn, has mixed effects for trade unions. Second, in addition to the pragmatic reasons identified by previous studies, the findings show that a key determinant in unions' acceptance of VPS involves earlier experiences of unions fighting unsuccessfully against the adoption of VPS.